‘Defection-Proofed’ Militaries and Authoritarian Regime Survival by Soliman, Hisham Soliman Abdelghaffar
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Political Science Dissertations Department of Political Science
8-8-2017
‘Defection-Proofed’ Militaries and Authoritarian
Regime Survival
Hisham Soliman Abdelghaffar Soliman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Soliman, Hisham Soliman Abdelghaffar, "‘Defection-Proofed’ Militaries and Authoritarian Regime Survival." Dissertation, Georgia
State University, 2017.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_diss/44
‘DEFECTION-PROOFED’ MILITARIES AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIME SURVIVAL 
 
 
by 
 
 
HISHAM SOLIMAN 
 
 
Under the Direction of Michael Herb, PhD 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The question of loyalty in autocratic regimes has drawn a sustained scholarly interest, 
especially with the resilience of many of these regimes over most of world history and over the 
past few decades in particular. Autocratic leaders need to secure the support of their militaries to 
survive in office and to minimize the risk of a coup. Among the commonly employed 
mechanisms in this regard is the extension of extra-budgetary financial rewards, including 
‘Military-Owned Businesses (MOBs).’ Nevertheless, under the increasingly significant threat of 
an uprising from below, military defection remains the key for the success of the revolution. The 
question then becomes: under what conditions would a military defect from an autocratic ruling 
alliance? Although many answers have been proposed to solve this puzzle, an increasing number 
of cases are proving them insufficient. Alternatively, this project presents one novel answer to 
this question, which is: militaries are “defection-proofed” in the face of mass uprisings when 
they develop financial dependency on the regime. By contrast, when the management of the 
extra-budgetary resource for the military, i.e. MOBs, becomes the exclusive domain of the 
military and independent from the regime, the military is expected to defect. This proposed 
hypothesis represents a contribution to the democratization literature, both its installation, i.e. 
underlining a ‘pro-democracy’ capacity of the military in removing the dictator, as well as its 
consolidation, i.e. handling the legacy of the autocratic regime after the transition. This 
hypothesis is tested comparatively against the cases of mass protests in China (1989), Indonesia 
(1998), Thailand (2006), Iran (2009), and Egypt (2011). This comparative analysis represents 
another contribution of this study, bringing together a diverse array of cases unexpected to have 
much in common. Analysis draws on a mix of both primary resources collected from the field 
along with secondary materials. The comparisons are made considering the type of civil-military 
relations in each case, the size and type of financial rewards controlled by the military, and their 
effect, if any, on its decision to repress or defect based on the interaction between the military 
and the dictator. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
This project engages the question of why it did not take long for militaries that have 
shown few signs of protest in their relationship with a durable autocrat, as in Suharto’s 
Indonesia and Mubarak’s Egypt, to defect when the regime was faced with mass protests. It also 
answers to the question of what would have happened had the People’s Liberation Army of 
China or the Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran grown more financially independent from the 
regime and defected during the political crises of 1989 and 2009 respectively. Put differently, 
the issue at hand in what follows is what is the effect of the financial independence of the 
military on its political behavior during political crises in authoritarian regimes? 
While a growing body of literature has engaged the question of military defection, very 
few studies have tackled the issue of financial independence of the military. Numerous studies 
investigated the political economy of authoritarian breakdown especially in relationship to the 
military’s patronage payments by the dictator. As this body of research remains inconclusive 
about the amount of financial rewards that may trigger defection, this project moves beyond the 
question of ‘how much’ to the questions of ‘what’ and ‘how’ in treating regime patronage for 
the military. The project’s focus on the rewards received by the institution engages the question 
of ‘what’ through identifying the extra-budgetary resources for the military. The example of 
these resources employed below is military-owned businesses (MOBs). The project also engages 
the question of ‘how’ by differentiating between two different modes of military control over 
these resources: regime-dependent and regime-independent. 
The argument proposed here is that the chances for military defection from an 
authoritarian regime faced with mass protests are much higher when it controls its own extra-
budgetary resources, i.e. MOBs, independent from the regime. The rationale for this argument is 
that when militaries secure their financial independence from the regime, they become less 
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motivated to defend it given that their independent financial resources can seal the institution off 
pressures during the crisis and provide it with resource for action during and after the transition. 
Given that much has been done on the techniques for coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes, 
this argument establishes the case for the need to consider the risk of defection by autocratic 
leaders. As much as they need to minimize the risk of a military uprising, i.e. coup-proofing, 
they need also to consider ways to minimize the risk of a military defection during a popular 
uprising, i.e. defection-proofing. One proposed technique here is to keep the military financially 
dependent on the regime.  
Therefore, delving into the question of financial autonomy of the military in 
authoritarian regimes, this project aims to initiate a discussion on the different types of financial 
resources, other than the budgetary ones, and how they are controlled by the military and/or the 
regime. This discussion aims to shed more light on how the military would react during 
moments of political turmoil so as to include financial autonomy to the factors currently 
highlighted in the literature, such as organizational structure, political or financial grievance, 
ideological or ethnic affinity, and international reactions to mention only a few.  
To make a case for the impact of extra-budgetary resources on the decision of the 
military to defect, this project will investigate five case studies where the military institution 
controlled sizable MOBs at the time of mass protests that were aimed at changing the non-
democratic regime. Two of the five cases, China in 1989 and Iran in 2009, followed the regime-
dependent, and eventually repression, causal mechanism; while the remaining three cases 
represent the regime-independent, and eventually defection, version of the hypothesis. While 
these cases have been investigated much in the literature, their previous treatment excluded a 
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systematic examination of the impact of the degree of financial autonomy on the military’s 
decision during the crisis.  
In what follows the manuscript will be divided into six chapters and a conclusion. The 
first chapter provides a general, theoretical overview of the proposed MOBs’ causal mechanism. 
It begins with a discussion of the politics of authoritarian durability, highlighting the role of the 
military in particular. The political impact of the economic role and resources of the military is 
underlined, especially the economic involvement of the military in civilian (i.e. non-military) 
economic activities. Such an unconventional role serves as the explanatory variable for the 
decision of the military to defend or to abandon the authoritarian leader and consequently the 
survival or breakdown of the regime. Militaries that own and run MOBs as an institution and 
independent from the regime will have stronger motivations for defection. The chapter ends with 
a sketch of the research plan, case selection, and data sources. 
The remaining five chapters present the case studies and proceed chronologically 
staring with the cases of repression followed by the cases of defection. The first case study is the 
Chinese military’s repression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Despite the fact that it has 
been almost three decades since the outbreak of the protests, they remain significant as the most 
serious challenge to the communist regime in China since its establishment. It remains also the 
case where a communist military repressed the people, rather than stood by them, during this 
turmoil period for the then-communist bloc. The chapter investigates the impact of the party’s 
decision to allow the military to establish and run MOBs to make up for the cuts in defense 
spending applied starting the late 1970s on the behavior of the military during the crisis. With 
the party maintaining control over the management of both the military and its institutionally-
owned MOBs, despite initial signs of growing financial autonomy by the military, it was 
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possible to keep the military in line and to defend the party’s survival in power against the 
protests. This case of large scale internal repression came as a precedent for the military, which 
was trying to stay depoliticized after the negative impacts the Cultural Revolution had on its 
professionalism in the early 1970s. With a mixed record of achievement, PLA’s MOBs were 
eventually divested in the late 1990s by the party.  
The third chapter presents the second case of repression, which is the Green movement 
protests following the Iranian presidential elections in 2009. These protests came to challenge 
the legitimacy of the religious authority in the regime of the Islamic regime. The supporters of 
the losing reformist candidate, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, were repressed by the Revolutionary 
Guards after days of occupying the streets. The guard corps, a parallel and a powerful military 
organization founded in the early 1980s to defend the Islamic revolution, is indoctrinated by the 
religious leadership of the regime. In addition, the corps’ economic involvement in the civilian 
domain has been increasingly growing with the blessing of the religious authorities. The defense 
of the regime, to which the interests of the IRGC are fundamentally tied, was therefore not 
unexpected. This powerful status of the organization, with its growing social, economic and 
political capacities in the regime, can enable the guards to eventually take over the core of the 
regime, and not only to serve in its defense. 
Moving to the cases of defection, chapter four discusses the case of Indonesia. With the 
military enjoying a constitutional duty to participate in national development and with a tradition 
of financial self-sufficiency, the creation of MOBs by the Indonesian military reinforced its 
financial autonomy. Upon assuming power in mid-1960s, Gen. Muhammad Suharto, who 
himself had some experience developing and running MOBs, expanded on the MOBs’ practice 
as he tried to use the military as a development agent while diverting the defense burden off the 
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national budget. Nevertheless, the democracy protests of 1998 were detrimental to the survival 
of Suharto regime as well as to the loyalty of the military to him. Although there were reports of 
conflicting positions to defection within the institution, especially by the presidential guards, the 
military stood together as an institution and defected in return for the president’s safe exit from 
politics. The subsequent move towards democracy installation, despite slow, came to divest 
most of the MOBs as well as to pave the way for improved accountability and transparency by 
the military towards civilian authorities. 
Chapter five presents for the more ‘ambivalent’ case of defection in Thailand, a country 
that has been democratizing since the end of military rule in 1992. As protesters took to the 
streets by the turn of 2006 against the increasingly authoritarian policies of Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra, political life was paralyzed. With a record of ruling over the country, 
control over independent MOBs and clear loyalty bonds to the Palace, which was critical of 
Thaksin’s policies, the military sided with the protesters and took over the government until new 
elections were held. The instability of the political scene and the desire to block the return of 
Thaksin’s party to power fueled two further military takeovers in 2008 and in 2014. The Thai 
military, with its political legacy and economic potential, continues to manipulate the political 
sphere, bringing more challenges for the democratization process. 
The last and most recent case of defection considered here is the case of Egypt. By 
contrast to the perceived apolitical attitude of the military under Mubarak, its defection in the 
face of the January 2011 protests came to uncover a different reality. The argument for defection 
presented here is that the military being highly institutionalized and one that owns and runs a 
conglomerate of MOBs, independent from the regime, was able to opt for defection from 
Mubarak’s ruling alliance. With sufficient resources for survival, the military turned into a 
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powerful political player that aims at defending its institutional interests. This left the military in 
a dominant political position, adding another challenge for the successful installation of a 
civilian democracy. 
The concluding section at the end of the document provides a comparative 
summary of the main findings of the study and a number of cross-case analytical patterns. 
It also identifies two areas for further research.  
 
2 CHAPTER 1: ABANDONING THE PRINCE?! MOBS AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIME 
SURVIVAL 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Maintaining the loyalty of the military, the repressive tool of last resort, has usually 
been a key challenge in autocracies. One common strategy employed to accomplish this goal is 
the provision of private goods or rents to the military, both as an institution as well as to some of 
its individual officers. The purpose is, at least, twofold: to secure the loyalty of the institution in 
the face of challenges from the opposition and from the masses, and to coup-proof the military, 
itself a source of threat to the dictator. While these private goods have arguably worked quite 
well towards the second goal, the record has been mixed regarding the first, especially 
considering the recent experiences of the Arab Spring. It is, therefore, the concern of this project 
to discuss the conditions under which the military defects from an autocratic ruling coalition in 
the face of mass protests. 
One specific type of private goods and of extra-budgetary resources of concern here is 
Military-Owned Businesses (MOBs). As will be detailed below, the management of economic 
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assets by the military, while securing an additional financial resource for the institution, may put 
their protection during political upheavals in conflict with that of the incumbent’s presence in 
office. In addition, these resources can also enable the institution to provide for itself and for its 
own members during these times of unrest. Therefore, the research question becomes: what is the 
effect of the presence of MOBs on the political behavior of the military institution during 
political crises in autocratic regimes? 
In trying to answer this question, this project will survey cases in which the military has 
been involved in managing civilian economic activities, i.e. non-defense industries, so as to 
determine its influence on the behavior of the military during times of challenge to the power of 
the incumbent, namely mass protests. The aim is to explore the effect of the way in which these 
resources are managed on the fate of the autocratic regime. The hypothesized argument is that in 
the face of mass uprisings, institutionalized militaries are more “defection-proofed” using MOBs 
when they establish financial dependency on the incumbent. 
The question at hand can be claimed to be of relevance to the study of democratization 
where the role of the military was not sufficiently explored in the existing theories of transition 
from autocratic regimes, except for Latin America (Serra, 2010: 25). The purpose is, therefore, to 
highlight the role the military plays during these transitions while taking the discussion a step 
further by exploring one type of extra-budgetary resource and how it influences the political 
position of the military. The presence or absence of MOBs and the style of their management can 
be indicative, together with other factors identified in the literature, of the outcome of the 
transition process. This study’s relevance can also be established empirically against the recent 
cases of the Arab Spring, where the process of political change initiated by mass protests in a 
‘durably-authoritarian’ region uncovered the indispensable position the military enjoys in 
8 
bringing about or blocking change. That is why tracing the ‘defection’ behavior of the military, 
both inside the region and beyond, can help fill in some of the gaps in the democratization 
literature.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Politically-Interventionist Militaries 
In non-democracies, political neutrality, a prerequisite for the military profession, can 
rarely be found. Rather, loyalty to an autocratic leader or some political ideology is present, 
undermining military professionalism and competence, and even risking the organizational 
integrity of the institution (Huntington, 1985: 71, 74). This politicization of the military results in 
the inability of the officers to effectively undertake their apolitical capacities vis-à-vis civilian 
politicians, which are: representative of the military institution against the politicians, advisory 
to inform decision making by the politicians, and executive of the decisions taken by the civilian 
politicians (Ibid: 72). These three roles for the military are largely expected in politicos-
dominated regimes where the chances for military intervention in politics are low, both in terms 
of frequency and duration. This is in comparison to the fully or partially military-dominated 
regimes where the military oversteps its domain as a result of the incapacitation of or 
dissatisfaction with the political regime or for the aim of creating an environment that supports 
the “corporate integrity of the organization” (Nordlinger, 1977: 49; Linz and Stepan, 1996: 67; 
Perlmutter, 1982: 310-2). This implies that the military aims at having a say or a degree of 
influence in the political and policy processes, especially those concerning political and social 
stability as well as security issues (Kuehn, 2016: 10).  
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While it remains one of the bureaucratic pillars of the state, the military institution 
occupies a unique position due to its “relationship to violence” given its assignment of protecting 
the state and society from external aggression and domestic disorder. This makes political 
interventions by the military in autocracies as the norm, rather than the exception, and, therefore, 
should be framed in terms of their degree and not their presence or absence (Welch, 1987: 1, 4).1 
The political, social, and economic roles the military plays in domestic politics can also be 
motivated by a perception to a privilege (or prerogatives according to Stepan (1988)) that it 
should control and maintain (Kramer, 1998: 133). Koonings and Kruijt (2002) classify the 
literature on what they call “political armies” into three successive generations in the post-second 
World War era. The first generation focuses on the study of the role of the military in nation-
building in the newly-independent countries. This role was legitimized in light of the 
modernization process that developing societies were undergoing and by the need for the 
organizational resources of the military, at a time where many state institutions were still lagging 
behind. The motivation for this involvement becomes less, however, the more modernized both 
the military and the society become (16-17). In reaction to this first generation came the second, 
neo-Marxist in nature, which define the political involvement of the military using a ruling-class 
perspective, implying either that the ruling group in the society uses the military to defend and to 
maintain its privileged position or that the military moves against a ruling elite it sees blocking 
the road for the proper development of the society. The importance of the political role of the 
military can be defined as a function of the extent to which it is involved in domestic coercion 
for the continuous domination of the ruling elite, a task that becomes more visible at times when 
civilian authority is contested (Koonings and Kruijt, 2002: 17; Alagappa, 2001a: 4). 
                                                 
1 Feaver (1999) argues that there is always some degree of political influence by the military, even in democracies, and it varies 
along a continuum and is hard to capture. 
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Still a more recent approach is one that goes beyond the military as the main actor of 
intervention and defines the relationship in dyadic terms according to the type of civil-military 
alliance in place. While acknowledging the significance of the problems of modernization and 
class relations, the study of these alliances is claimed more helpful in explaining the timing, 
motivation, and nature of specific political interventions by the military in civilian politics 
(Koonings and Kruijt: 18; Alagappa, 2001a: 3-4). The political role of the military can, therefore, 
be judged in light of both its scope (military’s role in domestic coercion, institutional autonomy, 
socio-economic role, and civilian control) and the jurisdiction for such a scope (Alagappa, 
2001b: 31-39). Finer (1962) classified political regimes according to the degree of military 
provenance, or the contribution of the military to the installation of the regime, making rule of 
the junta only one form, albeit the most common in practice. Another form is one where a duality 
in the governing structure exists, where both the army and the civilian government coexist, 
whereas the military’s position vis-à-vis the civilian government can be one of displacement, 
blackmailing or supplement (164-6). In-between these types, there are varieties of civilian 
control/military partnerships or military control/civilian partnerships (Dekmejian, 1982: 29). 
That is why civil-military relations in non-democracies can be best described as sliding over a 
continuum, ranging from military direct or indirect rule with a degree of civilian influence 
(which Nordlinger (1977) describes as praetorianism), to professionalism (i.e. civilian rule with 
military influence) (Dekmejian, 1982: 28).  
 
2.2.2 Autocratic Rents and Regime Survival 
According to DeMesquita and Smith (2011: 1, 8, 11), typical components of a polity 
are: the nominal selectorate (interchangeables); those with a de jure say in the selection of 
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leaders; the real selectorate (influentials): those with a de facto say in choosing the leader; and 
the winning coalition (essentials): the core group of powerful allies. The difference in their 
relative combinations is what makes different regime types. In non-democracies, leaders aim at 
maintaining the loyalty of the tiny but indispensable group of essentials. Dictators need the elite, 
and especially the military, as they cannot rule by themselves but they try not to over-power 
them so that they do not eventually turn against them. This is because the elite will always have a 
motivation to overtake the leader’s position or to cooperate with the opposition towards his 
replacement (Lee, 2015: 28; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 81-2; Magaloni and Wallace, 2008: 26). 
Weak dictators tend to ‘selectively’ co-opt the most powerful in the polity, while 
stronger ones would diversify their base of support and get cheaper agents in the coalition, i.e. 
random cooptation, all with the aim of accumulating more power for the cost of rewards 
extended to the co-opted. While these rewards should remain higher than offers from 
challengers, they would go down the more loyal these agents become and/or as the offers they 
receive from the opposition get smaller (Sekeris, 2011: 238-241). That is why dictators work to 
establish a “loyalty norm,” i.e. affinity between the incumbent and the members of the winning 
coalition that grows with “learning” about their secure position in the regime and whose strength 
depends on the “relative value” of rewards and “probability of inclusion [and] exclusion” from 
the coalition. This affinity gets stronger in “small-winning coalitions and large-selectorate 
systems” (DeMesquita et al, 2003: 286), a situation that eventually develops as winning 
coalitions accumulate more power and control – known as the “narrowing effect” (Geddes, 2006: 
156-7). The dictator aims at keeping the number of the essentials small and that of the 
interchangeables large to control who gets what and to be always aware of the risk of getting 
replaced “if their reliability [becomes] in doubt” (DeMesquita and Smith, 2011: 18, 62).  
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In other words, dictators need to assure their allies that they will stay in the alliance in 
return for their continued loyalty, a challenge that is hard to live with in authoritarian settings 
given the dearth of information about actors’ intentions and the absence of an external arbiter 
(DeMesquita and Smith, 2011: 29). Perceiving that a threat would also come from within their 
main clique; dictators raise the stakes for the members of the ruling coalition for defecting from 
the coalition through threats of punishment, and not only through incentivizing staying onboard, 
increasing the members’ commitment towards the power-sharing arrangement in the autocratic 
regime (Magaloni, 2008: 718-719, 722). This is especially true as challengers’ offers to the 
members of the winning coalition suffers from credibility problem, making defection less 
attractive as an option, especially if the size of the winning coalition is small relative to that of 
the selectorate (DeMesquita et al, 2003: 59-60; 66). In turn, members of the coalition cannot 
make promises not to turn against their fellow coalition members, who together decide on the 
distribution of resources in the society (Acemoglu et al, 2008: 987-8). Coups or defections, 
therefore, can take place to advance the interests of some of the members of the winning 
coalition (DeMesquita et al, 2003: 400). This risk of the essentials “deserting,” or defecting 
materializes when they expect better rewards from another competitor, or when the incumbent is 
no longer capable of or needed for providing them with the rewards they expect (Mesquita and 
Smith, 2011: 14, 199; Feaver, 1999: 226). This especially holds for stronger members, or agents, 
who are aware of their significant position in the ruling alliance that makes them also of 
particular interest for the opposition (Sekeris, 2011: 254). That is why Svolik (2012) 
distinguishes between established and contested autocrats with the autocratic leader in the latter 
much less capable of accumulating power to counterbalance the threat of rebellion from his allies 
and/or the public. In addition, non-personalist dictators are often more successful at nurturing the 
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loyalty of their militaries, while defection and splits happen under personalist ones as they are 
more dichotomous for the military officers in terms of competition for patronage and other 
benefits (Lee, 2015: 4-5, 43). 
Furthermore, defection can take place as a result of the accountability of the dictator by 
his coalition (Marcum and Brown, 2016: 256). Boix and Svolik (2013) define the threat of 
rebellion that it holds the dictator, who has an incentive to break his promises, accountable to the 
promise of power sharing. As the dictator accumulates more power relative to the ruling 
coalition, the latter may retaliate by removing him from power. Yet, such a move may fail, 
especially in light of the imperfect information about the political game. That is why the move 
against ‘established’ autocrats would take place in the midst of some extra-ordinary event, such 
as mass protests (Svolik, 2009: 478). This is especially the case for the dictators with smaller 
coalitions, given the elite’s large share in private goods and because of its continuous monitoring 
of the dictator due to the fear of replacement by other members of the selectorate. That is why 
Amegashie (2015) differentiates between the loyalty and the no-coup constraints on the military; 
whereas the first works towards suppressing the dictator’s competitors and the masses, the 
second is about the cost of abandoning the dictator, which can be mitigated during civil wars and 
civil protests. The coalition in the latter case, and not the dictator, acts as the principal and it is 
the policy competency of the dictator for the coalition that keeps him in office (Marcum and 
Brown, 2016: 257, 259-260). This mechanism becomes more evident the more the dictator relies 
on security institutions, making the regime his regime more vulnerable to them, considering that 
their loyalty to the dictator does not take away their self-interests (Ibid: 261).  
As far as the power of the military is concerned, it plays a dual role in the political game 
in autocracies: it is required to stay apolitical while being ready to intervene in defense of the 
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status quo against challengers. Having a strong military works best towards the second goal by 
deterring and repressing the opposition and the masses, yet it comes at a high cost to maintain its 
loyalty, risking even an overly powerful military turning into a challenger that commands 
enough power to unseat the dictator. The more competent and powerful the military becomes the 
harder and the costlier it gets to keep it under control (Mcmahon and Slantchev, 2015: 298-9). 
Even in the cases where the dictator does not have an interest in building a strong military for 
repression but the external threat environment necessitates the buildup of one, a capable and a 
powerful military will eventually be threatening on the domestic front (Talmadge, 2016: 112). 
Egorov and Sonin (2011) argue that military competence in autocratic regimes works politically 
against the officers as they represent a challenge to the dictator, who would aim at undermining 
their positions, if not the organization as a whole. In such cases, dictators may try to 
institutionalize the regime to help balance the risks posed by the powerful military, such as the 
development of institutionalized and efficient bureaucracies and/or civilian political platforms 
(Talmadge, 2016: 122-3). This is because institutions create more incentives for the elite in 
regime continuity, as opposed to centralizing and personalizing power in which case chances for 
defection increase (Lee, 2015: 37-8).  
Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) highlight two mechanisms for the maintenance of ruling 
alliances in autocracies: policy concessions and distribution of rents. Depending on the 
institutional development of the regime, availability of rents, and the severity of the threat of 
rebellion by the opposition, autocratic leaders will generally tend to rely more on the latter (i.e. 
rents) as the stakes get higher. DeMesquita et al (2003) and Lee (2015: 3) argue that the leader’s 
ability to stay in power is a function of her ability to extract revenues that finance spending to 
buy-off the loyalty of supporters, including the military, to keep the coalition intact. Buying-off 
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the military, however costly it becomes, is important not only to keep it loyal but to make it 
harder for competitors to buy off. Wintrobe (1998) also underscores the need for the dictator to 
overpay security forces in return for loyalty, while creating competing security institutions to 
guard against and to counter-balance each other. The amount of these gifts may expand over time 
until they become “demanded payments” (90), which remain constrained, however, by the 
amount of resources available. In addition, Conrad et al (2013) argue that as the dictator ages in 
office, especially in regimes lacking the loyalty norm, security spending increases as he gets 
more concerned about maintaining power. Underpaying the military may lead to disobeying 
orders to repress protests and may even end up in alliance with them against the dictator 
(Acemoglu et al., 2010: 2). Nevertheless, the private goods extended to the military carry in 
themselves the potential to be used against the regime. While coup-risk goes down for militaries 
that receive large financial incentives from the regime, this does not take away its ability to act in 
a concerted manner against the regime, i.e. to defect (Powell, 2012: 1036). This is because, as an 
institution, the military has an interest in maximizing both the amount of private goods received 
while preserving its own autonomy.  
While dictators try to nurture the loyalty of the elites and repressive institutions, they try 
also to create a sense of loyalty among the citizens realizing that repression cannot be applied all 
the time. It might also be the fact that nurturing a sense of loyalty can be less costly than the 
creation and maintenance of a repressive institution(s), in terms of both the direct and the indirect 
cost of risking a coup. Thus, it can be said that both the military and the citizens move along a 
continuum of loyalty and disobedience regarding their relationship with the dictator. Defection 
by the citizens, i.e. protest, may trigger a defection by the military to follow (Magaloni and 
Wallace, 2008: 2-3). 
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This foregoing survey highlights the fact that securing the loyalty of the military is no 
guarantee that it is ‘defection-proofed,’ especially in light of domestic political contestation and 
economic downturns. Defection is more likely during times of crises, especially when the 
incumbent is no longer able to pay his officers. For example, the pressures to economically 
liberalize autocracies in economic crisis situations usually come at the expense of payments and 
other forms of patronage extended to members of the ruling coalition. That is why there is a 
strong motivation for the regime to try to safeguard the military and to maintain its support by 
allowing it to undertake commercial activities to make up for the cuts in its budgetary allocations 
(Mora and Wiktorowicz, 2003: 88-89).  
 
2.2.3 Military-Owned Businesses as an Extra-Budgetary Resource  
Militaries are typically expected to act in defense of the nation against external 
aggression and in some cases to maintain internal control during times of unrest and/or crises as 
well as to be used for repression in non-democracies. There are, however, some atypical roles 
that include an economic one, especially the one that falls outside the scope of strategic military 
industries. While theories on military-owned businesses remain underdeveloped (Singh, 2001: 
8), they fall largely under the title of ‘military entrepreneurship,’ a term that denotes “the 
innovative creation of resources and new means of production by commissioned military officers 
acting in an institutional capacity as formal owners, managers, and stakeholders of enterprises 
that generate financial resources or goods directly benefiting the military” (Mani, 2011: 29).  
In this project, the type of businesses of interest is military civilian-oriented industries 
undertaken by active duty officers. This type generally includes non-defense military production 
that develops as a result of the insufficiency of the military budgetary allocations in many of the 
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developing countries and because of the use of the military institution towards infrastructure 
projects during times of peace (Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003: 1, 10). The engagement of the 
military in such business activities results in an additional source of revenue for the institution 
(Ibid: 2, 13-15). Autocratic regimes varied in their degree of control over this resource ranging 
from sponsoring its development and growth to controlling access to markets and business 
opportunities. While the military is entitled to the provision of defense as a public good, its 
involvement in civilian businesses results, however, in the creation of a private good that it 
works to maintain (Ibid: 11). This turns the military, in a sense, into an economic actor, 
concerned with maintaining a favorable business environment, making it more dependent on the 
market and quite less on the regime and/or state budget (Mani, 2010: 2). 
It is usually difficult to track the businesses owned or run by militaries due to the 
secretive nature of the military institution and the weakness of civilian oversight in developing 
countries in general. This is also because the economic role of the military was thought for long 
to be primarily into military-related industries (Hunter, 2000: 105). However, the little 
information available on MOBs reveal that they vary across countries in terms of their existence 
and type by the level of economic and political participation by the military in civilian affairs, 
structure of the armed forces, the capacity of the state, and changes in the security environment 
of given countries (Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003: 4; Mani, 2007: 595).  
Latin America stands out as an example of institutionalized MOBs with its legacy of the 
extended periods of military rule and political influence. The Argentinean military used to be 
heavily involved in business operations but divested most of them following the end of the 
military regime in 1989 (Mani, 2010: 1; Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003: 5). This is as opposed 
to the still-thriving military businesses in many Central American countries including Honduras, 
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Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador that are managed through military banks and pension 
funds with the aim of securing a decent post-service life for the officers (Brommelhorster and 
Paes, 2003: 5). MOBs in these four Central American countries are considered an extension of 
the influential role of the military in domestic politics and because of the weakness of political 
elites. It is projected that the size of these businesses will decline the increased consolidation of 
democracy (Castro and Zamora, 2003: 36-37). 
In neighboring Cuba, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and with a stagnant 
economy, the military, under the ‘business improvement system,’ was allowed to undertake 
civilian economic activities that ranged from managing medical services’ provision to the 
production and export of tobacco products. The target was both to lead a process of quasi-
liberalization of the Cuban economy as a role model institution while at the same time 
maintaining the loyalty of the military in the face of the cutbacks in both its size and budget in 
the early 1990s (Mora and Wiktorowicz, 2003: 99-101, 109). This, however, resulted in 
increased corruption within the institution and more leverage for the military over the regime 
(Ibid: 102). A similar experience exists in Vietnam with the major difference that the military is 
expanding its civilian business projects with no sign of unease from the Vietnamese communist 
party (Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003: 6). These military businesses grew from agricultural 
investments into developmental and other civilian activities that put military investments on 
equal legal status with those of state-owned enterprises and even the creation of economic-
defense zones. This has coupled with the decline in the military confrontations of the country 
with its neighbors and the political divisions within the ruling party, allowing the army a more 
independent say on how to define and to undertake its mission (Thayer, 2003: 75, 92). 
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This is while in Pakistan, the deep political involvement of the military has allowed for 
and was also motivated by the quest to develop and to protect its civilian businesses, owned 
mostly through military pension funds while a few are officially mandated as state corporations. 
Ironic as it may seem, while claimed to be economically productive, these businesses have 
depended on contributions from the defense budget to survive, which raises questions about the 
utility of these businesses for the military (Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003: 7). In Turkey, the 
investment arm of the military is a pension fund, known as OYAK, which depends on mandatory 
contributions from its members and invests the proceeds in different business activities. Though 
these businesses are not officially run by the military, there are concerns about unfair 
competition especially given the employment benefits officers enjoy in the enterprises OYAK 
owns and runs (Cook, 2007: 21, 111). 
Criticisms of MOBs come from concerns of unfair competition due to: tax exemptions, 
lower operational costs as a result of the use of conscripts and public resources, and government 
favoritism (Brenes and Casas, 1998: 159). In addition, the accumulation of off-budgetary 
allocations most often leads to eroding civilian control and the spread of corruption, negatively 
influencing military preparedness and capabilities (Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003: 16). Lastly, 
engagement in business activities makes military budget more vulnerable to economic shocks 
which can be very devastating at times (Scobell, 2000: 18).  
It remains that most of the literature on MOBs focuses on corruption and the effect of 
their presence on the military institution rather than on their political impact. Alternatively, the 
discussion in what follows aims at engaging this special type of resources and assessing its 
impact on the political role of the military in non-democracies, particularly the issues of loyalty 
and regime survival. 
20 
2.2.4 Military Defection and Regime Change 
Svolik (2013) summarizes the relationship between the autocratic leader and the 
military during times of crises as either one of three types: the military completely loyal to the 
dictator for fear of penalties; not fully loyal but will stand by the regime, especially when 
organized along ethnic lines; or the military defects when its interests may become at risk while 
not necessarily accounting for their future losses under a more democratic regime, as defection, 
the author argues, will undermine the position of the military in any future political configuration 
anyways. The chances for military defection remain high until it reaches the point where it has 
accumulated so many resources that it will not risk going against the status quo and the dictator.  
Military defection is located somewhere in the middle between total subordination 
(loyalty) and total insubordination (rebellion or coup). It is a function of the degree of military 
autonomy, i.e. the degree of independence in the political behavior of the military (Pion-Berlin, 
1995: 158). This independence ranges from defensive, i.e. protecting the immediate interests of 
the institution and its individual officers, observing its legally assigned roles and doctrine, and 
maintaining the organization integrity of the corps (Pion-Berlin et al, 2014: 231-232) – and 
therefore the military “stay[s] quartered”; to offensive, i.e. expanding the zone of its prerogatives 
and inducing a coup at the extreme (Pion-Berlin, 1995: 159). In Feaver’s (1999) analysis of 
military coups, defection may be a sign of both military strength and weakness, with the latter 
reflecting its inability to achieve its interests though normal channels.  
McLauchlin (2010) and Nepstad (2013) define autocratic regime collapse as a function 
of military defection and alignment with rebellions against the incumbent, making defection the 
most significant factor in autocratic breakdown (Lee, 2015: 3). The chances for military 
defection are believed to be highest during mass protests against the installed regime and with 
the lack of a clear constitutional exit for the political crisis faced (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 
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2010: 397). In fact, mass demonstrations are increasingly recognized as a significant factor in 
bringing down dictators and have set the pretext for political interventions by the military since 
the Second World War (Lee, 2015: 12). Put differently, military defection is a key factor in the 
success of protest campaigns and is the main reason behind a dictator’s departure from office 
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011: 46, 48, 56; Barany, 2016; 2013; Egorov and Sonin, 2011: 904). 
This comes in line with the logic that for military’s political interventions to happen, they require 
not only a “motive,” interest, and/or grievance as a push factor, but also an “opportunity” or a 
pull factor. In this case, the opportunity that comes during times of “social unrest” provides a 
needed cover for intervention against an increasingly perceived illegitimate civilian government 
(Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 63; Belkin and Schofer, 2003: 597). Even in the case when there is no 
immediate threat from the elite, the opening up/opportunity by the threat from below may 
instigate the elite, particularly the military, to defect, especially in personalist regimes (Lee, 
2015: 47; Nepstad, 2013: 156; Casper and Tyson, 2014: 548-9, 563). Even in the cases where the 
military would like to stand by the regime, repression will come at higher costs for the institution 
(Kricheli and Livne, 2009: 5; Lee, 2015: 2). While “accommodations signal weakness” on the 
dictator’s side, enforcing repression depends on the move of the military, who in this case is 
better positioned to decide what steps to be taken (Ginkel and Smith, 1999: 304).  
In line with the pacted or strategic transitions approach (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986), looking into the mechanisms of autocratic regime collapse should focus on the 
calculations of risks and gains by the members of the autocratic elite. Lehrke (2012: 147), using 
the term military arbitration, describes defection as the situation where “the military is drawn 
into politics against its will to arbitrate between “dual sovereigns”” during popular uprisings, 
leading to either a repression of the masses by the military or a removal of the autocrat from 
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power. This role of the military on this occasion is a function of its resources, organizational 
characteristics as well as its relationship with the regime. Barany (2011, 2016) and Bellin (2012) 
argue that military defection to mass protests can be understood in light of the way in which the 
regime structured and manipulated the military establishment in the first place. Six indicators are 
especially important which are: the internal cohesion of the military, its recruitment method, the 
regime’s treatment of the military, the military’s perception of the legitimacy of the regime, how 
big, representative, and fundamental are the protests, and lastly the chances of success for 
military intervention to back either side (Ibid: 40). Depending on the internal cohesion of the 
military institution as a whole and the satisfaction of individual officers with material incentives 
provided as well as their calculations of the chances of regime survival and its ability to punish 
defectors, a decision on defection is made (Egorov and Sonin, 2011: 903). The decision to 
defect, especially in militaries not ethnically engineered, becomes less costly when the decision 
is believed to be shared by other members of the elite as well (McLauchlin, 2010: 333). In 
addition, Pion-Berlin et al (2014) trace the roots of military disobedience to orders to repress 
mass protests and eventually defection to three reasons: rational calculation of gains and losses 
including dissatisfaction with incumbent’s policies and material grievances, ideational attitude 
resulting in rejection of internal political involvement, and structural concerns so as to maintain 
the internal integrity of the military.  
Other factors that may come into play while taking the decision of repressive 
intervention by the military are that the price of both a failed intervention, such as death or 
imprisonment after the dictator is gone, and of a successful intervention, such as negative 
impacts on the organizational integrity of the military institution. While Svolik (2012: 132) sees 
that coup-proofing is effective when applied before militaries turn into powerful agents only, Lee 
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(2009), Macara (2013) and Dahl (2014) argue that coup-proofing strategies, while minimizing 
the risk of a coup, increase the chances for military defection and disobedience in the face of 
mass protests. The chances for defection are highest where the military is fragmented (as a result 
of the dictator’s divide and rule policy), not ethnically engineered, and where the regime is more 
personalist. Defection, Dahl concludes, irrespective of the conditions under which it takes place, 
usually sets the military in a weaker position. Lee (2009), by contrast, argues that the recurrence 
of defections under successive regimes establishes the military as a major holder of political 
power in the system. This echoes the ‘military centrality theory,’ which implies that militaries 
with sufficient resources and higher levels of professionalism and organization are more 
politically engaged, and once an interventionist military, it is likely to stay so - the “coup trap” 
(Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 35). 
It can therefore be said that military defection does not automatically imply its support 
for the cause of the protesters or the end of the autocratic regime (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: xv). It 
rather establishes the military as a political player with economic, among other, interests it wants 
to protect. The presence of such an interventionist military may have a negative impact on the 
installation and consolidation of any type of successive regime. The remedy may even initially 
lie in the provision of more financial rewards as wider range of prerogatives for the military to 
minimize the threat of further intervention in civilian politics (Tusalem, 2014: 483). 
 
2.3 Proposed Theoretical Argument: Independent Financial Resources (MOBs) as a 
Defection Mechanism 
Taken together, the literature, however limited it is on military defection (McLauchlin, 
2010: 334), offers a long list of explanations for whether and why the military may defect in an 
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autocracy. For example, it is less likely for ethnically-engineered or ideologically-indoctrinated 
militaries to defect from a regime they consider legitimate. Also, fragmented militaries are more 
expected to defect especially when faced with mass protests that are costly to quell. Militaries 
with fewer material incentives or private goods may defect out of grievance. The literature 
remains short, however, of providing plausible explanations for why would a military decline to 
defend a dictator while receiving sizable private goods under him. This project aims at adding to 
this growing literature by considering the dynamic through which these private goods or 
resources extended to the military are managed. The resource employed to establish this case is 
military-owned businesses. This resource is claimed in what follows as a “contributing 
condition” or factor in the military’s calculation on defection (Mahoney, 2015: 203).  
While the literature suggests that militaries that are both institutionalized and that are 
receiving sizable rewards from the regime are expected to repress the protests and to stand by the 
regime (as was the case in China (1989) and Iran (2009) for example), reality may suggest 
otherwise, as became clear in the cases of Indonesia (1998) and Egypt (2011). This project, 
henceforth, suggests that the difference between these two groups of cases can be accounted for 
by factoring in the style of managing the extra-budgetary resources of the military. If these 
resources are managed by the military independent from other regime institutions, their 
protection will more likely come in conflict with the protection of the regime itself. They will 
also provide the institution with a resource for action beyond the life of the regime. Therefore, 
the independent management, i.e. the governing boards and operations of MOBs are exclusively 
controlled by active-duty officers, of the resources by the military institution contributes to the 
decision to defect as there is no financial dependency of the military on the regime. Conversely, 
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when the military is financially dependent on the regime for its management of these extra-
budgetary resources, the military will be more inclined to defend the incumbent.  
While the proposed MOBs theory applies to institutionalized militaries, they may 
represent the minority among militaries in non-democracies. This is because many dictators 
would aim at undermining the institutional autonomy of their militaries in their effort to 
minimize the coup-risk. Therefore, the study of the larger issue of financial autonomy of the 
military may require some further exploration of the types of rewards extended by the dictators 
to their military and/or officers so as to arrive at comparable patterns across cases. This way, the 
exploration of the subtypes of military organization and their financial autonomy can be taken as 
‘building blocks’ that would eventually contribute to a more overarching theory of the political 
behavior of the military (George and Bennett, 2005: 78). 
The benefit of this exploration of the MOBs causal mechanism is to include a previously 
overlooked causal factor influencing the calculations of the military on whether to defect from 
the dictator or to defend him and repress the protests. For example, this project challenges the 
idea that institutions will be more tempted to preserve the status quo than be the broker of change 
as both the Indonesian and Egyptian militaries did in 1998 and in 2011 respectively. This comes 
also as the project answers to the question of why these two militaries defected from two regimes 
under which they financially prospered (off the budget). Stated differently, imagine the reaction 
of the Indonesian or Egyptian militaries had their sizable MOBs been dependent on the regime or 
conversely how would the PLA in China respond to the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 had it enjoyed 
a higher degree of independence and control over its own budget and MOBs.  
Therefore, this project investigates more closely the economic and financial aspects in 
the calculation of the military’s decision to defect from or to defend the authoritarian leader. A 
26 
key point here is that not only does the presence and size of MOBs matter for the institution and 
for the fate of authoritarian regimes, but also does the way in which the military manages them. 
This in departure from the literature that largely considers the decision to defect or defend as a 
function of how much the dictator offers his officers, without necessarily differentiating among 
these rewards. This project focuses on one particular type of rewards, i.e. MOBs, and is 
concerned with the degree of control the regime/the military has over it. This way this project 
argues that not all authoritarian payments or gifts should be treated the same. With its focus on 
MOBs, this project also establishes a link between two largely disconnected bodies of literature 
on both MOBs and authoritarian regime breakdown/survival. In addition, this project aims to 
contribute to the growing literature on the indispensability of military defection and intra-elite 
splits during democratic transitions for the success of revolutions. Therefore, there is a need to 
move the discussion beyond ‘coup-proofing’ to make a case for the need to discuss ‘defection-
proofing’. This is because, while coup-proofing may prove effective in minimizing the risk of a 
military uprising against the dictator, it offers no guarantee to keep the military under the 
dictator’s control during an uprising from the masses. This project engages this ‘beyond-coup’ 
risk by focusing on the political economy of loyalty in authoritarian regime. It argues that the 
military will stand by the regime in the face of threats from below in the case it establishes 
financial dependency on the incumbent. Therefore, militaries are ‘defection-proofed’ when they 
lose their financial independence vis-à-vis the dictator. Expanding the debate to include the 
discussion of defection risk can help provide better assessment and expectations of the behavior 
of the military during political crises in non-democracies.  
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2.3.1 Institutionalized Militaries 
Despite all what may differentiate military officers, one thing they generally share is a 
‘corporate’ interest in the survival of the institution itself. This interest may be implanted during 
“socialization” or due to rational calculations and generally demands political stability. 
Institutionalization, corporateness, or professionalism can be translated into maintaining the 
organization with “hierarchy, discipline, and cohesiveness,” independence from “civilian 
interventions,” and securing “sufficient budgets to acquire weapons, trainings, and recruits” 
(Geddes, 2003: 54; Geddes et al, 2014: 148-9). “Professionalized” militaries are also rule-bound 
(Geddes, 2006: 158) making them more “predictable and meritocratic” (Bellin, 2005: 28). 
Although these interests provide a motivation for intervention in politics in cases where the 
civilian government is seen inefficient or going against the interests of the institution (Geddes, 
2003: 55), they can also lead to defection when the protection of the regime can come at the 
price of protecting the institution and its resources and/or interests.  
While it is difficult to clearly come across pure types of the different analytical 
categories used in what follows, their definition can be guiding for analysis. In this project, a 
military is institutionalized when it acts as a bureaucratic organization that has a clear corporate 
identity, that is merit-based with regard to appointments and promotions, and that observes the 
chain of command. By extension, MOBs are institutionally-owned when they are managed by 
the military as an institution, i.e. controlled through the military’s headquarters or through the 
ministry of defense either directly or indirectly through some affiliated foundations. They are 
managed by active-duty officers and their proceeds are channeled directly to the military. 
MOBs are regime-dependent when the regime is involved in the management of these 
MOBs, e.g. through assigning non-military regime agents on the boards of the MOBs. This type 
is usually found in cases where the decision-making in the military involves civilian regime 
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elements. By contrast, MOBs are regime-independent when the regime is not involved in the 
management of the businesses and they fall completely within the military’s exclusive domain 
of control. This type can be found in the cases where the military enjoys a high degree of 
autonomy vis-à-vis the civilian leadership. The presence of civilians on board of these MOBs 
takes place upon the approval of the military rather than as a result of regime direction. 
Institutionalized and regime-dependent MOBs tie the power of the purse to regime survival in 
power by contrast to institutionalized and regime-independent MOBs which, along with other 
factors identified in the literature, are left with much more to protect and to survive on beyond 
the regime. The military in the latter case, therefore, has a little motivation to stand by the 
regime while also being able to act in an independent manner during the crisis.  
Defection by the military means its disobedience to orders to shoot protesters, or the 
military’s declaration of neutrality and distancing itself from the incumbent during the crisis. By 
contrast, repression means the military’s intervention during the crisis to the defense of the 
dictator and against the protesters 
The proposed theory, displayed in the chart below, works as follows: the military in a 
non-democracy, and more generally in a bureaucratic sense, is interested in protecting its 
organizational integrity and chain of command, preserving its reputation as the savior of the 
nation, securing the safety of its individual officers from charges, and protecting its material 
interests as well as other prerogatives. In the cases where the military is more institutionalized, 
the interest becomes much higher in maintaining its organizational integrity and defending its 
prerogatives. The extension of MOBs can be taken as the result of the limited capacity of the 
regime (Mani, 2007: 594-5), or largely as part of a balancing act to keep the military in check. In 
such cases, ownership of these economic assets is expected to be more both institutionalized 
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(owned by the institution and managed by its top leadership) and independent from the dictator 
(who extends it for once while granting the military a free hand in running its activities). This 
partial giving up on the power of the purse may also signal that the dictator’s de-politicization of 
the military as well as its detachment from domestic repression. With mass protests threatening 
the dictator, chances for military defection are highest in this case. This can also be because 
institutionalization, while enhancing the corporate nature of the military, has at its core an 
entitlement to a national mission that goes beyond national defense to the protection of the state 
and its citizens, especially considering that large scale repression of mass protests is counter-
productive in most cases (Bellin, 2005: 28-9). With the institutionalized military resourceful, 
especially in the presence of MOBs, and autonomous from civilian control, it may eventually 
find defection the least risky strategy to pursue. 
 
Figure 1: Presentation of military reactions to threats to authoritarian leaders 
accounting for MOBs 
 
By contrast, repression is more expected in cases where the regime maintains full 
control over the military, including its financial resources and the management of its MOBs. In 
such cases, dictators tend to centralize command authority in their hands (Talmadge, 2016: 118-
9). The presence of MOBs becomes dependent on the consent of the dictator and ultimately his 
stay in office, with the military institution representing only one part of a larger network of 
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patronage, subordinate to the authority of the leader. In such a case, the military’s standing by 
the regime conforms to the literature in defending the status quo rather than acting as an agent of 
change. 
The study of loyalty, defection or insubordination, while ultimately tested during 
popular uprisings, can also be seen as a dynamic process that works in the opposite directions of 
both loyalty and accountability. The accountability of the military plays out towards its twin 
principals, the dictator and the people. This underlines some level of strategic interaction or 
interdependence between the military and the dictator and which is a typical pathway of political 
transitions (Marks, 1992: 398). Such intra-elite splits are especially expected when faced with a 
threat, with each member of the alliance concerned with not only maximizing its interests given 
its capabilities, but also minimizing its punishment, considering the goals and capabilities of the 
other side(s). The military would weigh in its punishment by the dictator if he survives or his 
lack of legitimacy following the protest against protecting its interests if it abandons him. The 
military, especially professional and large-sized ones, realizes that the dictator cannot survive the 
challenge without its backing. The military may come out as a soft-liner in the game when it 
decides not to repress, while the dictator as a hardliner when he presses for punishing the 
protesters and is concerned about his own fate (Scharpf, 1997: 12, 21; Kuehn, 2016: 11-2). The 
more the military accumulates resources and power, the more protective it gets. In opposition to 
Huntington’s the professional soldier, “corporate autonomy and submission to civilian control 
may be inversely related to one another” (Pion-Berlin, 1992: 85). That is why institutionalized 
militaries may not resist moves of political liberalization in autocracies and may even tolerate 
regime change by opting for defection (Campbell, 2009: 31, 34). 
 
31 
2.4 Methodology 
Analysis of this hypothesized relationship will be done using comparative case study. 
This methodological choice can be justified on theoretical grounds since this project is concerned 
with tracing how the causal factor of interest (management of MOBs as a proxy for financial 
autonomy) can be linked to the expected outcome (defection) in the autocratic regimes that 
experienced mass protests. This choice comes not only because case studies “are the major 
source of evidence” in comparative politics (Geddes, 2003: 172) but also because the in-depth 
knowledge of the cases can bolster our understanding of and even predicting the specific courses 
of action in which such critical situations eventually unfold (Barany, 2016: 5). According to 
Croissant et al (2016), cross-case studies are also particularly helpful in bringing more focus to 
the still-largely active political role of the military against the misleading suppression of such a 
role in large-N studies that focus on incidents of coups and military governments. 
The universe of cases for this study will be drawn from the pool of post-WWII countries 
that both experienced mass protests demanding the ouster of a dictator and had a professional 
military endowed with institutionally-owned MOBs as an independent variable2. Geddes (1990, 
2003) argues that there are multiple ways to select cases and that each influences the results one 
comes up with. Given the concern of this project with the political impact of MOBs, it departs 
from the case selection techniques in the literature on MOBs which surveys all the cases where 
MOBs are known to exist since this project concerns itself instead with the impact of these 
holdings on the military as an institution and with the civilian control over the military. As 
investigation covers the different outcomes of defection and repression, case selection comes as 
representative as possible of the causal process (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 295-296).  
                                                 
2 Personalized gifts are excluded because they are difficult to trace, against the limits of time and funding for the current project, 
and in addition they switch the level of analysis from institutional to individual calculations, but they are considered for a further 
research as will be highlighted in the conclusion. 
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According to Thelen and Mahoney (2015: 13), it is significant in cross-case 
comparisons to clearly specify the scope conditions where the proposed causal dynamic is 
considered valid. In line with this, the starting point for this project is located in transitional 
moments or critical threats for authoritarian regimes, operationalized here as mass protests. The 
cases of mass protests in the post-WWII period were compiled using two sources. The first is the 
“Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0” dataset (Chenoweth and 
Lewis, 2013) which surveys the incidents of mass protests in the world since 1946 through 2006, 
classifying them by regime type, campaign target and size, and the defection behavior of the 
repressive institutions of the regime, among other factors3. In addition, the project supplements 
the first dataset using the world protests report (Ortiz et al, 2013) which lists the occurrences of 
mass protests by type of grievance, size of protests, and reaction of the government. Military 
governments were excluded from the list since it is hard to decide on the scope of MOBs against 
the military’s control over the state. The remaining cases were individually surveyed against the 
MOBs literature for which is reported to have MOBs. The five case studies that fit the criteria 
and are the focus in what follows are China (1989), Indonesia (1998), Thailand (2006)4, Iran 
(2009), and Egypt (2011) as shown in the following table. With such a small number of cases, 
the use of the comparative method becomes more recommended on empirical grounds since 
cross-case comparisons help maintain a clear focus on the hypothesized casual explanation given 
that diversity in both the context of each case as well as in the weight of the other relevant causal 
factors in each (Rueschemeyer, 2003: 320; Della Porta, 2008: 202).  
 
                                                 
3 The goal of the protest was set to leadership change and the campaign size was set to the (100k protesters or more). 
4 While Thailand has been coded ‘free’ continuously since 1999, its Freedom House coding was moved to ‘partly free’ in 2006 as 
a result of the increasingly polarizing policies of the ousted Prime Minster, Thaksin Shinawatra. Its coding remained in the same 
category through 2014 (except for the year 2008 as a result of military takeover) and was downgraded to ‘not-free’ starting 2015 
(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/thailand). This made the case to be relevant to the purposes of this project 
as a country that has shown clear signs of authoritarianism during its democratic transition. 
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Table 1: MOBs Matrix 
Management Style of Institutionalized MOBs 
Regime-Independent Regime-Dependent 
Defection 
(Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Egypt) 
Repression 
(China and Iran) 
 
Although this may seem too limited a number of cases as compared to those where the 
military is (or was) in charge of sizable MOBs (as in many developing countries), confining the 
scope of analysis to these five countries, which represent the ‘population’ for the causal dynamic 
of concern, can be justified on multiple grounds. First, the study does not aim at analyzing 
MOBs presence per se but rather to explore their influence on the political behavior of the 
military during mass protest. Therefore, it will be difficult to diagnose and separate the influence 
of MOBs on the political behavior of the military in regimes where the military is the 
government for example5 or when the threat is a militarized insurgency rather than a mass 
protest. The puzzle of concern lies rather with autonomous militaries that can outlive the dictator 
drawing on their own extra-budgetary resources. Second, these five cases come to represent 
different regime types and dynamics as well as outcomes of the protests which can contribute 
towards establishing the theoretical validity of the proposed hypothesis. This way, analyzing 
these five cases, being a subset of the larger pool of MOBs’ countries, can become instrumental 
in understanding how the other cases would fare should they undergo similar conditions.  
                                                 
5 Geddes et al (2014: 148), for example, make the case that military regimes are the shortest in their life spans because they are 
the most vulnerable to coups and also because they usually incline to make their way back to the barracks instead of repressing 
protests. 
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Third, given the growing body of literature on military repression of mass protests, and 
that much has been done on these five cases already, there is little need to compare these cases 
with non-MOBs cases since the analysis expands on the existing discussion to a new area that 
was excluded from analysis before, i.e. including MOBs to the causal list. While this small 
number of cases may also limit the generalizability of the theory, as typical of the inherent 
tension between scope and generalizability of causal claims (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012: 214), it 
may help lay the foundation for an expanded analytical space that engages the wider issue of 
extra-budgetary resources of the military by far and large and the degree of their financial 
autonomy as a result. Therefore, the hypothesized causal explanation will be presented in 
relationship to how it departs from or conforms to the other explanations established in the 
literature, such as financial and political grievances against the incumbent, protecting the 
integrity of the institution, cost of the application of violence, ideational and ethnic links to the 
incumbent and the role of the military in internal repression, as relevant to each case. Stated 
differently, this project undertakes a parsimonious approach to the study of the casual factors of 
military defection while acknowledging the ‘equifinality’ of the phenomenon (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 85). 
Analysis of each case will begin with tracing the causal mechanism (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 206-207) underlying the military’s reaction to the threat posed by mass protests to 
the incumbent, focusing on the political structure of the regime, the type of civil-military 
relations in place, the type and ownership style of MOBs, and the nature of the protests 
campaign. The changes in the type and ownership of MOBs after the protests will be the last step 
in analysis and should provide evidence on whether they contributed, or not, to the move by the 
military. While not aiming at establishing MOBs as an alternative causal mechanism, they are 
35 
argued to function in addition to, rather than instead of, the other causal factors identified in the 
literature.  
It is needless to mention also that data availability is a big concern while undertaking 
such a type of projects. Primary data collection was feasible in the case of Egypt given the 
researcher’s knowledge of the language and was even needed given the few systematic studies 
conducted on the subject. Secondary literature was employed in the analysis of the other four 
cases. 
 
3 CHAPTER 2: CHINA’S ‘INTERTWINED’ MODEL: THE ‘PEOPLE’S’ ARMY IN 
DEFENSE OF THE ‘PARTY’ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Militaries in communist regimes are generally expected to undertake civilian economic 
roles out of pragmatism, ideological role modeling, and/or fiscal necessities (Scobell, 2000: 6-7). 
Such an involvement, however, may bring about negative effects on the civilian, or party, control 
over the military, leaving it more vulnerable in the face of threats, particularly mass protests 
(Ibid: 4). The dual controls of the party over the military, the power to appoint and the power of 
the purse, may get much weakened, especially the second, as making profits can become a 
priority for the military, eventually increasing the chances for disobedience to orders from the 
political establishment and/or the top leadership of the military (Ibid: 10-11). A relevant case in 
this regard is the Chinese military (People’s Liberation Army-PLA), which used to run a large 
business empire up until the late 1990s. These MOBs developed starting the late 1970s for the 
aim of self-sufficiency and to relieve some of the defense burden from the national budget with 
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the onset of the economic reform program, which came also at a time when a pressing need was 
felt to modernize the PLA. This economic activity negatively affected the readiness of the 
military and eventually made the PLA less ‘politically reliable’ in the eyes of the leadership of 
the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Cheung, 2003: 52). That is why, especially 
following the 1989 crisis, the CCP aimed to restructure this empire and divested it from PLA’s 
control into a few holding State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Brommelhorster and Paes, 2003: 6; 
Lee, 2006: 439). Though criticized for being slow, the CCP’s extended process to de-
commercialize the PLA has been maintained even under the pressures of the 1997 financial crisis 
(Cheung, 2001: 46).  
This chapter aims at highlighting the impact of the presence of PLA’s MOBs, as an 
extra-budgetary resource, on the PLA’s relationship to the CCP, especially during the Tiananmen 
Square crisis in 1989. The argument is that with the PLA institutionally and financially 
subordinate to the CCP, it acted along the party’s orders and repressed the protests. Although 
MOBs gave the PLA some financial autonomy at various points, paralleling also a weakness in 
political indoctrination by the CCP, the party reacted quickly and re-centralized its institutional 
oversight and re-activated its ideological penetration of the PLA. This left the PLA, as an 
institution, dependent on the CCP for their ‘intertwined’ survival.  
 
 
Figure 2: MOBs in PLA’s Repression of Tiananmen Square Protests 
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As will be shown below, the PLA as an institution enjoys a high degree of corporate 
identity despite its penetration by party membership and channels of ideological control. While 
the relationship has largely been marked by the supremacy of the CCP, there were incidents of 
the PLA taking the lead in the relationship as well. PLA’s MOBs were largely owned by the 
institution, despite some businesses that were owned by some of the local units. The centrally 
owned MOBs were the most profitable as they were the ones able to achieve economies of scale 
and provided up to two thirds of the military budget by 1990. Despite owned and run by the 
military, the presence of the party in different forms throughout the military’s chain of command 
granted it a role in the management and supervision over MOBs. In addition, PLA’s loyalty was 
not only to the CCP as an institution, but was directed also towards its revolutionary leader and 
the ‘godfather’ of its MOBs, Deng Xiaoping. Nevertheless, as the expansion and growth of 
MOBs resulted in some financial empowerment for the PLA vis-à-vis the CCP, some restrictions 
by the latter were placed on the economic behavior and performance of MOBs to keep the PLA 
firmly under control. The protests in 1989 came as these restrictions were at their initial and 
relatively loose stages of implementation (which, if where not present, it can be argued, might 
have led to cases of defection, at least on small-scale). The restrictions were eventually tightened 
and firmly applied through the mid-1990s until the complete divestment of PLA’s MOBs was 
announced in 1997. Since the PLA had no independent control over its finances and with a dual 
identity, i.e. the ‘communist’ soldier, it was forced to intervene and to repress the enemies of the 
regime. 
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3.2 Evolution of Party-Army Relationship in Communist China  
The influence of the military in Chinese politics comes not only from its possession of the 
gun but also from its loyalty to the political elite and acting as one of its executive tools 
(Mulvenon, 2001: 317). Such loyalty was maintained as the military was “penetrated from top to 
bottom by a political work system,” making the PLA claimed to be “the party in uniform” 
(Scobell, 2003: 58). This system came as an extension of the tradition of the “revolutionary 
soldier,” one that is entitled to undertake political tasks alongside carrying the gun. This tradition 
developed as a result of the assimilation of the political and military leadership in the early fight 
for state domination through the 1940s. This assimilation was later transformed as ‘the political’ 
and ‘the military’ became more institutionalized and professionalized following the 
establishment of the republic in 1949, yet both stayed highly interconnected at the top levels. 
This has allowed particularly for personal influence of the revolutionary leaders over the 
military, in addition to party’s control over military budget and appointments (Mulvenon, 2001: 
318-322). This “dualistic” relationship reflected a power structure with two arms and at the top 
of which is a dominant leader. These two arms ranged in their interaction from cooperation to 
occasional contention, with the latter manifesting itself as an intra-party conflict given the 
intertwined nature of their membership. This is because army-party relations have generally 
abided by supremacy of the CCP. 
The differentiation between the CCP and the PLA has fluctuated over time. At the turn of 
the communist era, the PLA acted as an executive tool for the party: helping with the 
administration of the countryside and maintaining control over remote and rural areas in the 
wake of the civil war. This differentiation, however, came to a historical low towards the end of 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1967) when the military stepped in and dominated the central 
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structures of the CCP and took over the administration of the provincial and lower levels of state 
bureaucracy during the “power seizure campaign” (Zhu, 1998: 9). This came as the revolutionary 
leader Mao Zedong (1949-1976) identified the CCP then as a liability rather than as an asset and 
used the PLA as a role model institution even for the party itself. Nevertheless, these fusions 
were temporary, never happened at the national level, and took place only during moments of 
‘political crises in the party.’ Moreover, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA retreated 
to the barracks without hesitation, despite the fact that it declined once to abandon its power and 
authority to Mao’s sponsored revolutionary guard militias in 1967, a move he later approved. 
Therefore, this direct political involvement of the PLA came only to maintain the party and the 
state moving along the path envisioned by the revolutionary leader, to whom loyalty was 
“automatic, unlimited, and unconditional” (Joffe, 2006: 9-11; 13). The PLA also acted as a 
political arbiter when it gave its support to the modernizing leader, Deng Xiaoping (1981-1992), 
during the Mao succession crisis against the more conservative CCP wing. This made PLA’s 
behavior to combine a “praetorian tendency with ultimate submission to party authority” (Ibid: 
1-2, 10-11). This falls in line with the logic of Communist regimes that when the party is unified 
and the society is stable, the military acts in a bureaucratic sense. But when the party, in this 
case the CCP, is split or when the society is experiencing some instability, the military acts as an 
arbitrator to restore stability (Shambaugh, 2002: 18). 
The PLA is a highly “cohesive organization” and its top leadership is appointed through 
the Central Military Commission (CMC), one of the organs of the CCP,6 located right below the 
Politburo and on equal standing with the People’s Congress in the configuration of the Chinese 
political structure (Scobell, 2005: 233). CMC is instrumental to PLA’s subordination to CCP 
since it puts CCP leaders on top of PLA’s chain of command (Ji, 2006: 98). This resulted at 
                                                 
6 There is a state-CMC, but it remains powerless in this regard.  
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times in a tension between the ideological and professional characteristics of the PLA, with the 
latter struggling against the dominance of the former (Murray, 1991: 30). In such cases, the PLA 
would bring its complaints to the leadership within the CMC but would rarely protest the CCP 
openly (Ji, 2006: 98). Even during the few times when the military leadership came out critical 
of the policy direction of the CCP, it was purged without much trouble in the PLA (Zhu, 1998: 
1). On the other hand, this political penetration of the PLA by the CCP can be seen also matched 
back by PLA’s involvement in the recruitment and the political struggles in CCP, while standing 
always by it. That is why the PLA is said to be “party-controlling itself” (Ibid: 38). For example, 
leaders of the key military regions in the PLA are also members of the politburo of the CCP and 
the majority of CMC members are military officers (Ji, 2006: 102). In addition, some military 
leaders would undertake political roles, drawing on their personal legacy, but not in their 
occupational capacity (Scobell, 1992: 194-5, Joffe, 1997: 36-7; Lan, 1996: 60).  
In addition, the CMC maintains control over the PLA through the trio of: political 
commissars, party committees, and discipline inspection system (Barany, 2016: 110). Of special 
significance are the political commissars who work under the General Political Directorate 
(GPD) and are appointed at the different rank levels to ensure continued loyalty and to maintain 
the delicate balance between the over- and under-politicization of the ‘gun’ (Murray, 1991: 29). 
This, effectively, establishes two lines of command: the military officer command line and the 
political commissar command line. The aim is to keep the “Red Army” working to serve and 
protect the people but only under CCP’s command (Lan, 1996: 57-8). Nevertheless, most 
political commissars in the PLA are, in fact, professional soldiers and not civilian CCP cadres. 
This is the outcome of the 1930s when the so-called civilian “commissar responsibility system” 
negatively affected the performance of the military and led to its over-politicization, a situation 
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that was loudly protested by the military commanders including Mao (Ji, 2006: 91, 95). Even 
though he himself, upon assuming power, relied heavily on the military as his “main power 
base” to push for his political project, it remained that he argued for the need for the undivided 
focus of PLA on military performance and only second to it comes political work and 
indoctrination (Ibid: 93-4). Mao was also keen in his appointment of commanders and 
commissars to give the upper hand to the former, who remain to be party cadres at the end of the 
day, to prevent any situations of divided leadership or contestation of authority within the 
military (Ibid: 102). That said, the relationship between political commissars and military 
commanders varied across time and by type of unit. For example, the higher the unit level, the 
more military leaders would act in dual capacities, i.e. representing both the CCP as commissars 
while serving at the PLA (and they also preside over party committees). Travelling down the 
chain of command, political commissars, drawn from within the ranks of junior officers, would 
reciprocate leadership positions with military commanders (Zhu, 1998: 36). 
Another tool for CMC control is party committees located across PLA’s chain of 
command, which report to the CMC and oversee the management of the military units’ affairs, 
including the duties of political commissars and political education officers. Members of these 
committees are drawn from the party secretariats on the regional and local levels as well as 
members of the political department within the military command (Ibid: 34-5). Under Mao, 
decisions by the committees were taken by party committees and implemented by both the 
military commanders and political commissars. With Deng in power and with his vision to 
professionalize the force, military commanders took the lead at the expense of political work. 
This dynamic was slightly reversed between 1987 and 1992 during the period leading to the 
1989 crisis and until the debate over the modernization of the CCP has come to an end to Deng’s 
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support (Joffe, 1997: 41-2). Therefore, the “primary power base” for Deng remained also to be 
the PLA (Ji, 2006: 95).  
 
3.3 Development of PLA’s MOBs  
Since its early creation in 1928, the PLA traditionally adopted a policy of financial self-
sufficiency. It acted also as a role model for what the revolution wants to achieve and to generate 
public support, especially in the country side by not engaging itself in extractive activities but 
rather by supporting the local economy through occasional employment and selling surplus 
production, a process that was then controlled by the political commissars (Bickford, 1999: 29). 
In the 1950s, following the success of the revolution, the military was encouraged to continue 
providing for itself through the military production complex, with the focus primarily on 
agricultural production. The PLA was seen as “a big school” setting a role model for other state 
institutions under the newly-founded communist regime (Ibid: 31; Cheung, 2001: 19-20, 22). 
This way, the PLA under Mao was seen as both a fighting and a working force. With Deng 
Xiaoping’s ascent to power in 1977, he aimed to fulfill two other important goals: modernization 
and professionalization of the PLA (Joffe, 2006: 12; 14). This came as part of Deng’s program to 
modernize the Chinese society, especially in the fields of science and technology, the economy, 
and national defense, setting the context for further differentiation in the CCP-PLA relationship 
(Scobell, 2003: 54). Therefore, the PLA continued as a working force but with a different title, 
“free market entrepreneurs” (Ibid: 67). 
Under the pressures of the economic crisis in the late 1970s, the cuts in defense budgets 
(Barany, 2016: 112) and the business-prone infrastructure of the PLA (i.e. demobilized soldiers 
as cheap labor, manufacturing sites, and distribution networks), it was possible for the PLA both 
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to set the example for the civilian sector as well as to politically support the controversial 
proposed reforms at the time. Deng initiated a conversion project of military industries that 
aimed at removing the barriers between the military and civilian production. He saw in the 
separation between military and civilian production a legacy of the Soviet Union, which he 
resented especially as he was re-orienting China towards better relations with the US over the 
course of the 1970s (Vogel, 2011: 538, 550). His goal was to engage the world and to achieve 
development rather than to prepare for war in defense of the revolution as was Mao’s vision. 
That is why Deng deliberately decreased military allocations, which was also meant to 
streamline the force size and to push for its modernization and professionalization. This new 
policy underlined a new phase in the relationship between the CCP and the PLA from 
politicization and professionalism to commercialization and professionalism (Shambugh, 2002: 
202). 
The target of the conversion program was to direct close to two thirds of the military 
production capacity towards civilian production, a goal that was accomplished by the end of the 
1980s, especially with the rise in demand for consumer goods domestically (Cheung, 2009: 55; 
Joffe, 1995: 26). The PLA, however, was initially slow in embracing the change and it took it 
until 1985 to fully agree with the new economic direction of the CCP leadership (Cheung, 2009: 
53-4). This came also in part to reflect the fact that the CCP was not wholly unified behind 
Deng’s reform program and it was highly contested behind closed doors by the more 
conservative wing of the party (Baum, 1997: 341). That is why many PLA units initially thought 
the conversion policy would not last for long and did not take it seriously and they were not 
motivated to make profits because the government can always step in and provide subsidies to 
keep them financially afloat, especially during the early years of the program as the concern was 
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more with the size of the output rather than with its value and/or quality. It also took these MOBs 
a while to adapt to the needs of the civilian market and to specialize in a given set of products to 
achieve economies of scale (Cheung, 2009: 70).  
Nevertheless, the growth and diversification of the nature and size of these MOBs over 
the course of the 1980s went far beyond the target of self-sufficiency, with a clear emphasis on 
profit maximization (Lee, 2006: 438, 440; Cheung, 2003: 53, 70; Joffe, 1995: 24), with estimates 
of around two thirds of PLA’s budget coming from MOBs’ revenues in 1990 (Murray, 1991: 
33). The military also made use of its control of land assets by leasing it or providing it for joint 
projects with civilian partners, both national and foreign. It also expanded the range of farming 
products and made them available in the markets for the public. In addition, starting the mid-
1980s, MOBs’ products were geared toward the export market, many of which were produced 
through joint ventures with other units or with civilian national or foreign capital (Joffe, 1995: 
27; Mulvenon, 2001: 10; Bickford, 2006: 167). The market share of PLA’s MOBs production 
rose to make up “70 percent of all taxi cabs, 20 percent of all cameras, and two-thirds of all 
motorcycles” produced in China by mid-1990s (Bitzinger, 2006: 181). The MOBs that fared the 
best were the ones “located in coastal area, in major cities, and in more technologically 
sophisticated sectors” (Cheung, 2009: 61, 63). This underlined the fact that while economic 
production for self-sufficiency was functional, it turned to become utilitarian under conversion 
(Bickford, 2006: 161, 167). 
One of the benefits for the PLA from this conversion process was learning to rationalize 
and to improve the quality of production processes for the defense economy (Cheung, 2009: 74-
5). This came as the management of the military production processes shifted to paying more 
attention to how and what the market needs when considering what and how much to produce 
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(Bickford, 1994: 461). Not only that these changes had a positive impact on the livelihood of the 
officers, they also increased the popularity and support for Deng’s modernization project within 
the PLA (Vogel, 2011: 549). Unsurprisingly, the political indoctrination of the military was also 
transformed so as to reflect the re-orientation of the economic ideology of the CCP leadership 
applauding “the positive aspects of business activity … educating troops on the benefits of a 
socialist market economy”. The price, however, came in the deterioration in the status of military 
mission (Bickford, 1994: 467, 551).  
Most of PLA business activities were controlled and supervised by the central command 
of the PLA (through its General Logistics Department-GLD), yet, some of the small-scale 
business activities at the region and local unit levels were run independently by the units 
themselves (Mulvenon, 2001: 66). Supervision was temporarily shifted from GLD to military 
regions in the early 1980s and some of the better performing PLA enterprises were given a freer 
hand in running their own production processes under the ‘management responsibility system’ 
(Bickford, 1994: 463). Nevertheless, the expansion of commercial activities, GLD re-centralized 
its control shortly after by the mid-1980s (Cheung, 2001: 23, 28). This came also as the CCP 
increased party presentation in the PLA starting 1985 (Ji, 2006: 95). The independence of local 
army units as far as their finances are concerned along with their joint businesses with civilians 
were among the alarming signs for the central authorities, fearing the negative effects on respect 
for the chain of command as well as the shifting loyalties away from the CCP and its 
revolutionary leadership (Cheung, 2003: 65-66).  
Overall, the process of MOBs development was about learning by doing and regulatory 
frameworks were reactionary rather than guiding or preemptive, leaving wide room for 
inefficiencies and corruption (Cheung, 2009: 56, 65). Bickford believes that MOBs did more 
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harm than good as they projected the PLA, and by extension the CCP, as a corrupt organization, 
killing out the competition in the local markets, especially with their discounted access to factors 
of production and the taxation privileges PLA’s MOBs were receiving since 1984 and that were 
later expanded in 1988 (Bickford, 1994: 463; 2006: 168). Discipline problems became rampant 
as well, especially among lower level units and personnel (Bickford, 1999: 32-3). Another 
drawback was that some of the economic competition was actually inter-PLA units, putting at 
risk the corporate identity of the military institution itself (Bickford, 2006: 167). PLA’s MOBs 
suffered also from the economic problem of a very few profitable organizations and a majority of 
inefficient loss-making smaller enterprises, mostly at the region and local level MOBs (Cheung, 
2009: 58). In addition, the lack of political will on the part of the party leadership occasionally 
led to ineffective application of regulations. For example, the separation between military and 
business activities was announced back in 1988 but did not go into effect until 1993 (Joffe, 1995: 
34-35).  
 
3.4 The Challenge of Democracy Protests and PLA’s Defense of the Party  
The 1989 protests came as one last and fundamental episode in a long struggle 
demanding political opening that developed as a byproduct of the social changes brought about 
by Deng’s modernization program, in effect for a close to a decade at the time (Bernstein, 2013: 
55). These protests, and earlier in 1986-1987, were trying to make use of the opportunity of the 
upcoming power succession in CCP leadership to push for more political freedoms. They took 
place primarily at Tiananmen Square at the heart of the capital as well as in some other 
metropolitan centers by mostly university students and middle-class citizens (Scobell, 2003: 96). 
The protests broke out following the death of the CCP reformist leader, Hu-Yaobang, in mid-
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April and later expanded to protest the negative impact of the economic modernization process, 
particularly corruption and inflation. The conciliatory attitude towards the protesters by Prime 
Minister Zhao Zyinag (who was believed to be enjoying Deng’s support) raised the bar and made 
the request rather for a change in leadership and for putting an end to CCP’s monopoly over 
political life. 
In the years leading to the demonstrations, the CCP itself was getting increasingly 
concerned about the course of the economic reform program, the cost born by the average 
citizens, who were getting more dissatisfied, and with the spread of corruption (Baum, 1997: 
344). In addition, a serious challenge was expected considering the cyclical pattern of “fang-
shou” or relaxation and control that marked the Chinese policies at the time (Ibid: 342). The size 
and scope of the protests, however, came to set a precedent in communist China, especially as 
they paralleled the anti-communist protests in Eastern Europe that led to a spree of regime 
collapses, which made the threat even more existential for the CCP leadership, resulting in the 
bloody suppression by the PLA in June 1989 (Barany, 2016: 106, 113). 
While out of the country on an official visit, the more conservative CCP leadership 
ousted the prime minister and called on regime supporters in counter mobilization. Yet, the PLA 
did not involve itself officially until the declaration of the martial law, which came in May, one 
month after the outbreak of protests (Cheung, 1991: 5-6, 9). Prior to that, there was a sense of 
reluctance or hesitation regarding the use of force on the part of PLA leadership, which came at 
some level to echo that of the CCP leadership and to reflect the ideological confusion over how 
would the “people’s army” shoot the people (Scobell, 1992: 199-200). Some of the top ranking 
military leaders, including those from the Central Beijing region as well as from the ministry of 
defense, were not in favor of repressing the protesters and were last to support the marital law 
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declaration (Lee, 2015: 154-155). This may have brought PLA’s loyalty into question, alongside 
the concerns over the growing corruption in the ranks as well as the deterioration of the image of 
the soldier in society (Cheung, 1991: 9). In addition, the PLA was also not to take the initiative 
to shoot the protesters, especially given its ethnically homogenous composition (Murray, 1991: 
28). Nevertheless, this reluctance did not materialize into actual restraint from eventually 
repressing the protesters. This is because the resistance of PLA leaders to the use of repression 
went down as the political leadership became more united and determined on a specific course of 
action, with Deng’s eventual approval of the declaration of martial law (Scobell, 1992: 201-2). In 
fact, Deng’s reform process and the changes the different state institutions were undergoing 
made his de-facto presence in power more critical to regime “stability and survival.” This, in a 
sense, continued the personalist tradition of Mao, the very tradition that Deng meant to change 
(Baum, 1997: 341-342). The eventual repression of the protest came in line with the expected 
behavior of communist militaries that are to stand by the party if two conditions are met: the 
army helped bring the party to power in the first place and when the party maintains acting in a 
unified manner, both of which were met in the case of the PLA in 1989 (Segal and Phipps, 1990: 
960-3).  
PLA’s intervention came after sparing the riot-control forces, the People’s Armed Police 
(PAP), which was overwhelmed during the events, especially in Beijing, given its limited size. 
Formally founded in 1983, the PAP was meant to be used for internal control under CMC control 
and separate from the PLA (at least until 1995). The PAP did a better job, however, outside the 
capital, which made it possible for the military to mobilize many regional units into the capital, 
reaching a force size of around 200,000 PLA members (Cheung, 1997: 263). This mobilization 
tactic also gave the CCP leadership the chance to frame this task as a national mission in 
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response to a threat from the counter-revolutionary forces (Ibid: 201; Segal and Phipps, 1990: 
607). In addition, political commissars were heavily involved in directing the troops on the 
ground during the enforcement of the martial law and the clearing operation (Cheung, 1991: 8-
9).  
After the operation, the military was projected as a hero against the anti-revolutionary 
traitors (Ji, 2001: 23). Around only 8% of the participating units had some discipline issues, few 
of which were believed to be major charges and had mostly to do with performance than with 
loyalty (Barany, 2016: 111). Despite the fact that some military elements may have shown a 
degree of sympathy to the cause of the protesters, the PLA did not abandon the government 
(Scobell, 1992: 203). While resourceful, the PLA remained complaint to CCP’s policy positions 
(Ji, 2001: 115). That is why, considering the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, 
maintaining tighter control over the gun became a more pressing task for the CCP, especially 
with the conservative triumph in the regime that lasted until 1992 (Ibid: 22). This resulted in 
revitalizing political work and education campaigns in addition to a campaign against 
“bourgeoisie liberalization” (Ibid: 20-21; Bregolat, 2015: 202-4) so as to reassert the priority of 
military professionalism and to push the PLA out of the economic domain (Joffe, 1995: 24; 
Blasko, 2006: 117-118; Kiselycznyk and Saunders, 2010: 21). These campaigns were short-
lived, however, because they were resented by some PLA commanders who were pushing for the 
full de-politicization and complete professionalization of the PLA (Murray, 1991: 32). As a 
result, Deng, in his capacity as the CMC chairperson, ousted the heads of the GPD and GSD 
(General Staff Department), or the ‘Yang brothers,’ in 1992 (Ji, 2006: 101). In return, the PLA 
reaffirmed its unequivocal support to Deng’s leadership and renewed its “promise to ‘escort’ and 
‘protect’ the reforms” (Cheung, 2001: 170; Joffe, 1995: 31).  
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To help restore the confidence of foreign investors in the Chinese economic reform 
program and signal the stability of the political situation, the PLA intensified its involvement 
with foreign joint ventures; where “the foreign capital in these ventures rose by 230% in 1992” 
(Bickford, 1994: 467). Although the need for the political and economic support of the military 
for the reform package gave PLA’s MOBs the kiss of life after they shrank by 88% between 
1989 and 1990 and continued to shrink until 1992 (Cheung, 2001: 45), their recovery came with 
centralized administration and with a clear emphasis on separation between the military units and 
business activities under the ‘rectification campaigns’ (Mulvenon, 2001: 50-51). New 
conglomerates were founded by the state, with a central headquarter in Beijing and a web of 
affiliate holding companies, specializing in production either by sector or geographically for 
streamlined supervision and profitability (Ibid: 104). Under the new regime, the GLD would 
assume control of the administrative supervision of all business activities while military units 
take charge of subsistence agricultural production primarily (Ibid: 71). In addition, party 
committees in the military units were assigned greater roles in running the MOBs (Cheung, 
2001: 65). This new regime came also to reinstate central budgetary allocations as the primary, if 
not the sole, source of income for military units and he government increased defense spending 
by 10% starting 1990 (Mulvenon, 2001: 75; 150). Small local military units were entirely banned 
from engaging in commercial activities in 1993, becoming fully dependent on the central 
budgetary allocations (Ibid: 156). While the increase in defense spending did not mean much for 
the PLA in real terms as the annual inflation rate was also rising at almost a 10% rate 
(Mulvenon, 2001: 77), it signaled that the priority was given to reaffirming the loyalty of the 
PLA to the CCP through restricting its financial independence, even at the expense of financial 
sufficiency (Mora, 2002: 189-190, 192; Mulvenon, 2007: 225; Scobell, 2005: 235). 
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 With a firm political will to divest PLA’s MOBs, it was possible to bring them fully 
under state control. Divestiture was also applied because of the negative effect MOBs had on the 
sought professionalization of the armed forces, and not only its loyalty (Shambaugh, 2002: 184-
5). In addition, divestiture came also at a time when the transition in the civilian leadership from 
the revolutionary to the party-bureaucracy generation was taking place, re-asserting the division 
of labor between the party and the military and re-establishing the leading position of the former. 
Alongside, a new program of civil-military integration was adopted for military outsourcing 
according to which the military was opening up for civilian businesses that were invited to take 
the lead in technology development and transfer, reversing the trend of military conversion under 
which PLA’s MOBs came into existence (Bickford, 2006: 162; Bitzinger, 2006: 180-181). 
3.5 Conclusion 
During the protests, the loyalist PLA followed Deng’s orders to interfere in 1989 to the 
rescue of the CCP and repressed the demonstrations, despite the initial resistance some military 
leaders expressed regarding the nature and timing of such action (Mulvenon, 2004: 11). 
Although the PLA claims to act in defense of both the people and the party, such a claim came to 
test during its intervention in Tiananmen Square, with loyalty to the party clearly winning over 
that to the people, or at least the demonstrators among them who were portrayed as perpetrators 
and enemies of the revolution (Blasko, 2006: 117-118). That is why the PLA can be generally 
seen as loyal to the CCP, taking away from its professionalism as an institution, having its prime 
client the party and its leadership, neither the state nor the people, especially with the top 
leadership of the regime working as an “interlocking directorate” between both the political and 
the military (Shambaugh, 2002: 12; Bickford, 2001: 1; 5). Had the PLA managed to develop and 
maintain its financial autonomy, this could have led to a more independent position for the PLA 
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vis-à-vis the CCP and could have resulted in a different calculation for whether to interfere on 
behalf of the regime or not during the crisis. 
The PLA was penetrated through a package of loyalty-maintenance-tools. The 
compliance of the PLA during the 1989 crisis was a clear sign of this deep penetration by the 
CCP. In addition, the fact that the military was continuously used as an experimentation site 
reflected the political reliability of the institution and its loyalty to the regime. The centralist 
penetrative approach of the CCP vis-à-vis the PLA can therefore be claimed the main cause in 
explaining the repression of the protests in 1989. It is true that this penetrative approach was 
implemented through different means, one of which was economic using MOBs, the approach 
has to be taken in its entirety for a more comprehensive understanding of the PLA’s standing by 
the communist party in China during the crisis. In fact, with a history of subordination and 
following orders, PLA’s suppression of the protests can be taken as an act by the regime, 
executed by the PLA (Joffe, 1997: 43-44). It can be said, therefore, that the business involvement 
of the PLA has been similar to its political involvement, both of which have been gradually and 
successfully divested by the CCP.  
53 
4 CHAPTER 3: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS: FROM 
SUBORDINATION TO GRADUAL DOMINATION 
4.1 Introduction 
However challenging it is to understand the politics of the Iranian regime, the political 
crisis and the legitimacy challenge posed by the mass protests following the 2009 presidential 
election came to add an additional layer of difficulty. This is because the regime of the Islamic 
Republic in Iran (IRI) has been marked, since its creation in 1979, by a duality in terms of the 
structures of power and sources of legitimacy. Parallel to the typical branches of a modern 
political system, which are directly elected by the people, there is a parallel clerical structure that 
checks on the power of the elected offices, controls the range of choices people have, and it is 
where ultimate power in the system is located. At the top of the power pyramid is the Supreme 
Guide (or Leader), the highest authoritative office in the system. The representatives of the 
religious authority are not directly elected and act in accordance with religious teachings 
(Eisenstadt, 2002: 238-9).   
When the protesters took to the streets to denounce what was believed a fraudulent 
result of an unfair and un-free presidential election in favor of the incumbent, President Mahmod 
Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) who enjoyed the support of the Supreme Guide, they were 
challenging also the authority of the Supreme Guide himself. Yet, the leadership of the protest 
movement, known as the green movement, made it clear that they were not challenging the 
Islamic Republic as was founded by Ayatollah Khomeini (1979-1989), but were rather opposing 
what they saw as a deviation from the path envisioned by the ‘founding Ayatollah’ by the current 
Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Khamenei (1989-present). To suppress the protests, the president 
54 
called on, with the approval of the Supreme Guide, the military of the regime, i.e. the 
Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and its affiliated militia (Basij), to intervene against the protesters.  
Since its creation following the establishment of the IRI, the political and economic 
power of the IRGC has been exponentially growing, especially during the first presidential term 
of Ahmadinejad, who himself is a Basiji veteran. The direct link the IRGC has, primarily with 
the Supreme Guide, whom it directly serves, and secondarily with the president, made its defense 
of the latter’s declared victory in the election less of a surprise. Nevertheless, the concern in what 
lies ahead is not with the IRGC’s continued defense of the regime in the face of challenges, but 
rather in the risks associated with its rising political and economic networks to the point that it 
may eventually penetrate back the regime and eventually establish its domination over it. 
 
Figure 3: MOBs in IRGC’s Repression of the Green Movement Protests 
 
While the IRGC is institutionalized and corporate, it is penetrated by the Grand Leader’s 
office though indoctrination and religious commissars as well as his steering of the public 
policies to the endorsement of the political, social and economic roles of the IRGC and other 
revolutionary institutions. Therefore, while IRGC’s MOBs are owned and run by the institution, 
the Islamic regime enjoys a high degree of control over what and how to do business, e.g. the 
grand leader sponsors the rise of the regime’s cooperative foundations, including IRGC’s, to 
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assume a leading role in the Iranian economy. The expansion and growth of MOBs empowered 
the IRGC and introduced a new political class of militant clerics, distinct from the traditional 
conservative core of the regime. The challenge during the 2009 crisis came at a time when 
MOBs were on the rise and whose impact was travelling and multiplying into other domains of 
power as well. By defending Ahmadinejad during the crisis, the IRGC defended by extension 
both the supreme leader as well as its key position in the regime to which it remains politically 
and financially tied. IRGC’s accumulation of power can eventually lead to its taking over the 
regime and not only defending it. 
In what follows, this chapter aims at underlining how the economic rise of the IRGC 
contributed to its defense of the power of the clergy in the IRI, especially during the 2009 crisis. 
It will start off with a layout of the political structure in the Islamic republic followed by a survey 
of the civil-military relations in Iran. It will then turn to the electoral crisis of 2009 and how 
IRGC’s MOBs played out in the decision of the Guards to defend the ‘revolution’. 
 
4.2 The Politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
The political system of the IRI can be described as an “‘electoral’ autocracy” since the 
powers of the elected offices are limited by the powers of those who claim a divine right to office 
and occupy it by selective appointment while acting as gate keepers through deciding on who 
can run in the elections in the first place. As can be seen in figure (4) below, the core of the 
regime is the office of the Supreme Guide, who is chosen for life by the elected Council of 
Experts from among those that possess certain religious and political qualification. This selection 
process has been applied only once since the establishment of the republic in the wake of the 
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death of the founder of the regime, Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Yet, lacking the qualifications 
of his predecessor, more weight was given to the political, at the expense of the religious, 
competency of the candidates during the selection of Ayatollah Khamenei for the office of the 
Supreme Guide, turning the position from one that is supposed to stay above politics to one that 
muddles in politics (Forozan, 2016: 43-44).  
 
Figure 4: The political system of the IRI7 
 
The domination of the clerical parallel structure in the regime is made possible through 
the Guardian Council, which oversees bills passed by the elected parliament (Majlis) and decides 
on them at its own discretion8. This domination is also established through the role of the 
Guardian Council in approving the candidates for the all elected offices and councils (except city 
councils) in the system, to filter out those perceived as enemies of, or at a minimum not loyal 
enough to, the revolution. In addition, the council has the power to decide on who can run in the 
elections of the Council of Experts, making it a gate keeper during the process of selecting the 
Supreme Guide. In return, The Supreme Guide appoints half of the council’s members from 
within the clerical establishment (Ibid: 46; Arjomand, 2009: 250). 
                                                 
7 Adopted from: (Thaler et al, 2010: 23). 
8 The Expediency Council was created in 1989 to mediate between the Guardian Council and the Majlis due to the continued 
blocking of legislations by the former. 
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With the success of the Islamic revolution in 1979, two political trends were formed: the 
leftist Islamists (or the Khomeinists and later the reformists) and the traditionalist Islamists (who 
later became known as the conservatives). These two political wings replaced the old elite 
associated with the Pahlavi regime, yet both were formed under and continued to reflect the 
social and political challenges inherited from the era of the Shah including issues of nationalism, 
the role of the state in the economy, and social justice. The reformists, as opposed to the 
conservatives, are generally more politically liberal and economically statist (Forozan, 2016: 80). 
However, by the end of the 1980s, the revolution was able to produce its own elite class, drawing 
from the IRGC and its veterans as well as from other revolutionary institutions. This new 
political class, known as the neo-radicals, grew out of the regional and internal conflicts in which 
the revolution was involved and presented itself as the guardian of ideals of the revolution. In 
undertaking such a guardian role, the neo-radicals made use of their access to the political, 
economic, and social resources of the state to propagate their hard-line agenda, with the blessing 
of the new Ayatollah Khamenei. The demobilization of a large number of IRGC veterans after 
the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) sat the stage for the political and economic involvement 
of an increasing number of IRGC and Basiji elements. This rising elite is connected as part of the 
ideological revolutionary networking in the Bonyads (or veterans’ foundations) (Hourcade, 
2009: 58-60). In their political and economic positions, the neo-radicals make an all-the-way 
enemy of the reformists and an occasional friend of the conservatives. They also give superiority 
to the divine over the popular source of legitimacy and are more inclined towards adopting 
populist and government-interventionist economic policies and a hardliner foreign policy 
(Sinkaya, 2015: 179).  
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By the turn of the 2000s, a principalist (Usulghyran, or a revolutionary fundamentalist) 
political coalition was formed in response to the rise of the reformists over the second half of the 
1990s, one that managed to dominate the 2003 local elections, the 2004 parliamentary elections, 
and eventually the 2005 presidential elections. The re-assertion of the revolutionary ideals and 
the introduction of new political cadres with military or security career backgrounds,9 whose 
focus was on issues of development and social justice, combined with the failure of the 
reformists in delivering their promised reforms, garnered the principalist coalition wide support, 
especially among the rural masses (Ibid: 166-7; Forozan, 2016: 87). In addition, the turbulent 
regional context for Iran and the rising tensions with both its neighbors and with the west made it 
easier for the retired IRGC officers to run on nationalistic platforms in the elections. The appeal 
of the IRGC-veterans’ candidates to their former colleagues in the corps and in the Basij was 
also strong and as a result they benefited from the corps’ mobilization capacities during their 
campaigns, especially in the poorer regions of the country, as well as from its control over the 
polling stations and monitoring during the electoral process (Sinkaya, 2015: 168-9). Therefore, 
Ahmadinejad’s assumption of the presidency in 2005 (and until 2013) came to reinforce the 
more conservative version of the Islamic republic (Ibid: 171). He worked to consolidate his 
power base among the poor and in the rural areas through manipulating the privatization program 
and the adoption of redistributive and populist policies for which he relied on and gained from 
links to the religious authorities and institutions (Ibid: 175-7). In addition, the first term of 
Ahmadinejad in office witnessed the largest number of IRGC veterans in the cabinet (9 
ministers), as opposed to both the lowest number under reformist president Mohamed Khatami 
(1997-2005) (1-2 ministers) and the moderate number under the conservative presidents Hashimi 
                                                 
9 There was a wave of resignations of a large number of IRGC and Basiji members during the preparations for the elections, since 
active duty officers are banned from running for civilian positions, leaving the impression that it was a concerted effort. 
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Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021) (4-6 ministers) (Forozan, 2016: 89, 
95).  
Even as they lost many of the post-2009 elections, this rise of the neo-radicals gave 
them control over a number of key positions in the regime, adding much to their political weight. 
Nevertheless, the difference in policy positions between the neo-radicals and the conservatives 
resurfaced temporarily after defeating the reformist camp during the 2005 presidential election. 
The local and parliamentary councils of 2006 and 2008 respectively were dominated by the 
conservatives, a situation that made the neo-radicals’ defense of Ahmadinejad’s survival in the 
presidential office for a second term more fundamental to further consolidate the neo-radicals’ 
position in the system. As the 2009 crisis unfolded, the traditional conservatives decided to join 
ranks with the neo-radicals against the reformists (Sinkaya, 2015: 179-180). Both the neo-
radicals and the traditional conservatives claim a direct connection to the Supreme Guide, who, 
while welcoming their increased power, makes sure that they remain in check under his control 
and counterbalances the increased influence of either camp by swinging his support between 
both so that neither party dominates the political field exclusively by itself.  
 
4.3 ‘Civil’-Military Relations in Iran 
The debate over who controls the military in Iran goes back to the time of the shah and 
was among those inherited by the Islamic regime. Following the constitutional revolution of 
1906 and the creation of a national assembly, the rise of Reza Khan, the founder of the Pahlavi 
dynasty (1926-1979), to power in 1926 came as conflicts aroused between the elected prime 
minister (and the parliament) on one side and the Qajari king on the other regarding who has the 
right to control the military. The growing nationalist sentiment contributed even more to this 
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conflict which was occasionally settled in the context of induced popular protests to pressure the 
other side, but largely came out in favor of the palace. Being a military officer himself and 
whose rise to power came with the support of the military, Reza Shah invested much into and 
tightly personalized his control over the institution indispensible for the survival of his regime, 
especially as it helped centralize his control over the country (Cronin, 2014: 162-3; Forozan, 
2016: 35). After the assumption of power by his successor Mohamed Reza Shah and especially 
after the end of the second World War, competition over the control of the military was among: 
the royalists (led by the Shah), the nationalists (mostly civilian powers with parliamentary 
representation that aimed at establishing civilian control over the military independent from the 
palace and against foreign interventions), and the religious leaders (who were mobilizing their 
followers at the grassroots level) (Sadri, 1996: 212).  
The rise of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1951 can be seen as an outcome 
of this competition and as one round in which the nationalists succeeded in establishing 
nationalist civilian control over the military. It, however, did not last for long and the Shah 
regained control shortly after in 1953. The Shah’s authority, however, was seriously challenged 
as a result, especially with the rising social unrest. This made controlling the military even more 
pressing for his survival in power, interfering in all military matters and directing the loyalties of 
senior officers to the palace, a policy that left the Iranian military without an effective sense of 
corporateness (Hashim, 2012b: 105-113; Cronin, 2014: 135-6, 138, 145). Nevertheless, the 
junior and non-commissioned officers, who represented the majority of the size of the force and 
who were excluded from regime patronage, were among the targeted groups by the Islamist 
religious leaders (Ibid: 169). In the face of the ever-growing protests, a seriously-ill Shah, and its 
perceived inability to preserve the integrity of the chain of command, the Supreme Council of the 
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Armed Forces (SCAF) surrendered to the Islamic Revolution on Feb. 11, 1979 as it was no 
longer able to defend the Shah regime (Sadri, 1996: 214-5). 
With the installation of the revolutionary regime, a revolutionary guard corps (IRGC) 
was founded to make up for the political un-reliability and suspicious loyalty of the national 
army (Artesh) to the new regime, especially after the attempted coup by a group of middle rank 
and junior officers in 1980 (Hashim, 2012a: 71). Therefore, the creation of the IRGC came to 
serve the twin purpose of balancing with the Artesh and also to bring together the different 
militant revolutionary committees formed during and after the revolution in one integrated 
institution to facilitate their control by the new ruling class of religious leaders. In line with this, 
the IRGC was entrusted with the task of defending the revolution from both types of threats: 
internal, implying its involvement in law enforcement, and external, which did eventually take 
place during the war against Iraq in cooperation (and sometimes in competition) with Artesh 
(Ward, 2009: 226; Eisenstadt, 2002: 241). In fact, the presence of external enemies to the 
revolution has consistently contributed to both the professional and the political rise of the IRGC 
(Ibid: 59, 71). The guards benefited from their involvement in the Gulf War which helped 
reinforcing the professional elements in the corps, turning it from a militia to a standing military 
force without abandoning its ideological orientation (Abedin, 2011: 381-2). Eventually, the 
IRGC gained the upper hand in the military domain especially after the establishment of IRGC 
navy and air forces, a status that was reinforced by its improved and better armament over the 
Artesh (Forozan, 2016: 52). As opposed to the Artesh under the Shah, the IRGC enjoyed a 
higher degree of corporateness (Sinkaya, 2015: 184). The Basij popular militia is the main tool 
through which the IRGC was involved in internal control (Golkar, 2012: 627; Forozan, 2016: 50, 
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53). The IRGC also helped establish a mobilization system for regime supporters, ultimately 
becoming a “political military” (Forozan, 2016: 47). 
Therefore, the new military tool came to reflect the inherent duality in the regime. As 
can be seen in the following chart, the Supreme Guide, not the president (or the prime minister 
during the early 1980s), is the commander in chief of the twin entities that make the Iranian 
Armed Forces. While the IRGC had its own ministry during the war with Iraq, it was jointly put 
with Artesh under the administration of the ministry of defense and logistics starting 1989, but 
with the minister of defense increasingly drawn from the IRGC ranks. There is a general staff for 
both forces but below which there is a separate command structure for each (Forozan, 2016: 52). 
The corps has also resisted multiple political moves by the two presidents Ali Khameni (1981-
1989) and Hashimi Rafsanjani as well as by the Majlis to subordinate the force to the authority 
of the government and consistently defend their responsibility only to the Supreme Guide (Ward, 
2009: 227). The links among the IRGC, clerics, and other politicians are fostered even further by 
their family links and inter-marriages (Ibid: 304-5). 
 
Figure 5: The structure of the Armed Forces of the IRI10 
                                                 
10 Adopted from: Wehrey et al (2009: 9). 
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This is not to imply that the Artesh was left unchanged following the establishment of 
the IRI. On the contrary, deliberate efforts were adopted towards its islamization in the wake of 
the revolution. This was done not only through purges but also through a newly established 
‘ideological-political directorate’ staffed with “Islamic commissars” of clerics working across all 
levels of the Artesh, indoctrinating the troops and assessing their loyalty to the revolution 
(Byman et al, 2001: 32; Ward, 2009: 230, 302). Similarly, there is a representative of the 
Supreme Guide11 to the IRGC and underneath him, there is a supervisory bureau and a political 
bureau, which are not distinguishable much in practice (Alfoneh, 2013: 80). However, these 
clerical officers remain not part of the decision-making process in the IRGC (Forozan, 2016: 57). 
On the domestic front, while the IRGC, relying on the Basij militia, is increasingly 
involved in regime security (Thaler et al, 2010: 34), the constitution remains ambivalent 
regarding any political interventions for the IRGC (Alfoneh, 2013: 18). Constitutionally, the 
IRGC is required to stay apolitical, which is a difficult task to maintain in practice given its 
ordained assignment to defend the revolution and to stay loyal to it (Forozan, 2016: 73). 
Nevertheless, IRGC commanders maintain an ‘officially announced position’ of non-intervention 
in domestic politics.12 Yet, this did not stop them from voicing their political positions in 
different occasions. For example, a number of IRGC commanders expressed their concerns over 
students’ protest under the reformist president Khatami in 1999, criticizing his ‘soft’ 
management of the situation, signaling their willingness to interfere instead (Byman et al, 2001: 
50; Alfoneh, 2013: 28). Conversely, it also happened once that the IRGC refused to follow 
president Rafsanjani orders to suppress an incident of ethnic rioting in Qazvin in 1994. The 
                                                 
11 The Supreme Guide has representatives to different state institutions to deliver his own directives and monitor their 
revolutionary performance (Forozan, 2016: 46-7). 
12 http://www.mei.edu/content/io/latest-crackdown-iran-points-irgc-s-meddling-elections  
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protests, however, were repressed by Artesh in one rare incident of its internal defense of the 
regime while coming out critical of IRGC’s position. Nevertheless, the IRGC was involved 
shortly after in suppressing workers’ protests in 1995 (Ward, 2009: 306-7).  
The current Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (1989-present), enjoyed a special 
relationship with the IRGC while president (1981-1989) and wanted to subordinate it to his 
office. Upon his selection as a Supreme Guide (1989-present), nevertheless, he reversed the trend 
and limited the controls of the office of the president over the corps. He also appointed his 
loyalists to leadership positions and dictated that any changes to the command structure of the 
IRGC had to go through his office, not that of the president (Alfoneh, 2013: 118; Forozan, 2016: 
49-50). This was facilitated by the IRGC’s tense relationship with then-president Rafsanjani, 
who while allowed for the corps’ economic involvement in light of unavailability of sufficient 
funds in state budget to satisfy IRGC’s financial needs, he was also for either the integration of 
IRGC with the Artesh or its complete demobilization (Ibid: 82-3). Eventually, as went earlier, 
the Supreme Guide sponsored the guards’ increased political involvement, using them as a tool 
in the balance of power against the traditional conservatives. This development has been 
described as the rise of a new type of political actors in the regime, the ‘militaristic clerics’. This 
rise has also been facilitated by the increased tension in the external environment of the regime 
and its need to maintain IRGC’s loyalty (Sinkaya, 2015: 182-183). 
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4.4 Military-Owned Businesses13 
Following the end of the war with Iraq, the reconstruction efforts necessitated the 
reliance on the IRGC as a developmental force in the name of the revolution, restoring faith in 
the regime in the war-affected areas. This came also in line with Article 147 of the constitution 
which mandates the use of military resources towards national development during times of 
peace (Alfoneh, 2013: 174). Some of the proceedings of these activities contributed towards the 
charity spending of the regime as one way to win the hearts and minds of the people (Forozan, 
2016: 75). Under Ahmadinejad and after a period of stalemate under president Khatami, MOBs 
of both the IRGC and the Basij expanded in light of their preferential treatment in governmental 
bids and the appointment of a number of their veterans to key positions in state-owned 
enterprises as well as the expansion of their MOBs’ involvement in foreign trade and importation 
of consumer goods (Habibi, 2015: 309; Alfoneh, 2013: 187-8). 
The budget of the IRGC is directly controlled by the Supreme Guide and is not reported 
in the national budget, which makes it hard to estimate (Najdi and Bin Abdul Karim, 2012: 81). 
One estimate of the size of ICRG operations put it, however, at $25 billion in the energy sector 
alone (Forozan and Shahi, 2017: 77). In 2007, IRGC’s largest business group, Ghorb (or Khatam 
al-Anbiya) group of companies and one of the biggest in the country, had 812 affiliated 
companies, maintaining a foothold in most of the sectors of the Iranian economy, especially the 
strategic one, with some overseas business operations (Hashim, 2012a: 77). The holding 
company maintains a close and interlocking relationship with the government as well as some 
sectors of the financial and technical elite in the country. While technically owned by the state, 
                                                 
13 There are also Artesh’s MOBs, separate from the IRGC’s, but are rarely mentioned or discussed (Harris, 2016: 100; Abedin, 
2011: 383). 
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Ghorb remains in practice outside the control of the government given its responsibility only to 
the Supreme Guide (Forozan, 2016: 77).  
Most of IRGC’s MOBs are controlled through the IRGC cooperative foundation 
(Bonyad) (Ibid: 73). By the end of 2009, following the electoral crisis, Ayatollah Khamenei 
ordained an increase in the share of cooperatives to reach a quarter of the Iranian economy 
within 5 years (i.e. by 2014) and encouraged their increased take over state-owned enterprises 
offered for sale under the privatization program, in an effort to support what he names the 
‘resistance economy’14 (Ibid: 84). While these cooperatives are not exclusively IRGC, the 
guards’ became among the biggest beneficiaries, especially with their ability to work in strategic 
sectors of the economy, those not accessible by private sector contractors (Ibid: 78-81).15 These 
Bonyads fall beyond the jurisdiction of the auditing authorities that oversee the private sector and 
act, therefore, as a backdoor for the regime to re-take over the privatized public sector while 
enjoying higher degrees of freedom in managing their own finance operations (Najdi and Bin 
Abdul Karim, 2012: 83). 
In addition, the Basiji cooperative foundation was established in 1992 to seal off the 
members of the Basij militia from the economic pressures during the post-war period by 
providing them with financial and material assistance. Basiji business operation continued to 
expand over time arriving at the control of the biggest private bank in Iran (Mehr Bank). The 
Basiji cooperative was also among the beneficiaries of the status of the ‘priority’ contender in the 
privatization program. The control by the Basij over the transportation and internet services in 
the country accorded the militia additional tools of control. Basiji business projects are also used 
                                                 
14 http://www.mei.edu/content/io/irgc-commander-rejects-rouhani-s-criticism-about-its-role-iran-s-
economy?utm_medium=email&utm_source=cc&utm_campaign=io-weekly&utm_content=readmore  
15 There are also economic entities controlled by the office of the Supreme Guide and that act in economic alliances with the 
IRGC’s MOBs and Basij-owned corporations (Forozan and Shahi, 2017: 81). 
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as mobilization vehicles for both their members as well as for the masses, especially with their 
presence throughout the country and with each regional unit running its own set of activities and 
projects. The successful economic involvement of the Basij serves the twin purpose of projecting 
the image of the regime as an achiever while extending charity for the worse off in the society 
(Golkar, 2012: 631-4, 640).  
 
4.5 The Crisis of the 2009 Presidential Election 
The challenge of the protests that broke out following the announcement of the official 
results of the June 2009 presidential election was unprecedented in terms of scale over the 
history of the Islamic Republic (Morady, 2010: 39). It came as a climax of the conflict between 
the two sources of legitimacy in the system: the divine, represented by the Supreme Guide, and 
the human, materialized through the ballot box, with ultimate power resting in the hands of the 
representative of the religious authority. Despite not aimed at overthrowing the regime itself, the 
protests went beyond expressing frustration with the election results to challenging the 
distribution of power in the system and calling for more limits on the powers of the Supreme 
Guide.  
The election was suspected stolen for the incumbent Ahmadinejad by both the second 
and third contenders (Mir-Hussein Musavi (reformist) and Mehdi Karrubi (conservative) 
respectively). The suppression that followed, upon the Supreme Guide’s approval of the results, 
made no political way out for the crisis (Sinkaya, 2015: 178-9). This is despite the fact that the 
two losing candidates joined ranks together against the Supreme Guide’s backing of the result 
and reached out to other reformist politicians and leaders. They also put together a request for the 
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verification of the fairness of the results of the elections beyond the constitutionally ordained 
channel to go about its control by the Supreme Guide and his network (Rigi, 2012: 133-4). 
Nevertheless, these efforts proved fruitless in the face of the Supreme Guide’s orders for the 
IRGC and the Basij to repress the protests and by extension the reformist camp (the conservative 
candidate later admitted the validity of the results). This position of the highest authority in the 
regime, who expressed his support for Ahmadinejad’s re-election multiple times before the 
election, emboldened the religious and revolutionary authorities even further against what they 
considered a ‘velvet coup’ (Abedin, 2011: 384; Sinkaya, 2015: 181; Ostovar, 2016: 181, 186). 
The protests centered also on the search for the “stolen votes” and continued over the 
following few months calling for fair investigation of the reports of a number of electoral 
irregularities, such as the mobilization of IRGC and Basij members at the polling stations 
(Ostovar, 2016: 182; Holliday and Rivetti, 2016: 17). The protests also capitalized on the 
protracted grievances in the society with the social, ethnic, and economic problems that remained 
unresolved over the course of the previous two decades. For example, urban citizens and 
religious, ethnic, and social minorities were part of the protest movement; while most of 
Ahmadinejad’s votes came from the rural areas, where the Basij enjoys the most control and 
support (Rigi, 2012: 132). The protests also came to reflect, not only the political and identity 
tensions, but especially an economic tension concerning the role of the state in the economy, 
which remained economically dominant even after two decades of the privatization program, a 
situation that deeply hurt the traditional private sector. Adding to this grievance was 
Ahmadinejad’s effort, upon the directives of Khamenei, to give the cooperative foundations 
priority during the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Given that most of these cooperatives 
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are dominated by the clerical elements of the regime, they became in command of a sizable share 
of the Iranian economy, which strengthened them even further (Adelkhah, 2012: 18-19).  
That said the protesters made it clear that, through their choice of symbols, places, and 
times of gathering, they are not aiming at overthrowing the Islamic Republic but rather at 
announcing Ahmadinejad’s second government illegitimate. The green color of the movement is 
originally the color of the Islamic revolution, which implied sticking to the ideals of the 
revolutionary regime but one that is more democratic and inclusive and that is founded on 
popular legitimacy. This came out clearly with Musavi’s identification with the Khomeinist 
tradition, recalling his service as Prime Minister under the founder of the Islamic Republic. Thus, 
the ‘green movement’ came to protest the politics of the ‘second republic’ under Khamenei 
(Holliday and Rivetti, 2016: 18) and to protest IRGC’s increasingly overt political involvement 
in the system (Rigi, 2012: 135; Wehrey et al, 2009: XVII). Eventually, however, the crisis 
contributed to even larger degree of political influence for the IRGC as it assumed the role of a 
“junior arbiter” in the regime (Forozan, 2016: 98, 105). 
In fact, the mobilization of the Basij and IRGC during the presidential elections of 2009 
(and earlier in 2005) came to support one of their own veterans and, in return, both their MOBs 
expanded even further as a result (Ibid: 642). Defending Ahmadinejad’s electoral ‘victory’ needs 
to be seen in this light and as part of the revolutionary institutions’ overall attempt to defend the 
revolution using a self-empowerment approach (Ghadar, 2009: 424, 427). This is evident with 
the fact that most of the revenues of these foundations were re-channeled towards re-engaging 
politics and the masses and to defend the revolution as well as the institutional interests of the 
foundations (Golkar, 2012: 628-630). Nevertheless, the presence of these corporations may have 
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also provided the IRGC with sufficient resources to co-opt other political actors and not only 
intimidates them (Wehrey et al, 2009: XV). 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
It can be said that the IRGC works as the Trojan horse to infiltrate and take over the 
“non-clerical institutions” of the regime (Forozan, 2016: 29). Its involvement in the political 
defense of the regime made it even more powerful. Assuming the presidency by one of its own 
gave the corps the chance to gain access to additional economic and political resources. With 
personalities, informal relations, and networks dominating over the formal structures, there are 
little chances to witness a reverse in this trend (Lim, 2015: 153; Wehrey, et al, 2009: 9). The 
ever-increased power of the revolutionary institutions, at the core of which is the IRGC, and the 
establishment of new channels of elite recruitment and promotion, as was evident in the case of 
the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency, makes the next competition to be within the 
principalist camp itself. The rising tensions between the traditional conservatives and the neo-
radicals seem to be on the rise, especially with the worsening health condition of Ayatollah 
Khamenei and the upcoming selection of a new Supreme Guide.  
The size of these MOBs is expected to expand even after the departure of Ahmadinejad 
from office as the IRGC and the Basij rely on the protection and support of the Supreme Guide16 
as well as their political networks are spread across the regime. This became clear when the 
current president Hassan Rouhani tried to put some restrictions on IRGC’s national economic 
role, the corps were able to go around this restriction and worked alternatively at the local level, 
making use, to cite only one example, of their connection to the mayor of Tehran, one of their 
                                                 
16 http://www.mei.edu/content/io/irgcs-involvement-agricultural-industry-signals-growing-militarization-iran-s-economy  
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veterans, to secure an estimated 7 billion-dollar worth of projects instead (Forozan and Shahi, 
2017: 83). 
While the IRGC makes use of its connection to the Supreme Guide, the question that 
remains is what would happen in case the neo-radicals managed to control the choice of the new 
Supreme Guide and combine both the de-jure and de-facto powers in the regime. The financial 
self-sufficiency achieved as a result of the extra-budgetary resources at the disposal of the IRGC 
and the Basij can, therefore, empower them enough to have a final say in the political game and 
to enjoy a more autonomous position. This may raise another question regarding the willingness 
of the IRGC to defend a conservative, let alone a reformist, president had a similar scenario to 
the 2009 crisis is to materialize. Even more importantly, what would be the position of the 
IRGC, as far as the defense of the revolution is concerned, vis-à-vis the new Supreme Leader in 
case he comes from either the traditional or reformist camps, or in case he intended to divest 
their MOBs. 
By comparison to the Chinese case, where the PLA was used by the Communist party to 
advance and defend its stay in power, the IRGC represents the conservative core of the IRI and is 
institutionally tied to it. Its accumulation of power and expanding membership makes defense of 
the regime its prime, if not the sole, responsibility. The risk, however, lies in the capture of the 
regime by the IRGC and the rise of an ‘Islamic Reza Shah,’ especially with no signs of 
weakening in the economic and political involvement of the IRGC.  
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5 CHAPTER 4: THE INDONESIAN MILITARY: FROM THE ‘NEW ORDER’ TO A ‘NEW 
PARADIGM’ 
5.1 Introduction 
For long, the Indonesian military (TNI) occupied a special place in the study of 
authoritarianism, democratization, and MOBs. This is not only because it has been an 
interventionist military since its very creation but also because its interventions has been 
legalized over most of Indonesia’s modern history. While its political intervention remained 
short of openly overtaking the government, it expanded to include having a quota in the 
legislative assemblies as well as undertaking economic activities for financial self-sufficiency. 
While stepping outside of the defense domain by the TNI has changed over time, it remained a 
constant fact of political life in authoritarian (1957-1998) and to a lesser extent in democratizing 
(post-1998) Indonesia. 
Following the war of independence in 1945, the Indonesian military grew to be an 
important player in political life. While its corporate identity was still evolving, it consistently 
resisted subordination efforts by civilian governments. Since 1957, the military undertook both 
political interventions and economic interventions as it was used by the civilian leadership to 
control a sizable portion of the public sector as well as expanded on the range of its MOBs. 
Being autonomous and financially independent from the regime (with up to 75% estimated 
contribution of MOBs revenues to TNI’s budget), it had little interest in defending the status quo 
and sided with the democracy protesters during the 1998 crisis. Yet, it secured a safe exit for the 
leader, Suharto, who had maintained a base of loyalists, including family members, within the 
force. MOBs kept the military financially secure under Suharto and during the crisis. 
Nevertheless, the military declared shortly after the transition its willingness to divest its MOBs 
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as soon as budgetary allocations grow large enough to make up for MOBs’ contribution to its 
budget. 
TNI’s MOBs came into existence out of necessity during the war of independence and 
later for the insufficiency of defense appropriations. Suharto (1966-1998), with experience in 
founding and running MOBs while on active duty, manipulated the logic behind TNI’s MOBs by 
adding a patronage component to them and by expanding the range and scale of economic 
opportunities available for the military while tying their very presence to his own stay in power. 
In addition, Suharto, while allowing these MOBs to be run by the TNI as an institution which 
remained underfunded by the state, his personalist style of patronage and manipulation of the 
command structure accorded him considerable leverage over who runs and manages these 
MOBs. That said, TNI’s defection from Suharto in the face of the democracy protests in 1998 
took only a few by surprise. This is because Suharto has increasingly alienated the TNI from his 
‘political’ power-sharing arrangement since the end of the 1980s, lowering the stakes for the 
military in the survival of his regime. TNI’s position during the crisis accorded the military a 
high degree of political legitimacy during and following the transition. It was only after its 
political defeat in the management of the crisis of East Timor and with the stabilization of 
civilian politics by 2004 that the TNI did come under increased civilian control and a process of 
divestment of its MOBs was launched. The aim of MOBs’ divestment was to re-establish TNI’s 
financial dependency on the state as well as to redefine its role, keeping it exclusively within the 
defense zone. 
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Figure 6: MOBs in TNI’s Defection from Suharto 
 
In what follows, this chapter will proceed with an introduction on civil-military relations 
in the Indonesian context under Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime (1966-1998), while also tracing 
their roots in the formative years of his predecessor, President Sukarno (1945-1966). Then, the 
development of TNI’s MOBs will be presented and how the independent control by the military 
institution over its MOBs made it possible for the military to survive beyond Suharto’s regime. 
 
5.2 TNI in Politics: From Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ to Suharto’s ‘New Order’ 
Following independence in 1949, the instability of political life and tendency of some 
politicians to politicize the military caused a push back and the military presented itself as a 
political player. Yet it remained a force that President Sukarno managed to keep under his own 
control by siding with it especially given his own dissatisfaction with the parliamentary multi-
party system (1949-1957), which he considered to be highly destabilizing (Sukma, 2010: 152). In 
this context and with its legacy in the struggle for independence, the TNI saw itself increasingly 
as a partner in managing the newly founded state. It stood, for example, against the creation of a 
federal state upon the declaration of independence. The TNI, yet, did not aim at replacing the 
civilian government but aimed instead at a more visible and influential presence given the 
perceived failure of civilian politicians (Hoadley, 1975: 123). TNI’s grievance grew even more 
as civilian governments made its development and professionalization as a fighting force more 
challenging task by manipulating military-related bills, especially regarding funding and 
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appointments (Goshal, 1980: 7; Singh, 2000b: 614). This is because the TNI was created out of 
loosely structured combat units and militias that were controlled by or coordinating with civilian 
politicians during the war for independence in addition to some of the militias that were trained 
by the Japanese (led mostly by some of the Islamist and secular politicians, one of whom was 
Sukarno himself) and to a lesser the remnants of the local Dutch forces (Hoadley, 1975: 96; 
Sundhaussen, 1996: 190-191). Political manipulations proved counterproductive as the military 
institution, through the early 1950s, remained characterized by powerful regional command 
centers at the expense of the central command, leaving the TNI more of an informal organization 
with a weak chain of command (Singh, 2001: 24-25; Mietzner, 2009: 39, 44). A moment of open 
challenge broke out in 1952 when a group of military officers publicly protested at the 
presidential palace the policy of the government regarding the military and the growing 
politicization of defense affairs by political parties. Sukarno disapproved the presentation of 
military demands through protests as he did not want the military to go out of control. Three 
years after, however, the military made its first overt political intervention by rejecting the Prime 
Minister’s nomination for chief of staff leading eventually to the resignation of the Prime 
Minister (Ibid: 101-102).  
In 1957, Sukarno, increasingly dissatisfied with the political course of the country, 
declared martial law, disbanded the parliament, and initiated a phase of ultranationalist and 
authoritarian politics in the country under the label of “Guided Democracy.” During this period, 
Sukarno, while using the military as a tool of the state in the economic domain and civilian 
administration, brokered also the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and most of the 
political developments in the country during this period (1957-1965) can be seen in light of the 
competition between these two forces. As the military was ordered by Sukarno to intervene and 
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to enforce martial law, it was also put in charge of running the nationalized Dutch companies, 
institutionalizing TNI’s economic intervention. This economic role expanded in the early 1960s 
as nationalization expanded to include American and British companies. In addition, the military 
was involved also in developmental projects throughout the country to help with the 
reconstruction efforts in areas still further behind or where rebellions took place in an effort to 
win the hearts and the minds of the people (Hoadley, 1975: 120-121). This further legitimized 
military’s interventions, claiming itself to be interventionist, not by nature, but rather by 
necessity. By time, however, these political and economic interventions were taken as 
entitlements (Singh, 2001: 12-13; Mietzner, 2009: 37-8). 
As a result, the military theorized for itself a strategy of participating in the ‘guided 
democracy’ regime named the ‘middle way,’ underlining its rejection to a complete 
subordination to civilian politicians. This new TNI strategy can be seen as the outgrowth of a 
typical example of an independence fighting force, one that claims credit over politicians during 
the process, i.e. army of the people and not of the state (Sukma, 2010: 151). Since its 
development in 1959, this policy platform represented the foundation of TNI’s interventions 
until it voluntarily decided to adopt a ‘new paradigm’ in 1999 following the transition to civilian 
democracy in 1998. According to the ‘middle way,’ the military is to position itself along the 
continuum of political interventions somewhere in the middle between actively ruling the 
country on one side and staying completely apolitical and confining itself to defense affairs alone 
on the other (Sukma, 2010: 153-4; Sundhaussen, 1996: 198; Goshal, 1980: 21). The ‘middle 
way’ strategy entitled the military to secure a degree of representation at and sometimes 
domination over most state institutions (Vatikiotis, 1998: 70). This policy was facilitated by the 
creation of the territorial command structure in the military that was founded distinct from the 
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professional combat structure and parallel to the administrative organization of the state. In 
addition, a greater degree of independence was granted to the small regional units so as to suit 
the geographical nature of the country and to maintain good relations with the local populations 
while also making these units responsible for raising their own funds. This structure 
institutionalized military interventions in the political arena and led to a more visible role by the 
military in local life, especially in the electoral and business domains (Mietzner, 2009: 48-9; 
Callahan, 1999: 13).  
Alarmed by the rising influence and powers of the military and to block the way in the 
face of its domination of the political scene, Sukarno gave more support to the communists 
(PKI), whom the military took as an enemy since the divergent paths they adopted during the 
struggle for independence (Goshal, 1980: 33). Nevertheless, in the wake of an alleged coup 
attempt by the PKI in 1965 that resulted in the death of most TNI’s top leadership, Sukarno’s 
guided democracy was brought to an end. This transition was sponsored by the military and 
Suharto’s (then-chief of the reserve force) eventual rise to power (effectively in 1966 when he 
forced Sukarno to delegate his authority to him and until he was officially declared president in 
1968) came at a time where the economy was at its lowest and protests where widespread 
making it possible for a push for change by the military to be well-received by the public (Lee, 
2015: 111; Sundhaussen, 1996: 196). Post-1965, the military undertook another phase of 
political intervention under the martial law (announced through 1969). Yet, this incident of 
military intervention remained also short of being a rule by the junta in the traditional sense as 
the military was primarily employed to establish the domination of Suharto’s regime, i.e. ruling 
through the military (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002: 36-7).  
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Suharto used his capacity as the head of the armed forces to disqualify his political 
enemies on grounds of national security concerns, particularly during the marital law years 
(Mietzner, 2009: 53). He also expanded TNI’s representation in the parliament, a tradition 
inherited from the Sukarno era when he replaced the elected parliament with an appointed, 
professionally-representative council in 1960 (Sundhaussen, 1996: 194-5). He also continued on 
Sukarno’s balancing policy against the political power of the military, after getting rid of the 
communist PKI, through initially sponsoring the rise of a regime-backed party (Golkar) shortly 
after assuming power and later the rise of some of the Islamist opposition groups in the 1990s. 
While Golkar initially grew as a TNI creation out of TNI’s involvement in organizing civilian 
mobilization groups during the political fight against the PKI at the regional level in the late 
1950s, it eventually developed a character of its own and distanced itself from TNI especially 
starting 1983 and began challenging the political and business roles of the military (Hoadley, 
1975: 115-7; Vatikiotis, 1998: 78; 85).  
Upon his formal assumption of the presidency, Suharto did not want the military to 
have independent political power from his office and aimed to secure his political control over it, 
he initiated a plan to consolidate the institutionalization of the military and to streamline the 
chain of command. Suharto centralized authority around his office assisted by a group of 
loyalists in the armed forces who also administered forums for political debates within the force 
(Sundhaussen, 1996: 201; Lee, 2015: 111-2). Additionally, he stripped the regional commanders 
of most of their powers and shifted power back to the headquarters in the capital and limited any 
troop movements unless formally approved by his office only. He also trimmed the power of the 
service branches and downgraded their top positions from ministers to chiefs of staff under 
himself as the minister of defense. In addition, Suharto launched a “de-Sukaronization” 
79 
campaign while extending patronage to the officers so as to secure their loyalty (Crouch, 2007: 
234, 237). Suharto oversaw all non-military tasks of the TNI as well, keeping them under his 
own direct control (Goshal, 1980: 48). He continued to have a strong control over the military, 
especially with regard to senior-level appointments, until the end of his stay in power (Said, 
2006: 70, 95, 111; Kristiadi, 2001: 101-2).  
While the first few years under Suharto were overly dominated by military officers, the 
political changes over the course of the 1980s uncovered increased limits on the political role of 
the military especially with the rise of a class of civilian politicians and bureaucrats (Mietzner, 
2009: 61; Slater, 2009: 146, 152). A nascent group of economists and technocrats proved itself 
more capable of informing and directing state policies towards growth and development, 
contributing to the stabilization of the country’s economy by mid-1970s while taking away from 
the power of the military especially with the spread of corruption in the ranks (Lee, 2015: 118). 
In addition, Golkar grew also in power to the point that the vice president was chosen from 
among its members for the first time in 1989, reflecting the regime’s growing “civilianization” 
(Slater, 2009: 157-8). This change manifested itself also in the decline in the number of active 
duty officers appointed to civilian positions from 21,000 in 1977 to 16,000 in 1980 and then to 
14,000 in 1992 (Callahan, 1999: 11). This changing face of the regime came following Suharto’s 
retirement from service in 1978 and paralleled the rise of new generations of more 
professionalized military officers and also (Lee, 2015: 122; Mietzner, 2009: 59). By giving more 
political space for the technocrats, while not pushing the military fully out of favor, Suharto 
maintained a system of “balanced vested interests” (Crouch, 2007: 310). 
Despite some of the negative effects of its overt political involvement on its 
institutionalization, the TNI still prides itself as one integral institution as compared to the 
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fractionalization that characterizes civilian political actors. In fact, Suharto’s patronage style, 
known as the ‘self-service’ approach, functioned through forging personal relations of loyalty 
but without undermining the institution (Vatikiotis, 1998: 75; Mietzner, 2009: 55). This was 
clear as Suharto tried to maintain some balance between different dividing lines within the 
military, such as religion, ethnicity, service branch, and class. It remains, however, that TNI’s 
corporateness was undermined to some extent by Suharto’s manipulation of promotions and 
appointments, resulting in competition among the middle and senior-ranking officers to secure 
the patron’s confidence (Crouch, 1979: 577-578; Callahan, 1999: 30). In addition, the duality in 
function ordained by the ‘middle way’ doctrine created some tensions within officer corps 
between the socio-political and professional aspects (Sundhaussen, 1996: 203). Furthermore, the 
non-military roles of the TNI resulted in networks of informal bonding through family, business, 
and exchange of favors both within the military and between the military and other regime 
institutions and elites, especially at the local level (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002: 66-67; Mietzner, 
2009: 100). 
 
5.3 TNI’s MOBs: Growth and Decline 
TNI’s business involvement goes back to the independence war when the units (or 
militias) were responsible for raising enough funds to support themselves (Rabasa and Haseman, 
2002: 71; Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007: 29). These businesses were either run 
independently by military officers or through partnership with civilian businesses (McCulloch, 
2003: 97, 101-102). Following independence and during the first years of guided democracy, this 
pattern continued especially at the local level. Nevertheless, the institutional economic role of the 
TNI came after the military’s control over the nationalized Dutch (in 1957) and later over the 
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British and the American companies in 1964 and in 1965 respectively. In addition, against the 
pressures of the financial crisis over the course of the 1960s, the military secured control over 
and/or representation at many state-owned enterprises through active duty and retired officers, 
who channeled a share of the profits of these companies to TNI’s institutional coffers. This 
eventually led to a situation where the military was partly financially self-sufficient at the central 
and regional levels while many of the local units where completely financially self-sufficient 
(Ibid: 100-101). Through its involvement in the civilian economy, TNI acquired also technical 
experiences in civil administration that added to those it already accumulated through its direct 
administration of some of the remote rural areas and the territories with separatist tendencies 
during the years of the martial law in the late 1950s. 
With Suharto’s rise to power, he made the promise of development and economic 
prosperity, in departure from his predecessor’s nationalist and anti-imperialist discourse. With 
highly incapacitated state bureaucracy, Suharto elected to use the military in his efforts to 
accelerate the rate of economic growth and societal development, especially given TNI’s 
business experience under Sukarno. Suharto himself, while a military commander, was involved 
in the development of MOBs to support his own regional command (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002: 
72). Therefore, Suharto’s economic platform expanded the business and funding opportunities 
for the military while making it possible also for the TNI not to make demands on the national 
budget during a low point for the economy – contributing to TNI’s image as the promoter and 
guardian of national development (Crouch, 2007: 273-4). In addition, the military, while 
participating in national development efforts, had a ‘corporate’ interest in having additional 
MOBs to seal itself against political manipulations and pressures (Singh, 2001: 9). To reaffirm 
this position, the first law specifying the role of the TNI was passed, clearly underlining its 
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duality of function both in defense and in social, economic, and political development (Lee, 
2015: 123). This resulted in a new distinction within the military between the “financial” and the 
“professional” officers (Mietzner, 2009: 99). 
Suharto also expanded the use of the military to occupy civilian positions in state 
bureaucracy, not only as a patronage channel for the officers but also out of necessity to fill in 
the many positions that became vacant following the war on communists as well as to replace 
those whose loyalty to the ‘new order’ was suspected (Croissant et al, 2013a: 99; Kristiadi, 2001: 
101-2). The military’s control over some of the state-owned enterprises, especially the lucrative 
oil and logistics companies, provided it with huge sources of revenue both for its own 
operational expenses as well as to extend patronage both for itself and on behalf of the regime. 
This growing business involvement of the TNI brought about new titles for the officers, 
including the “manager” and the “bureaucrat,” in addition to the traditionally carried one of the 
defender and the “guardian” of the state and of national independence. Nevertheless, Suharto’s 
heavy reliance on the military for economic development was seen as a gradual pulling of the 
military out of politics so as to restore normalcy and stability (Singh, 2001: 26).  
TNI’s MOBs grew and expanded over the course of the 1970s especially after the oil 
boom and the influx of foreign, primarily Chinese, investments into the country (Brommelhorster 
and Paes, 2003: 6). While this increase in the revenues of the government led to some increase in 
the budget of the TNI, the budgetary allocation did not grow to fully cover military needs. In 
light of the absence of a strong political will or need to kill TNI’s MOBs, they continued to 
expand and mushroom. Corruption, however, was on the rise as well to the point that it was 
publicly criticized by Suharto himself in 1967, still in his second year in power. Nevertheless, 
many of the measures of accountability he introduced were not seen effective enough (Crouch, 
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2007: 291-2). It was not until 1974 that Suharto has to issue a decree prohibiting any business 
dealings by active duty officers and their families (Singh, 2001: 15).  
TNI’s MOBs grew even more over the following decade especially with the 
involvement of Suharto’s family in business and cooperating in business alliances with the 
military (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007: 38; Mietzner, 2009: 55). This allowed MOBs to 
become active across almost all types of economic activity with examples found in the fields of 
transportation, construction, telecommunication, and extraction as well as in the service sector 
(McCulloch, 2003: 106; Rabasa and Haseman, 2002: 74-76). As of 1998, there were 57 different 
businesses owned by the military, the net worth of which was estimated at around $8 billion in 
199917 (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007: 37; Callahan, 1999: 26). However, against the 
growing share of the first family in the Indonesian economy, Suharto had to occasionally 
interfere to defend TNI’s MOBs against the cooperation-turned-competition with the ‘first’ 
businesses (Lee, 2015: 131; Singh, 2001: 19-20). It is to be noted also that the official budget of 
the military did not expand as a share of the GDP even during the miraculous economic growth 
starting the late 1980 and until the 1997 crisis (McCulloch, 2003: 103).  
TNI’s MOBs are controlled through charitable foundations (yayasans) and cooperatives 
that act as holding companies for a range of specialized corporations (McCulloch, 2003: 106-8). 
Foundations can be found by each service branch and under the central command, with each 
owning its own holding or group of companies that aim at channeling the proceeds towards 
higher provisions for the soldiers (McCulloch, 2003: 106-107, 116). Cooperatives also exist by 
service branch and at each unit level under the control of the central cooperative at the service 
branch headquarters. Cooperatives are membership-based (as opposed to foundations) and are 
                                                 
17 An extensive list of corporations formally owned by TNI can be found in (Kingsbury, 2003: 214-220). There were also some 
informal, and in some cases illegal, activities by active duty officers that included the hiring of military equipment for service 
provision such as security, construction, and transportation (McCulloch, 2003: 110-111). 
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the least accountable to auditory bodies (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007: 42-3). Proceeds of 
cooperatives are directed towards providing services and commodities for military personnel and 
their families at discounted prices as well as improving the professional standing of the military.  
Therefore, it can be said that the military maintained its financial ‘independence’ under 
both Sukarno and Suharto (Beeson, 2008: 479-480; Crouch, 2007: 276-7; Yunanto, 2005: 81). 
Despite the fact that there are no specific estimates for the size of TNI’s MOBs, they remain 
significant as a motivation for TNI’s political involvement given the fact that the estimated range 
of TNI’s self-financing, which varies by time and source, overly goes from 55% to 75% of the 
military budget (McCulloch, 2003: 121-2; Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007: 50; Rabasa and 
Haseman, 2002: 69).  
 
5.4 May 1998 Protests and TNI’s Defection 
Suharto’s developmental project seemed to be working out well and the economic 
miracle was recognized both domestically and internationally. Yet, the 1997 crisis proved 
damaging to the economy and the government’s strategies for recovery seemed not be bold 
enough to fix the problem. By the turn of 1998, the worsening economic situation precipitated 
nation-wide protests led by university students who used this opportunity as well to protest 
Suharto’s re-election and his manipulation of political life as well as the wide spread corruption 
in government and business circles. The challenge was unprecedented for Suharto and his efforts 
to calm it down were fruitless especially after his formation of a new cabinet that had his 
daughter and a number of his cronies serving as ministers, aggravating the crisis even more (Lee, 
2015: 105). On May 12th, Suharto’s official trip out of the country, a show of confidence on his 
side, came as an opportunity for the protesters to scale up their demands, especially after the 
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killing of four student protesters on May 15th. Two days after, on May 18th, security forces, 
which serve under the command on the TNI, withdrew from the capital on claims of staying out 
of politics, leaving the door open for violent rioting and criminal activities (Singh, 2000a: 116-
118). 
The military had orders to repress protests earlier in February and there were multiple 
threats by Suharto of imposing martial law. Nevertheless, the military tolerated the protests and 
made them permissible in specific confined locations (mostly on university campuses), which 
was a de-facto permission. It also held “open dialogues” with the student demonstrators until 
eventually allowing them to take their protests off-campus and even to the parliament. This 
situation that was not limited to the capital alone but was replicated in most regional centers 
where protests were taking place as well (Lee, 2015: 106-8). In addition, the military also did not 
welcome Suharto’s proposal of imposing martial law considering that the situation was not out of 
control. Instead, the minister of defense, Gen. Wiranto, convinced the president to resign in 
return for securing his and his family’s safety. Accordingly, Suharto announced his resignation 
and handed power over to his vice president, B. J. Habibie (Ibid: 108-9).  
As these developments took place, Suharto reshuffled top military positions more than 
once during the first half of the crisis year to tighten his grip over TNI (Lee, 2015: 133-134). 
This came in line with his increasingly frequent rotations in top military positions since the end 
of the 1980s both to secure the loyalty of the senior leadership as well as to give enough 
opportunities for the growing size of the officer corps to advance towards command positions 
(Chandra and Kammen, 2002: 104-6). He also appointed his son-in-law, Gen. Prabowo, to head 
the Special Forces, who acted occasionally in an independent manner from the chain of 
command during the crisis and reached out on his own to the protesters and the opposition 
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groups, especially the religious leaders, in search for compromises and ways out of the crisis. In 
fact, Prabowo is believed responsible for the kidnapping and the killing of a number of the 
student protesters, which were seen as attempts to weaken the position of the army chief. This is 
while Gen. Wiranto rejected these moves and secured his control over the military with the aim 
of protecting the professionalism of the force and reforming the civil space (Lee, 2015: 135-9). 
This was also made possible in light of Wiranto’s reputation as one of the “intellectual officers,” 
who were critical of both TNI’s political involvement as well as its manipulation by Suharto. He 
also enjoyed a family and a business relationship with leaders from Nahdat Ulama, the biggest 
Islamist opposition force to Suharto, giving him additional leverage during the crisis (Ibid: 146; 
148-9). Despite initially agreeing with Prabowo to serve as his minister of defense upon the end 
of the crisis, then-vice president Habibie eventually saw in Wiranto a more reliable partner since 
the latter was the one to control much of the armed forces and also to make his interim stay in 
office less of an extension of Suharto’s reign (Ibid: 147). 
The way in which the transition took place strengthened the position of the military vis-
à-vis civilian politicians who remained divided (Mietzner, 2006: 8). However, after the 
transition; the military self-declared a position to limit its political interventions in a reform 
document released in October 1998 under the title of ‘New Paradigm’ (Sukma, 2010: 150, 158-9; 
Callahan, 1999: 19). According to this new document, the military accepted the appointment of a 
civilian defense minister and dissolved all military offices in charge of non-military tasks 
(Kristiadi, 2001: 105-6). The military also changed its name from the Armed forces of Indonesia 
(ABRI) to Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI), the name of the anti-colonization military, 
underlining a focus of its role in external defense alone. In addition, the police force became a 
separate entity, distinct from the TNI (Sukma, 2010: 149; Callahan, 1999: 20). TNI also brought 
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an end to the appointment of active-duty officers to civilian positions as well as promised staying 
above party politics and out of Golkar membership. The parliament also cancelled TNI’s 
legislative quota in the national and local legislative bodies (8% and 10%, respectively) 
(Callahan, 1999: 21-23). These changes were later codified in the 2002 constitution (Mietzner, 
2006: 60; Mietzner, 2011a: 139). 
Nevertheless, through 2004, TNI remained autonomous against successive presidents 
concerning its own internal affairs (Sukma, 2010: 160), especially the control over the promotion 
of middle and lower rank officers (Chandra and Kammen, 2002: 96). This was made possible 
because the interim president, Habibe (1998-1999), was seen as an extension of the old “new 
order;” while A. Wahid’s presidency (1999-2001) proved highly divisive and lacking in 
experience. This is while the third president, Megawati Sukarno (2001-2004), depended too 
much on the military for her own political legitimacy so that not much change took place in the 
management of civil-military relations (Mietzner, 2011a: 141). The preservation of the territorial 
management structure, seen by civilian powers as the main channel for the political influence of 
the military, was also defended on the ground that the military needs to maintain presence 
throughout the different regions of the country, especially the ones with separatist tendencies 
(Croissant et al, 2013a: 99). The survival of TNI’s MOBs was also defended as long as the TNI 
remained under-funded from by the state (Vatikiotis, 1998: 72). In addition, while the military 
declared neutrality in the post-transition elections, an increased number of candidates were 
retired military officers, which can be seen as a new approach to political interventions by the 
institution (Heidux, 2011: 260). 
By 2004, with civilian politics heading towards increased stability, a 20% increase in 
the military budget, and the military’s preoccupation with fighting the separatist movements, the 
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government passed a law, the Armed Forces Act, to divest all TNI’s MOBs by 2009 (Mietzner, 
2014: 442). Accordingly, all TNI-affiliate corporations were sold; yet the cooperatives and 
foundations themselves remained operational and under effective military control (Mietzner, 
2011a: 140; Rieffel and Pramodhawardani, 2007: 59).18 This is while complete divestment 
remained an unrealistic target for the state to accomplish because it would imply a strong 
demand by the military on the national budget at a time when the economy was still recovering 
(Singh, 2001: 26). The current gap between the requested and approved budgetary allocations 
continues to be as high as $10 billion (Sebastian and Gindarsah, 2013: 299). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
It can be said that the entwined process of development of both the state, as opposed to 
the regime, and its military may have contributed to a military ideology that brings with it a 
sense of responsibility to intervene in politics when instability arises. This inseparable link to 
civilian life was established by the military’s control over the police force and involvement in 
internal security (Sukma, 2010: 157). In this light, TNI’s MOBs can be seen as a ‘functional,’ 
rather than patronage, resource that provides for the institution to operate, especially considering 
the process of historic development for both the Indonesian state and military. This was true even 
during the 1997 financial crisis as TNI’s MOBs, despite the losses they incurred, helped seal off 
the military during the crisis (Singh, 2001: 32). In addition, following the transition, TNI’s 
leadership expressed its willingness to divest the MOBs as soon as the allocated defense budget 
grows to cover all TNI’s operational needs (Kingsbury, 2003: 188-9, 191). It can be said, 
therefore, that Suharto, while developing different methods to establish patronage networks with 
                                                 
18 In 1999, a law was passed to consider all the proceeds of TNI’s foundations’ economic activity as state money (for increased 
scrutiny) but not their affiliated companies (McCulloch, 2003: 116). 
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his officers, TNI’s MOBs remained not part of such a network. They, by contrast, contributed to 
the military’s autonomy under his regime. As the military leadership was turning towards less 
political and social involvement (partly due to its increased professionalization and partly due to 
Suharto’s downplay of the military’s role in politics) coupled with its concern with institutional 
integrity against the threat of the uprising and the cost of applying repression and the 
accountability of its officers, being financially autonomous contributed positively to the 
military’s calculated decision to defect. While its involvement in internal repression, through the 
control of the police as well as the alleged human rights violations, and the presence of a group 
of Suharto-loyalists in the ranks may have made a case for repression and defense of the status 
quo, the institutional interest in and ability (through MOBs) to survive beyond Suharto tilted the 
balance in favor of defection.  
This discussion, however, raises the question of why did Suharto19 keep the military 
underfunded while he was aiming to maintain both its loyalty and its institutional integrity. As a 
matter of fact, some argue that financial independence and institutional autonomy of the military 
can be overcome by maintaining control over appointments and security policy, both of which 
Suharto retained for himself. Militaries would opt to remain acivilian-controlled otherwise 
(Mietzner, 2009: 10-49). The case of the TNI poses a challenging puzzle in this regard since it 
defected from Suharto even with his control over senior appointments and security policy, 
making a strong case for the influence of financial independence on the defection behavior of the 
military. Consequently, had the military been financially dependent on Suharto’s survival in 
office, the transition may have adopted a different course. With up to three quarters of the budget 
of the institution, outside of the state budget, controlled in this counterfactual case by the 
                                                 
19 This applies also to the case of Egypt under Mubarak’s regime as will be shown later in chapter six. 
90 
incumbent and with the military’s control over the police force and its involvement in internal 
control, a decision to repress could have been made.  
Another related question, especially in the case of democratizing countries as in the 
Indonesian case, concerns the prospects of the political role of the military against its 
interventionist legacy and in light of its continued command of independent financial resources. 
This is relevant because TNI stands out as a military that did not take over the government 
openly but remains one that undertakes occasional political interventions in order to defend 
values beyond its mere corporate interest, such as protecting the nation and restoring order and 
stability (Sundhaussen, 1982: ix). While it is true that the military post-2004 became increasingly 
subordinate to civilian authorities, the chances for its political comeback remain high. 
 
6 CHAPTER 5: THE THAI MILITARY IN 2006: A MONARCHY-INDUCED DEFECTION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
There are two major centers of power in the Thai political system: the monarch who 
enjoys several formal and informal powers and the military which ruled the country over most of 
its modern history and turned the monarchy from absolute into constitutional starting 1932. 
Civilian politicians and the parliament eventually dominated the political system following the 
end of military rule in 1992 (and effectively until 2006) while enjoying varying degrees of 
influence and control under military rule before that. In addition, state bureaucracy, the media, 
and business associations enjoy a significant amount of influence in the political system. 
The concern of this chapter is with the military in its relationship with the rest of 
political powers. This relationship has varied from cooperation to confrontation over time. In 
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1932, the increasingly professionalized military and the rising modern state bureaucracy joined 
ranks to protest the absolute powers of the king and the arrangements of the royal family that 
monopolized access to top posts, with no regard to merit. Shortly after limiting the power of the 
palace, the military turned against the civilian bureaucracy and tried to dominate the political 
arena exclusively. With increased challenges from the bureaucracy and the rising middle class, 
the military re-oriented itself towards cooperation/subordination to the king starting 1957. In 
fact, the military remained subordinate and loyal to the king since then, identifying the protection 
of the monarch to be part of the institution’s definition of national security. The king, on his part, 
accumulated a range of moral and informal as well as formal powers, most of which come into 
action through its ‘advisory’ Privy Council,20 which is mostly staffed by retired and active-duty 
military officers and that also oversees the immense royal wealth through the ‘autonomous’ 
Crown Property Bureau (CPB)21. While the influence of the monarchy extends beyond the 
political system to business circles, the palace occasionally mediates military’s connections with 
civilian government (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 130-131). It remains that the military, 
with its interventionist legacy, developed a wide range of independent MOBs that ranged from 
banking services to control over media and security services. 
Following the democratization and civilianization (as opposed to militarization) of the 
political system in 1992, the roots of electoral legitimacy started taking roots. The uninterrupted 
survival of civilian governments for more than a decade (1992-2006) was unprecedented in the 
modern history of the country and Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) became the first civilian 
prime minster to complete his full 4-year term in office (and to win a re-election). Up until the 
                                                 
20 The council does not have any de-jure powers in the Thai political system; yet, it enjoys a lot of influence given its affiliation 
with the Palace (Chachavalpongpun, 2014: 5). 
21 The CPB is among the oldest investment funds in the country as well as the biggest landowner. In fact, the king comes as the 
richest in the country. The CPB sealed the palace off financial pressures by the government, securing its independent funding 
upon the return to its control to the palace, and away from the state, in 1948 (Ouyyanont, 2008: 166-7). 
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1990s, civilian governments did not last for more than a year as a result of some sort of a 
military intervention, early election, or a coup. The transition to democracy was codified in a 
constitution promulgated in 1997 that strengthened both political parties and the executive 
branch. The relatively unsuccessful record of managing the 1998 economic crisis cost the 
traditionally-dominant Democrat’s Party power to the newly-taken-over Thais love Thais 
(TRT) party by the ex-police colonel and business tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra. While praised 
for his delicate mix of promising to provide for the less well-off while opening up the economy 
and modernizing state bureaucracy, his reign in office was also charged with corruption, power 
abuse, wealth accumulation, and increased authoritarianism. This led to a political crisis that 
polarized the country and still does for more than a decade since its outbreak back in 2006.  
Thaksin’s opponents, especially after his landslide victory for a second term in 2005, 
joined ranks together to maximize their opposition to his regime. His manipulative control of 
the media and powerful electoral machine brought democracy advocates to the streets in protest 
of his policies, especially in the central urban and southern regions of the country. The 
movement, or the yellow camp, came also to reflect the concern that the political rise of 
Thaksin represented a direct threat to the power of the palace as well as traditional power 
centers in the system. The movement petitioned to the king to intervene to support democracy 
which he did by referring the electoral results to court which annulled them. The opposition, 
acknowledging its electoral weakness, boycotted the new election scheduled for April 2006 and 
that was rescheduled as a result in October 2006. With the growing “mess,” as per the 
description of the king, the military intervened to restore order and to ‘give democracy back to 
the people.’ 
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In a country with a long history of military coups (a total of 19 as of 2006), this incident 
of military intervention in particular has been described as a good coup, coup de grace or a 
royalist coup, among other titles. Nevertheless, it remains puzzling as far as defection/coup 
dichotomy is concerned given the fact that there were two competing centers of loyalty in the 
system, namely the King and the Prime Minister, both of which claim the legitimate 
representation of the people. To engage this puzzle, in what follows the role of the military over 
the history of modern Thailand will be investigated as well as its access to resources and how 
this control had an effect on its decision to intervene against Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006. The 
argument is that: the military’s siding with the king came in line with the fact that the king has 
already won his battle against the government to secure the loyalty of and control over the 
military, through his Privy Council. The palace, for example, managed to confirm its nominee 
for the head of the Army in 2005 against Thaksin’s nominee. In addition, the military, as an 
institution, saw in Thaksin’s efforts to subordinate it a threat to its institutional integrity and 
financial autonomy. As a result, this intervention reinforced the role of the military in the 
political system becoming, however, a protector of the status quo as opposed to an agent of 
change (as it was once in 1932). 
 
 
Figure 7: MOBs in Thai Military intervention in 2006 
 
The Thai military was becoming increasingly corporate since the transition to civilian 
rule in 1992. Nevertheless, it remained autonomous from civilian control, except for the 
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influence of the king through his Privy Council. In addition, the military inherited some MOBs 
from the six decades of intermittent military rule (1932-1992), which it controlled independent 
from civilian governments. Thaksin was trying to establish his domination over the military, at 
the expense of that of the king, through manipulating finances of the institution and re-
establishing them on the budget, and through selective appointments. For example, some MOBs 
were either privatized or aimed to be put under the control of Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra. With a high anti-Thaksin political tide, the military found its interests, MOBs 
included, better secured by reasserting its loyalty to the king and against Thaksin.  
 
6.2 The Role of the Military in the Thai Political System 
The significance of the military in the Thai political system has been increasing since 
the beginning of the 20th century, with military spending and modernization reaching a quarter of 
the national budget by 1915 (Hoadley, 1975: 11). Following the First World War and as 
Thailand regained its de-facto independence in 1925, there was, however, rising resentment 
within the professionalized corps (increasingly educated in the West) against the appointment of 
members of the royal family to top posts (Ibid: 12). This resentment was also present within the 
rising modern, western-modeled state bureaucracy that was also aiming at securing a higher 
degree of influence in the system (Ibid: 13). Against these two players’, i.e. the military and the 
bureaucracy, shared grievance regarding the restriction on “commoners” advancement, they 
staged a joint coup in 1932. The coup, which was led by 24 bureaucratic officials and 37 military 
officers, successfully brought an end to the absolutist monarchy and subordinated it to the 
constitution. This joint move came two decades after the abortion of a coup attempt in 1912 that 
was motivated also by the same grievance (Ockey, 2001: 191). The success of the 1932 coup can 
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be seen in light of, not only the military’s increased professionalism and its cooperation with the 
bureaucracy, but also as a result of the pressures of the economic crisis in the country that 
sharply cut national spending on public services. That is why the coup was seen more of an 
“adjustment” of the political field, rather than a coup in the traditional sense (Hoadley, 1975: 13, 
Ferrara, 2014: 24). In between 1932 and 1991, the military undertook a number of interventions 
and government takeovers, most of which were made on corporate grounds (Ockey, 2001: 206; 
Bunbongkarn, 2013: 175; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009: 246). Nevertheless, this first successful 
coup had, at least, four important implications for the political dynamics in the country 
afterwards.  
The first implication of the 1932 coup was the fact that the military made its move under 
the title of acting in support of democracy, establishing itself as the protector of the people’s 
right to govern and as an agent of change, laying the foundation for other interventions to come 
(Ockey, 2001: 191). In fact, the other incident where the military openly intervened through a 
coup on people’s behalf was in 1991 but was protested a year after as it became part of the 
problem rather than the solution, proving its stay in power no less corrupt than its civilian 
predecessors.  
The second implication is that, by not abolishing the monarchy and with an active 
monarch as the past King, Bhumibol Adulyadej (1946-2016), the palace managed to regain much 
of its clout and powers as an institution above, rather than within, the state, a position that 
created a number of problems for the consolidation of a functioning civilian democracy. This 
was especially true as a link was established between the monarchy and Thai democracy in the 
framework of the so called-‘Thai Style Democracy.’ Among the titles for the Thai kings are: the 
‘Father of Thai Democracy’ for King Prajadhipok (1925-1935) for his surrender to the 1932 
96 
coup and for not blocking, if not allegedly initiating, the process of democratization in the first 
place. The past king also had the title of the ‘Guardian of Thai Democracy’ in reference to his 
intervention on behalf of the people during the 1973 and 1992 crises against military 
governments (Ivarsson and Isager, 2010: 15, 17). In addition, the developmental platform the 
king was pushing for, especially in the least developed regions of the country, attained him great 
respect and popularity as well (Ibid: 20). In fact, the king and his royalist supporters proved 
adept to the political changes as long as they were able to secure their prerogatives and to 
dominate the political scene, even at times indirectly through the military (Ferrara, 2014: 29). 
This became clear in the period between 1932 through the end of second World War and the 
promulgation of a new constitution in 1949 when the king, assisted by the royalist politicians as 
well as the poor record of military and civilian governments, managed to restore important 
powers, such as commander in chief of the armed forces and the power to declare war as well as 
appointing the members of the upper house. The king also retained control over the country’s 
lands. Despite the fact that these powers witnessed cycles of expansion and retraction over the 
years, they remained largely intact and the palace remained to play influential roles in Thai 
politics. As a symbol of national unity that is supposed to stay above politics, the king became 
also seen as a source of political legitimacy, together with or instead of popular legitimacy 
(Hewison and Kitirianglarp, 2010: 184-6).  
The monarch’s capacity as the “legitimizer” of political power became evident with his 
ability to pressure the military out of power following the push for democracy through protests 
both in 1973 and in 1992 (Slater, 2010: 248-9). In addition, securing support from the palace has 
become crucial for the success of any move by the military since 1957 (Chambers, 2013: 69). 
This is because the king skillfully made use of the splits that resulted from the politicization of 
97 
the military in the 1970s and 1980s as an arbiter while commanding the support of the public, 
especially in rural areas, and of the bureaucracy. However, it remains that taking sides in politics 
goes in principle against the king’s presumed role of staying above politics (Alagappa, 1987: 40-
43). 
The third implication of the 1932 coup was that political alliances are short-lived in 
Thailand, except for the king-military alliance, as they are mostly formed to achieve specific 
targets during moments of challenge or crises. This pattern was witnessed when the military 
turned against its civilian partners following the 1932 coup and when it later re-aligned itself 
with the king to legitimize its actions against the popular demands for democracy in an act of 
‘self-subordination’ by the institution. The same pattern was also witnessed during the 2006 
crisis when Thaksin’s enemies formed an alliance that brought together different groups that had 
little in common. The formation of these alliances is facilitated through Thailand’s ‘ruling 
circles,’ which bring together members from more than one formal political institution since 
none of them would prove capable of amassing enough power to ‘dominate’ the political field by 
itself for extended periods of time (Hoadley, 1975: 21).  
Related to this is the fourth implication which is that the rise of new social powers and 
institutions brings with it changes to the ruling alliance. Back in 1932, modernization processes 
gave rise to national institutions, i.e. the military and the bureaucracy, and to a growing middle 
class that aimed at taking a share of the pie of political power. Their increased power and 
influence led to their promotion into partners in governing the country, with the military 
eventually securing the biggest share of political power and it even captured the state itself 
multiple times (Croissant et al, 2013b: 157). Eventually, however, the military, as well as the 
bureaucracy, became more dependent on the blessing of the king for their own power and 
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privilege, falling within a network of patronage that had the media, businessmen, and political 
parties on board (Ibid: 159). Parallel to this, the introduction of the concepts of the modern 
nation-state, constitution, and democracy led to the rise of the idea of active citizenship in the 
society, coupled with the rise of an educated middle class that has been increasingly asking for 
its own space in the alliance. The struggle of Thai people to enjoy their right to political power 
and to challenging the elite came particularly starting the 1970s (Ockey, 2001: 195). The retreat 
of the military and the rise of civilian governments to power following 1992 was another big 
milestone towards democratization. The rise of Thaksin in 2001, however, came to be a game 
changer. This is because Thaksin’s policies were challenging to the position of the king who 
remained the arbiter of political conflicts and enjoyed the ultimate authority in the land, backed 
by network of “good men” spread across state institutions managed through the Privy Council, 
with the military as its iron fest (Ferrara, 2014: 29-30, Chachavalpongpun, 2011: 52). The crisis 
of 2006 can be seen in this light. Drawing parallels to the 1932 “adjustment” of the political field 
in Thailand, the current protracted political crisis in the country can be understood along the 
same lines, with anti-monarchical civilian politicians trying to establish their right to govern in 
spite of or in cooperation with the traditional elite (Croissant et al, 2013b: 172). 
 
6.3 The Persistence of Civilian Rule and the Rise of Thaksin (1992-2006) 
Between 1932 and until 1992, military intervention in politics was the norm rather than 
the exception. In fact, the military dominated the political scene except for very brief periods 
following Second World War and when it failed to repress the democracy protest in 1973. 
Nevertheless, the fight against communism allowed for a military come back in 1976-7. Part of 
the military’s strategy of fighting and winning this war was to allow for a more liberal polity, 
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which began to materialize over the course of the 1980s and until the military’s willful 
withdrawal from politics to the barracks in 1988 (Bamrungsuk, 2002: 78-9). The military was 
also, with the king’s blessing and constitutional ordinance, involved in the efforts to develop 
especially the Northern parts of the country, where most of the communist influence was 
concentrated, a role that it continued to play even after abandoning political power in the 1990s. 
The logic for this developmental role for the military was that the more developed the society 
gets, the more secure it becomes (Ibid: 81-2). 
Following the transition to democracy in 1992, the government changed all laws that 
were used to justify military interventions in political life and transferred control over the riot 
control force to the police (Ibid: 80). The minister of defense was also drawn from among 
civilians as the 1997 constitution banned active duty officers from serving on the cabinet. Yet, it 
remained that retired officers qualified as civilians and through a political class of retired 
officers, the military was able to remain autonomous and shield itself from effective civilian 
control, especially considering the fact that the bureaucracy in the ministry of defense stayed 
largely staffed by active duty officers (Pathmanand, 2001: 6; McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 
132). The problem of civilian control was compounded by the fact that the armed forces 
committees in the parliament remained underdeveloped (Ibid: 89). This caused civilian 
governments to remain vulnerable vis-à-vis the monarch and the military (Chachavalpongpun, 
2014: 3). Against the military’s resistance to civilian subordination efforts, the domination of the 
Privy Council22 on defense-related issues, and civilians’ lack of expertise on defense issues, 
civilian politicians opted instead for cutting on the privileges of the military rather than 
subordinating it to their civilian control (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 133; Croissant et al, 
                                                 
22 The Council has been led since 1989 by retired Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, former Prime Minister and army chief. Gen. Prem, as 
a prime minister, oversaw the opening up for democracy and the return of the military to the barracks in 1988 (Croissant et al, 
2013: 158; Chambers, 2011: 294). 
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2013b: 162-3). Even with the government’s control over the defense budget, especially 
procurements, the electoral process politicized the process and turned some of the political 
parties into clients either to the military or to the arms suppliers, further undermining civilian 
control over the military (Bamrungsuk, 2002: 83). 
The rise of Thaksin came in the wake of the financial crisis in 1998, adopting a critical 
position on the government’s management of the crisis. Making use of his control over a re-
branded political party and the minimal influence the crisis had on his investments, Thaksin had 
sufficient resources in the 2001 election to push for a populist platform that aimed at both 
rescuing affected businesses while shielding the poor. This election was also the first to be held 
under the 1997 constitution, which strengthened the role of the executive branch in the 
government (Kongkirti, 2016: 4-7). The constitution also sponsored a move towards more 
“nationalized politics,” as opposed to a factional, power dispersion model that tended to give 
more weight to local centers of traditional authority.  
Nevertheless, Thaksin changed the rules of the political game from a power sharing, or 
sum-sum game, to a winner-take-all by dominating the political field. This became clear also as 
he tried to build an elite-masses alliance to consolidate his power and to back his policy positions 
against the royalist-military-bureaucratic traditional authority network. According to Croissant et 
al (2013b), Thaksin’s accumulation of power was meant to endorse his own personal power and 
authority rather than to lay the foundation for democratic practices. In addition to trying to 
subordinate the bureaucracy and the military to centralize power in his hands, Thaksin brought to 
power the business sector, expanding its influence over the political process (Hewison, 2010: 
123-5; Connors, 2008: 481; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009: 243). 
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Additionally, the looming monarchical succession has also had some influence on the 
rise of Thaksin in the sense that the low levels of popularity of the heir-to-the throne presented 
an opportunity for the prime minister to be on the offensive and to compete with the monarch 
within even one of his traditionally claimed-exclusive constituencies, i.e. the poor rural 
communities in the Northern parts of Thailand. Thaksin’s wider victory margin in the 2005 
election, on the eve of the king’s 60th anniversary on the throne, made his threat even more 
imminent. In addition, Thaksin’s political and business influence could have also negatively 
affected the work of the CPB (Hewison, 2010: 120-121, 128-129). This made Thaksin’s 
combination of political and economic power and his populist appeal all threatening to the 
institution of the palace (Hewison and Kitirianglarp, 2010: 194-5). According to 
Chachavalpongpun (2011: 45, 50), Thaksin was seen as taking over the Thai state through a 
rising “network Thaksin,” building upon his legacy as the first civilian Prime Minister to 
complete his full term in office and by making use of his career background in police work and 
business operations. 
As far as the military is concerned, the rise of Thaskin and his efforts to take over the 
entrenched ‘monarchy network’ came to challenge both the power position of the military as 
well as the king’s control over it (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 135-6, 151). As Thaksin’s 
approach was to centralize power in his office through informal powers rather than institutional 
means (Croissant et al, 2013b: 165-6), problems arose as he tried to secure his own leverage over 
the military through politicizing promotions and appointing a large number of retired- and 
active-duty generals as advisers to his office. Thaksin also directed the proceeds of MOBs’ 
privatizations or the profits of some of the standing ones to officers loyal to him and to his party, 
yet while occasionally approving some long-delayed increases the national defense budget (Ibid: 
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167). The military, and the Privy Council, was antagonized by Thaksin’s meddling with its own 
finances and promotions. The challenge reached its peak when Thaksin nominated his cousin to 
the position of the head of the army in 2005. Seen as meritless for the position, and upon Gen. 
Prem’s recommendation, the king intervened and appointed one of his loyalists to the post 
instead (Chambers, 2013: 72; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009: 270). 
 
6.4 MOBs and Military Disenchantment 
The Thai military remains a coherent, professional and well-resourced institution 
(Hoadley, 1975: 17). While the motivations for its intervention against Thaksin in 2006 may 
seem clear by now, the grievance related to its MOBs deserves some further detail. Since the end 
of the 1960s, the Thai military, while the government at the time, maintained ownership, direct 
and indirect, of a number of MOBs in different economic sectors including: construction and 
related industries, marine, oil, and food industries, contributing either to the ministry’s budget or 
towards the welfare of retired officers. The military also owns and runs media outlets, especially 
radio stations and print media (Ibid; Silcock, 1967: 309, 312).23 For example, the military 
controls almost half of the radio stations (around 250)24 in the country as well as two of the 
state’s six TV stations (Croissant et al, 2011: 201; Barany, 2012: 200), which allowed the 
military to have, not only sizable revenues25, but also great influence in directing public opinion. 
This is especially significant in a country where most of media outlets are controlled by the state. 
For example, there was no media coverage of the 1992 demonstrations (Pye and Schaffar, 2008: 
                                                 
23 In addition, Peng et al (2001) list a number of active duty officers who serve on board of Thai private businesses, with a total of 
42 companies, where they receive a share of the profit in return for securing profitable contracts and providing protection against 
government intervention. 
24 Military-owned radio stations go back to 1934 when the military used them to spread its own discourse about democracy and 
the vision for the development of the Thai society following the 1932 coup (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009: 124). 
25 The proceeds from the military-owned radio stations are estimated to reach quarter a billion dollars per year (Alagappa, 2001: 
201). 
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51). This was part of the reason why civilian governments tried to challenge the control of the 
military over media outlets and tried to place at least one of its two TV channels under 
government control and entrusted a new government body with the management of media 
frequencies (Pathmanand, 2001: 7). 
As of 2006, the military ranked 26th on the list of top business owners in the country 
with listed specializations in leasing and investments (Wailerdsak and Suehiro, 2010: 250). The 
military is also involved in private security services (Mietzner, 2011b: 8, note 7). Yet, the 
primary investment arm for the Thai military is the Thai military bank (TMB), which controls 
also an insurance company. The TMB was turned from a military-targeting into a general public 
bank in 1973, the same year the military was forced out of office. In 1982, it became part of the 
larger network of the royal economic institutions, yet it is not clear whether the CPB holds any 
shares in it.26 The bank has also been on the list of the top businesses in the country since 1989 
and it peaked in the size of investments through 1997, followed by a decline in the wake of the 
financial crisis (Wailerdsak and Suehiro, 2010: 244). It merged in 2004 with the “Thai Dhanu 
Bank and Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT)”, turning the bank into a joint 
venture with the ministry of finance27 (their total combined share in 2008 was 34%). It is not 
clear, however, whether the merger took place out of financial necessity in the wake of the 1997 
financial crisis or due to pressures from Thaksin considering that the TMB remains the bank 
responsible for arranging all Thai military procurement deals and Thaksin was holding off on 
these procurement lists under austerity claims and until 2005 (Pathmanand, 2001: 7). The bank 
still ranks 4th in terms of the number of assets owned among ‘state-owned’ commercial banks 
                                                 
26 https://www.tmbbank.com/en/about  
27 An active duty military general still serves on the board of directors: https://www.tmbbank.com/en/about/bod  
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and ranks 5th among commercial banks in terms of the size of operations nationwide (Wailerdsak 
and Suehiro, 2010: 261-2).  
While the military lost much of its autonomy in devising its own budgetary allocations 
following the 1998 crisis, its MOBs have been harder to control (Ockey, 2001: 201). Thaksin’s 
keen interest on privatizing MOBs, or at least to re-channel their proceeds through himself or to 
his cronies, can be claimed a contributing factor for the military’s grievance against him. In 
addition, Thaksin adopted a vision of national security that was quite different from that of the 
military. This can be seen through the Thai national budget, where defense of the king is listed as 
part of the definition of national security. Under Thaksin, the protection of the monarchy came 
last among the projected expenditures on national security listed for the ministry of defense in 
200528; while it came on top of the list in 201629, with the military in power following the 2014 
coup. In addition, under Thaksin, the budget of the military remained relatively fixed in terms of 
GDP percentage (6.8%) as opposed to the expenditures of the ministry of interior30 which were 
growing exponentially (30% increase from 2004 to 2005 alone, or three times the growth in 
military budget in monetary terms). With his background in the police, which he needed more 
for internal control; it was relatively easier for Thaksin to rely on the police and to use it as an 
alternative power base instead of the military. 
 
                                                 
28 http://www.bb.go.th/bb/budget/inbrveE/inbrve48E/menu.htm 
29 http://www.bb.go.th/budget_book/e-
Book2559/FILEROOM/CABILIBRARY59/DRAWER01/GENERAL/DATA0000/inBrief2016.pdf 
30 Thaksin took the riot control function away from the military, to the police, to minimize the chances for its political 
intervention. 
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6.5 Protests in “Color-coded Politics”31 
The anti-Thaksin protests broke out due to his increased manipulation of and 
domination over the economy, endorsed by his political power, as well as his political 
authoritarianism (Mietzner, 2011b: 7). Thaksin was accused of using his position to harass 
opponents given his control over the anti-corruption and media advisory bodies, further 
monopolizing the economic and political domains (Montesano, 2009: 2-3). In addition, towards 
the end of 2005, there were demonstrations against the negotiations for a free trade area with the 
United States (as well as with Australia and Japan) leading to their early closure. The protests 
came because of rejection to the principle of the free trade itself and also because of concerns of 
tweaking the terms of the deal for Thaksin’s own business interests. Then, a deal was made to 
sell Thaksin’s family business, tax-free, to a Singaporean Corporation that fed more into the 
protests on the grounds of corruption. This came in addition to some of the problems inherent in 
Thaksin’s policies, including the privatization of state-owned enterprises that seemed to have 
hurt, especially on the long-term, the very group of low-income beneficiaries he was aiming at 
their benefit (Pye and Schaffar, 2008: 47-54). 
Thaksin’s policies brought together several “heterogeneous” groups of opposition 
members in one large movement, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) (Pye and 
Schaffar, 2008: 40-41; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009: 270). PAD was composed of a loose 
group of middle class citizens and large families from the capital and Southern areas in addition 
to some activists at the grassroots level who were alarmed by Thaksin’s neoliberal agenda 
(Hewison, 2010: 125). Despite initially only yellow in color (appealing to the king through 
adopting the color of the monarchy) with its forefront leader Sondhi Limthongkul32 making his 
                                                 
31 (Chachavalpongpun, 2014: 11). 
32 He was also one of the leaders of the democracy protests in 1992 and a media businessman who was shut off air on Thaksin’s 
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affiliation as a royalist very clear since the beginning, PAD turned into a rainbow as time went 
by and the momentum of the grievance increased (Montesano, 2009: 4; Pye and Schaffar, 2008: 
43-4; Chachavalpongpun, 2014: 4). By the end of March 2006, the protesters called for the 
intervention of the king, recalling his interventions in 1973 and 1992, with the joint demand of 
forcing Thaksin to resign especially with the proven difficulty of ousting the prime minister 
through elections (scheduled for April 2006 and which opposition parties boycotted) (Pye and 
Schaffar, 2008: 54-55). The king agreed to intervene and aired multiple messages implying that 
Thaksin must step down, which Thaksin did not agree to. The king, eventually, called for a joint 
meeting for the constitutional, supreme, and administrative courts to find a way-out for the 
political “mess” in the country and they annulled the results of the elections (Montesano, 2009: 
13). Increasingly dissatisfied with the paralyzing political situation, the king allegedly gave his 
blessing to the military to intervene against Thaksin in September 2006, which it eventually did. 
During the crisis, it was reported that Gen. Prem and many of the ‘military’ members of the 
Privy Council paid visits to different military units to reassert their support to the king and not to 
the government (Hewison and Kitirianglarp, 2010: 193). This made Thaskin’s ouster by the 
military in 2006 the highest in royal symbolism among all military interventions in Thailand 
(Ferrara, 2014: 18). The military aimed with this intervention to preserve the status quo and to 
keep power in the hands of the military and state bureaucracy, under the guidance of the king 
(Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009: 271).  
Upon assuming power, the military dissolved the parliament, called for new elections 
and acted as a caretaker government until new elections could be held and a new constitution 
drafted (Pye and Schaffar, 2008: 56; Hewison and Kitirianglarp, 2010: 192-3; Chambers, 2010: 
51). Despite the 2006 military intervention might have suggested that “network monarchy” won 
                                                                                                                                                             
orders because of his increasingly critical tone. 
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over both Thaksin and eventually the rest of the non-royalist elements in the anti-Thaksin protest 
movement, the crisis did not come to an end (Pye and Schaffar, 2008: 57). This is because the 
‘redshirts,’ symbolizing Thaksin’s political current, took to the streets to protest Thaksin’s ouster 
by the military. The political conflict between the “royalists” and the “populists” continued to get 
worse, leading to further military interventions in 2008 and in 2014, all with the aim of blocking 
the political come back of Thaksin Shinawatra and his political network (Ferrara, 2014: 20).  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
It can be seen that the military during the 2006 political crisis, instead of playing the 
role of the arbitrator, was actually used by the ultimate arbitrator in the regime, the king, in what 
can be termed as a ‘monarchy-induced defection.’ While unseating Thaksin Shinawatra through 
the use of force technically qualifies as a military coup, the reality of it requires delving a little 
deeper into the roots of the crisis and the wider processes of political change that were taking 
place in Thailand. The military, acting upon the orders of the king, even allegedly, raises 
questions regarding to whom political authority ultimately belongs in the regime. Unless the 
debate on whether legitimacy flows from the top or the bottom of the political structure is settled, 
the political intervention of the Thai military in 2006 should be placed in the grey area falling 
between the two extreme cases of active (coup) and passive (defection) political interventions by 
the military. 
While it remains true that the Thai military has a legacy of excessive political 
interventions which provided the military with experience in governing the country and secured 
access to and control over many resources, this incident of intervention, especially as it came 
during a political crisis and a moment of acute political polarization, was motivated less by 
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institutional self-interest. This can be seen as the military did not hold political power for long 
after removing Thaksin Shinawatra. Its intervention, rather, was geared towards standing by and 
out of loyalty to the monarch, the unelected source of political legitimacy in the system and 
above all the head of the state. This is not to say that the military did not have its own grievance 
against Thaksin. In fact, his efforts to subordinate, and in a sense downgrade, the status of the 
military from a partner in the political regime to a follower, through tying the financial 
allowances and top level appointments and promotions (as well as appointments to lucrative top 
bureaucratic positions) to himself while cutting on the media and banking businesses of the 
military, it would be safe to assume that Thaksin made an enemy of the military. In addition, it 
was Thaksin that reversed the trend of depoliticizing the military (yet, while remaining under the 
King’s command) that had been in effect since 1992 and tried to turn its loyalty towards him 
(which came as a challenge to the palace and not only to the military).  
This concern about Thaksin’s approach was also shared by other economic, political, 
and bureaucratic circles that the prime minister tried to dominate and/or subordinate (Croissant 
and Kuehn, 2009: 197). Therefore, it can be said that Thaksin’s manipulation of the professional 
and financial autonomy of the Thai military contributed to the Thai military’s decision to be part 
of the anti-Thaksin alliance and to act as its power enforcer. The military joined the ‘yellow’ 
alliance in order to defend its autonomous privileges and MOBs as well as the access to secure 
even more of them. Doing so, the military acted in defense of the status quo, being part of the 
standing regime and in contrast to its very first intervention back in 1932.  
While the subordination of the military by Thaksin was less likely, especially following 
his inability to push for his nominee for army chief in 2005 and rising resentment within the 
ranks, it can be said that had the military been fully subordinated by Thaksin and its financial 
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subordination efforts were successful, it could have stood by the prime minister or at least it 
would have taken a more neutral position during the crisis, especially to distance itself from the 
king. Thaksin’s unsuccessful attempt to forge a patronage network with the military left the latter 
with little motivation to defend his stay in power.  
It remains to be said that it is generally believed that the military did not economically 
profit from its political intervention considering the losses reported by the TMB in 2007 
(Mietzner, 2011b: 8). Nevertheless, the military, as the interim government and through the 
formation of the new civilian government in 2007, controlled the national budget and the official 
military budget increased by one third in both 2007 and 2008 respectively. It is also not 
unexpected that MOBs might expand on the long term, with the military re-establishing itself as 
a key player in Thai politics. 
To conclude, the defense of the independence of its MOBs and its financial autonomy 
came as a ‘contributing factor’ in the calculation of the military’s decision to defect. This factor 
reinforced the institutional calculations with regard to protecting the integrity of the institution 
and the risks associated with subordination to civilian government on both its autonomy and on 
the status of the palace by far and large in Thai politics. 
7 CHAPTER 6: MUBARAK AND THE MILITARY IN 2011: ESTABLISHING A ‘NEW 
ORDER’ 
7.1 Introduction 
While almost all dictators may seem willing to call on the military to quell mass protests, 
not all of them would be able to get the military to back their will (Hashim, 2015: 5). This was 
the case with the Arab Spring as seated autocrats called on their militaries for intervention to 
their rescue but not all were ready to answer the call. As the waves of the Arab Spring unfolded, 
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the reaction of the military in the first two cases, namely Tunisia and Egypt, proved to be 
unexpected (Ibid: 1). By itself, this reaction by the military may have contributed much to the 
subsequent domino effect and the spread of the protests to other parts, especially the republics, of 
the Arab Middle East. The generals’ decision to abandon the resilient autocrats, who have 
already spared their internal repressive apparatuses, made them look much weaker than they 
were perceived for long. By contrast, the subsequent cases of protest, where the military either 
stood by the dictator or was split over the issue, made the first two cases stand out even more. 
Particularly, the reaction of the Egyptian military, given its large size, political influence and 
economic resources as well as its direct political involvement thereafter, makes it worthy of 
further exploration. While the disintegration of the long-seated Mubarak regime as a result of the 
insubordination by the military was well received by the protesters; it stood out puzzling given 
the traditionally subordinate position of the military vis-à-vis civilian leadership.  
Prior to the uprisings, few studies (notably Brooks (1998) and Cook (2007)) tackled the 
role of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) in the political system and mostly identified the 
military as a key agent in the ruling alliance and whose support is indispensable for the survival 
of the authoritarian regime, yet one that remains politically-‘disengaged’ (Harb, 2003). In the 
same direction went Albrecht and Bishara (2011) who saw the military’s recent direct political 
engagement taking place out of necessity to protect both the state and the military’s own 
interests, instead of the regular position at the back of the regime. This chapter, therefore, aims to 
contribute to this growing literature from a political economy perspective. It argues that due to 
the financial autonomy, as a result of the independent ownership of its institutionalized MOBs, 
there was less motivation for the Egyptian military to defend Mubarak’s stay in power. 
Mubarak’s approach of fragmenting the political field, to borrow Springborg’s term (1989), 
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made it possible for the military to manage its own extra-budgetary resources and in particular 
MOBs without much intervention from him. It can be said, then, that when Mubarak’s survival 
in office was challenged by the masses, the rational calculation by the institution landed it swiftly 
in the opposite side of Mubarak (see figure 8 below).  
 
 
Figure 8: MOBs in EAF’s Defection from Mubarak 
 
The Egyptian military, while largely autonomous against civilian governments, has been 
increasingly corporate, especially starting 1968. Prior to that, it undertook a military takeover 
that was later turned into an autocracy under Nasser. Not only that he used the military as a 
vehicle for social and political control, Nasser also geared the military towards involvement in 
the civilian economy and penetration of state bureaucracy. By the end of the 1970s, EAF’s 
MOBs were founded and began to grow, drawing also on EAF’s economic experience in the 
1960s. These MOBs are exclusively owned and run by the military, independent from the 
regime. During the 2011 crisis, the military adopted an anti-Mubarak position given that the 
latter’s longer term political and economic agendas were not in line with the politically and 
economically powerful position of the institution and it therefore defected.  
To establish this causal link, the chapter will start off with a survey of civil-military 
relations in modern Egypt, with a focus on the influence of MOBs, followed by a presentation of 
the 2011 challenge to Mubarak and how the military managed the crisis. The implications of the 
defection by the military are also highlighted in the concluding section. 
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7.2 History of Civil-Military Relations 
Since its creation as a modern national army by Mohamed Ali Pasha in the early 19th 
century, the Egyptian military has been used as one effective policy tool towards national 
defense (and at times imperial expansion) and modernization as envisaged by the ruler. Initially 
created as a “coercive” force, it gradually transformed into a national military and amassed 
increased political power and influence over the years (Fahmy, 2001: 21). While military recruits 
were primarily Egyptians, the command positions were initially confined to the ruling Turkish 
elite only, a policy that caused tensions within the ranks (Ibid: 28). A challenge came with 
General Urabi’s revolt in 1880, which started off as a military movement calling for the equal 
treatment for Egyptian officers in the military but one that later gained momentum by reaching 
out to civilians. This uprising eventually was brought to a halt by the defeat of the military and 
the direct occupation of the country by the British troops in 1882 (Ibid: 30-32). The British 
colonizer imposed limits on the size and composition of the Egyptian military, turning it into a 
limited force recruited primarily from within the aristocracy to make it easier to control (Beattie, 
1994: 36-39), with senior positions limited to the British commanders and second to them 
Turkish officers (Fahmy, 2001: 35). 
Following the declaration of independence in 1922 and the conclusion of the 1936 treaty, 
which re-defined the Anglo-Egyptian relations, many of the restrictions on the size and 
capabilities of the Egyptian military were removed, opening the door for a wider spectrum of 
Egyptian nationals to join the corps. In fact, the seeds of military autonomy, rather than 
subordination to the landed aristocracy under a largely unstable quasi-democratic constitutional 
monarchy or interventions by the British occupation, came when admission to the military 
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academy was opened for average, middle-class Egyptians (Trimberger, 1978: 152). The size of 
the military grew from 3000 to a peak of 100,000 during the Second World War before falling 
down to 36,000 at its end (Kandil, 2012: 92-93). Being at a heated political moment, both 
nationally and internationally, and not quite ready for the institutional expansion33, the ability of 
the military to seal off its new recruits from political influences, both in terms of membership in 
political parties or the political movements recruitment of the active officers, was largely lacking 
in practice (Beattie, 1994: 40-43).  
Therefore, this politicization of the military greatly expanded, especially after the defeat 
in the 1948 war in Palestine, for which the political leadership, i.e. the king, was held responsible 
(Tignor, 1998: 31, Kandil, 2012: 94, 96). Failure of the Wafdist government, elected against the 
will of the palace, to deliver on its economic and political reform, added to the frustration. The 
ongoing negotiations over the presence of British troops in the country brought the military to 
the center stage, with both the king and the prime minister competing over its control. With the 
increased political and social instability in the country and rising nationalist fervor, the military 
was called in to restore order, adding much to its political influence. The Free Officers (FO),34 
one of the many secret groups within the ranks, capitalized on this resentful attitude towards the 
ruling elite and undertook a “revolution from above” (Hashim, 2015: 4) and founded a 
republican regime shortly after.  
The initial position of this political intervention by the military in 1952 was to undertake 
the role of the arbitrator for the impending political crises and to withdraw later to the barracks 
upon the successful installation of a new civilian-led political regime (Kandil, 2012: 94). 
Nevertheless, it became clear shortly after during military’s interim assumption of power that FO 
                                                 
33 For example, the required time frame for military training was cut in half during WWII (Tignor, 2016: 15-16). 
34 Eight out of the eleven core FO members joined the military academy in 1936 (Fahmy, 2001: 36). 
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members had divergent views of what should be done next. The Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC) was formed to be as representative as possible of the different service branches 
but power was ultimately concentrated in the hands of especially colonels Gamal Abdel-Nasser 
and Abdel-Hakeem Amer, along with few others from the infantry (Kandil, 2012: 101). 
Eventually, the RCC turned against the civilian political powers including those that supported 
the military movement in the first place (Beattie, 1994: 85; Abdalla, 2001: 46). This is because 
the RCC did not believe in the ability of political parties and elections to provide effective 
solutions to the country’s problems (Karawan, 1996: 109).  
Political activities were banned within the ranks after 1952 (Abdalla, 2001: 48; Fahmy, 
2001: 37). A process of military cleansing of all suspected officers, purging them off or 
reassigning them to non-military posts also followed through the newly created office of 
‘political guidance’ (Beattie, 1994: 86, Kandil, 2011: 108). This culminated in a number of 
confrontations, two of which took the form of a military standoff while one took place politically 
within the RCC itself resulting in President Mohamed Naguib’s resignation, symbolizing the 
final decision on the debate on whether the military should go back to the barracks or not, and 
Naguib belonged to the first camp (Ibid: 88-90). In addition, the size of the military greatly 
expanded with the admission of a larger number of non-commissioned officers, a move that 
aimed at augmenting coordination problems for any other attempted political interventions by the 
military (Kandil, 2012: 106). 
As Nasser (1954-1970) was increasingly taking over the political domain, he entrusted 
FM Amer to lead over the military and to keep it in check. In addition, Nasser also assigned 
Amer some civilian administrative and economic roles, including the head of the high dam 
project and the chair of feudal liquidation committee and of the land reclamation projects. 
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Nevertheless, Amer turned the balance to his own personal authority and this led to a duality 
within the regime. By time, Amer grew even more powerful with his extension of gifts to the 
officers to the extent that Nasser was incapable of removing neither him nor his cohort from the 
corps (Beattie, 1994: 125, Kandil, 2012: 147-8). This left Nasser powerless as concerns military 
affairs though still the supreme commander of the armed forces (Ibid: 161-2). In addition, the 
autonomous military under Nasser banned any role for the political organization of the regime, 
Arab Socialist Union (ASU) at the time or any communist indoctrination among the ranks35 
(Karawan, 1996: 112). Amer also tried to expand his political influence by appointing military 
officers to civilian posts in key state institutions though at times the appointment was taken as a 
punishment for the officer depending on the post. The number of appointments to civilian posts 
increased as Amer was aiming at creating a class of “officer-technocrats,” lending the military 
and its top commander decisive powers over, and by time expertise in, the management of 
civilian affairs (Brooks, 2008: 74-5; Karawan, 1996: 108; Beattie, 1994: 125; Kandil 2012: 152-
3). This political influence had grown over time to counter balance the political leadership the 
military was meant to endorse in the first place. In fact, the military leadership under Amer 
showed increased interest in wielding more of the political power for him, including the creation 
of political arms for the military – which did not materialize eventually (Brooks, 2008: 73).36  
The 1967 defeat from Israel and the subsequent conflict between Nasser and Amer 
culminated in a political defeat of the military, pushing it out of favor and of politics. The forced 
resignation of its personalist commander and its over-occupation with the desire for revenge for 
the defeat resulted in a coincidence between the internal attitude within the military and the 
political position of Nasser, who was shouldering a share of the problem in the eyes of the 
                                                 
35 The Soviet Union was the main arms supplier to the EAF since the late 1950s and over the 1960s. 
36 This move was met by the creation of a mobilizable youth organization within ASU, the third and most mature of three 
political organizations founded by Nasser (Brooks, 2008: 75). 
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professional officers for allowing the politicization of the corps in the first place (Karawan, 
1996: 113-4, Brooks, 2008: 113, Kandil, 2012: 194). Nasser’s first step was to purge Amer’s 
group from the military. Learned his lesson, he also restored the powers of appointment to his 
office and reconfigured the military institution in a way that allowed no ultimate power for any 
single commander, a strategy that was closely followed by his successors (Beattie, 1994: 212). 
He also dissolved the office of political guidance and made the reporting of the service 
commanders directly to him, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and formed the 
national defense council, which included other civilian and security ministers in addition to the 
president and the minister of defense so as to counterbalance the autonomy of the military 
regarding defense policy matters. Also, the ASU appointed civilian technocrats to replace the 
officers previously assigned to public sector companies (Kandil, 2012: 200-201). 
Sadat (1970-1981) continued in this very direction and added to it the frequent 
reshuffling of military leadership, so as not to allow for the rise of any counter center of power to 
his office within the military, and sharply cut the appointment of military officers to senior 
government positions (Kandil 2012: 232; Brooks, 2008: 117; Hashim, 2011a: 74; Campbell, 
2009: 79, 115). He also made sure to appoint commanders who were known not to be friends 
with each other and from among those who have no known political ambitions (Brooks, 2015: 
14). Although this strategy was meant to weaken the political influence of the military, it helped 
much in institutionalizing its existence and in overcoming Amer’s personalist legacy. The de-
politicization of the military manifested itself clearly in the subordination to the political 
decisions made by Sadat during the 1973 war, even while disagreeing with them the most. 
Sadat’s strategy was to aim for a limited military attack that would clear the road for a 
subsequent political settlement. This is while his generals were for a large scale sustained attack 
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(Kandil, 2012: 241; Brooks, 2008: 120). Following the war, Sadat constructed for himself the 
image of the hero of the crossing (of the Suez canal), directing the credit to the civilian, rather 
than the military, leadership. He also passed a law (35/1979) banning military leaders who 
participated in the war from undertaking civilian positions for the rest of their lives37, 
preemptively blocking the road for any political career for them (Kandil, 2012: 226, 271; 
Hashim, 2011a: 75; Satloff, 1988: 5-6). He also made it clear that the next war for the Egyptian 
military is the war of economic and social development, a message that was meant for the 
regional audience as well (Kandil, 2012: 273). 
This re-orientation of the role of the military was also internalized by the institution as 
was reflected in its own journals and publications, which, staring 1974, were geared towards 
highlighting the role of the military in the process of economic development while leaving out 
political content (Campbell, 2009: 96, 136). This economic involvement came in line also with 
the interest of the military in securing additional sources of revenue to sustain itself and the 
economic crisis in the country in the mid-1970s as a result of the war and the subsequent 
economic opening up under Sadat brought about negative impacts on the livelihood of the 
middle- and lower-rank officers as well as on the needs of the institution as a whole. The military 
also did not object to the accompanying political opening up for the West, especially as they 
were not happy with the presence of Soviet experts in the ranks during Nasser years (Hashim, 
2011a: 72). Therefore, the military became adaptive to the new political realities with the priority 
given to maintaining its corporate identity (Karawan, 1996: 115). This does not deny the fact that 
a number of officers, including some of the military commanders during the 1973 war, resigned 
                                                 
37 His vice president (and eventual successor), Hosni Mubarak (1975-1981), was one notable example as he served as the chief of 
the Air Force during the war. 
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in protest of Sadat’s policy positions, especially over his peace plan with Israel (Kandil, 2012: 
258, 265).  
Toward the end of the 1980s, Sadat was creating a “presidential monarchy,” one where 
he would tolerate political openness at the elite level but not to the extent that it would challenge 
his office, let alone to be inclusive of the masses (Hinnebusch, 1981: 444). The power of the 
office of the president can be compared to that of a monarch, where its decisions are not to be 
brought to discussion before any other civilian power, and whose support and legitimacy may 
come only and directly from the people through referenda (Karawan, 1996: 110). To achieve 
this, he pushed the military to be the sustainer of “order” rather than the promoter of “change,” 
both regarding his internal and external policy positions (Hinnebusch, 1981: 454). In return, the 
military did not resist its de-politicization as long as it secured access to the office of the 
president through formal and informal networks in a “military-political complex” (Fahmy, 2001: 
40-41; Hinnebusch, 1990: 193; Cook, 2004: 11).  
Mubarak (1981-2011) inherited Sadat’s political regime and preserved his position vis-à-
vis the military especially as he was behind the nomination of Abdel-Halim Abo-Ghazala, 
Sadat’s last minister of defense, in 1979. He, however, revitalized Nasser’s/Amer’s policy with 
the use of ‘retired’ officers in various civilian positions (Springborg 1987: 5-6; Droz-Vincent, 
2014: 701). On the other side, the military chief, who was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal 
under Mubarak, proved, however, to be politically ambitious and enjoyed increased popularity in 
the ranks. This is because Abo-Ghazala was able to expand on the privileges extended to the 
officers as well as launch a modernization program for the institution as a whole. This added to 
Mubarak’s challenges in consolidating his power considering also the strong demands for 
political liberalization in the early 1980s and the under-development of his ruling party, the 
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National Democratic Party (NDP) (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 34; Kandil, 2012: 313; Acemoglu et 
al, 2014: 13). In addition, Abou-ghazala grew powerful on the civilian sphere upon his 
appointment as a vice-prime minister and a chairman of the higher strategic committee in the 
government which oversaw national development projects. It remains, however, that Mubarak 
approved the expansion of both the military’s modernization efforts as well as the scope of its 
non-military activities (Satloff, 1988: 9-10). He made it clear multiple times throughout the 
1980s that the military is the ultimate line of defense against both domestic and foreign threats, 
clearest of which was during the 1986 riots by the riot control police (Central Security Forces) 
which the military suppressed (Ibid: 15-16). Nevertheless, when Mubarak attempted to trim on 
Abou-ghazala’s, and the military’s, growing powerful position by nominating his defense 
minister to become vice-president, the latter declined and preferred to continue serving as a 
military chief (Satloff, 1998: 10-12). With the presence of a popular and strong leadership in the 
military, Mubarak was in a position similar to the one Nasser faced with Amer. This increasingly 
competitive relationship was eventually brought to an end when Mubarak managed to remove 
Abo-ghazala in 1988 without much open resistance on the military’s side and replaced him with 
a quite uncharismatic, unpopular officer. Shortly after, in 1991, Mubarak promoted the-then 
commander of the Republican Guards, Mohamed Hussain Tantawy, to be his third and last 
minister of defense as he served in the office through 2013 (Kandil, 2012: 318, Chennoufi, 2016: 
50-51).  
The military post-Abo-ghazala, stepped back from the public sphere, urged by the high 
degree of debate and politicization of its policies and affairs, especially with regard to its MOBs 
and involvement in civilian projects (Ibid: 24). A “policy of separation,” between civilian and 
military affairs was therefore adopted with a basic premise of refraining from criticizing the 
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military by civilians, contributing to the increased autonomy of the military (Ibid: 32-33, 
Springborg and Stafkinas, 2001: 63). Parallel to this, the ruling NDP grew more powerful. 
Nevertheless, the regime stayed largely personalist in character and even its political institutions 
were more of channels for the management of patronage than of organized political interests 
(Geddes, 2003: 74). These networks of patronage were replicated by the secondary power 
centers in the regime with each having its own, sometimes intersecting, circles of agents (Henry 
and Springborg, 2010: 202). In the military for example, in contrast with the short tenures of 
military commanders under Sadat, the extended tenure of FM Tantawi (1991-2013) carried the 
potential of turning him within the institution into a shadow or a parallel principal. This became 
evident with Mubarak’s frequent reshuffling of the chiefs of staff and service commanders. 
While the presidential power of appointment may have limited Tantawi’s ability to build up a 
clique of loyalists within the military, it remained that Tantawi was the one to make these 
nominations and was also the one to control the promotions of the lower levels of command, 
which eventually make it all the way up (Campbell, 2009: 86).  
Mubarak, especially towards the end of his tenure, was increasingly relying on the 
ministry of interior38 to secure his regime survival, though the seeds can be seen under Sadat as 
well, and this meant a take away from the resources and the political influence of the military, a 
trend that was expected to continue if Gamal Mubarak was to succeed his father (Brooks, 2015: 
17). This made the alleged grooming of Gamal Mubarak to the office of the president disruptive 
of the political balance for the military; especially the possible loss of the formal guarantees of 
military’s autonomy as it will no longer enjoy a special access to the president’s office (Cook, 
2004: 13). 
                                                 
38 Towards the end of the Mubarak era, the ministry of interior, including the riot control police, mushroomed to a size that is 
comparable or even surpassed that of the military (Meitzner, 2014: 439). 
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Therefore, the political field in Egypt changed throughout its modern history in terms of 
the civil-military alliance and actors as follows: 
1. Civilian rule with military influence39 (1936-1953): the military vis-à-vis the king, 
political parties and the parliament, a growing bureaucracy, and an occupation force. 
2. Nasser’s personalist/military rule with technocratic civilian influence40 (1953-
1970): The military vis-à-vis the president, the political establishment in the latter phases 
of the regime, and an established and penetrated bureaucracy. 
3. Sadat’s regime (1970-1981): The military vis-à-vis the president, a weak political 
establishment, and an over-sized, politically-weak bureaucracy. 
4. Mubarak’s regime (1981-2011): The military vis-à-vis the president, the political 
establishment, a rising class of political-businessmen, a powerful security establishment, 
and an over-sized, politically-weak bureaucracy.  
 
7.3 MOBs and the Decision to Defect 
Colombo (2014: 2) believes that the higher the degree of institutionalization of the 
military, as in the case at hand, the higher its level of corporate identity and, therefore, the higher 
the levels of identification and pursuit of institutional interests. These institutional interests 
include, on the defensive side, the protection of the institution itself, protecting its social and 
political status, and preserving the resources for action. On the offensive side, the institution may 
seek to capitalize on the political opportunity available to expand its prerogatives. In the case of 
Egypt during the 2011 protests, the military aimed at defending the position of the institution in 
the political system. F.M. Tantawi ran the military and its institutionally owned MOBs while 
                                                 
39 Karawan (1996). 
40 Ibid. 
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heading also the ministry of military production41, making financial autonomy for the military a 
key resource for its independence within the political system42 (Barany, 2016: 140-1; Meitzner, 
2014: 443). The defensive posture during the crisis was facilitated by the availability of 
resources for action at the disposal of the institution, which through its control over land use and 
economic involvement, was believed one of the “powerful economic institutions in the country” 
(Ibid, 2014: 3). Therefore, it can also be said that the economic role of the military boosted its 
political influence (Springborg and Stafkinas, 2001: 62).  
The roots of modern MOBs go back to 1979 under Sadat. This, however, does not 
downplay the earlier experience of economic involvement of the military under Amer’s 
leadership. The latter’s personalist style in leadership, giving more weight to loyalty over 
discipline and meritocracy, led to an extensive use of material privileges to reward the officers 
whom he recognized as loyal or aimed at securing their support. In addition to these 
individualized privileges, in 1957, the economic foundation of the armed forces was redesigned 
as the main body for the management and extension of these privileges.43 The foundation came 
as the military’s counterpart to the civilian foundation established in the same year under Amer’s 
direction as well (Hatem and Sherbiny, 2015: 74-75; Brooks, 2008: 73). Amer’s economic roles 
and the appointment of active-duty officers to civilian positions accorded the institution much 
learning and experience in the economic and administrative domains. 
After the end of the 1973 war, Sadat decreased military spending, to give legitimacy to 
his initiatives for peace on the one hand and, at least partially, as a step to put limits on the 
political power of the military. Alternatively, he pushed the military towards greater economic 
                                                 
41 The ministers of military production and of defense (or of war as it was called in the 1960s) were separated after the foundation 
of the former as a separate body in 1966, when Nasser was trying to regain some control over the military away from Amer, and 
until 1976 (Campbell, 2009: 114, 116). There is also usually a civilian minster of state for military production. 
42 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1145162  
43 Later renamed the General Services Organization. 
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engagement, building on the legacy of the economic involvement of the military under Amer, to 
make up for these spending cuts (Satloff, 1988: 3; Kandil, 2012: 261). In addition, the large-scale 
development of MOBs came as part of the ‘peace dividend’ that was extended to the military to 
overcome the grievance over its stolen victory because of the disagreement with the political 
leadership on the purpose and means of the 1973 war and the management of subsequent 
negotiations with Israel (Springborg, 1989: 103). It can therefore be said that Sadat’s infitah, or 
economic open-door policy launched in 1974, was not confined to the civilian economy alone 
but found its way into the ways in which the military undertook its economic activities in 
collaboration with state and private sector business actors (Springborg, 1989: 110), making it 
also both a lab and a partner in his own economic policy platform. This was boosted by granting 
the military’s defacto control over the unoccupied lands of the country (accounting for more than 
90% of the total area of the country) (Henry and Springborg, 2010: 198).  
Therefore, following the 1978 peace accords and the ensuing political crisis in the 
country, there was a political desire to take away from the grievances of the military and to keep 
it financially secure while also keeping it busy. This was especially true considering the 
experience of the shah of Iran who was a close friend of Sadat and whom he received upon 
fleeing Iran following the success of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 as his military and 
expansive security establishment failed to defend him.44 These political and financial realities 
contributed to sealing off this extra-budgetary resource, i.e. MOBs, from political manipulations 
and guaranteed its extended life.  
An additional possible facilitating factor to be considered in understanding Sadat’s move 
to create MOBs is the influence of the concurrent Chinese experience in this regard. Egyptian 
                                                 
44 Sadat’s role during the Iranian crisis availed him a lot of credit in the U.S. that he was trying to normalize relations with (Stork 
and Reachard, 1980: 31). 
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MOBs were founded during a time when China was also both redefining its relationship with the 
United States and developing its own MOBs, a coincidence that suggests some mutual learning 
given the good relationship, especially in the military domain, between the two countries over 
the course of the 1970s. While Egypt was among the first countries to recognize the Communist 
revolution in China, bilateral relations got colder under Nasser in the 1960s as a result of China’s 
strained relations with the Soviet Union, Nasser’s closest ally. With Sadat’s growing friction 
with the Soviet Union, the relations between the two countries began to get warmer, especially 
with China’s bad relationship with Israel (Calabrese, 1991: 31, 53-4, 80). In fact, following his 
assumption of power, Sadat aimed to redefine Egypt’s foreign policy alliance45, moving closer to 
the United States46 and away from the Eastern Bloc (Beattie, 2000: 53), a similar trajectory to 
that of Deng Xiaopeng, then-Chinese Prime Minster47 (Calabrese, 1991: 81). During this time, 
China offered some military help and Mubarak, then-Vice President, paid an official visit and 
held bilateral talks over military upgrades and spare parts supplies (Ibid, 1991: 82). In the late 
1970s, unable to get further support from the Soviet Union and unable either to pressure the US 
to deliver on its promises of military finances and equipment supply fast enough, Sadat supplied 
the Chinese military with samples of modern soviet military equipment he obtained in return for 
Chinese military supplies. This helped with his political maneuvering on both the domestic and 
international arenas and in diversifying the sources of his military supplies (Ibid: 106-107, 132). 
Relations between China and Egypt seemed even stronger over the course of the 1980s upon 
Mubarak’s assumption of power and the frequency of official visits at the highest levels was 
                                                 
45 Initially, Sadat was swinging between both camps, the Eastern and Western blocs, while pressing for faster military shipments 
from either side, a tactic that was well received by the military (Tignor, 2016: 79-82). In fact, it was Sadat (who was upset 
because of the initial neglect of his signals for rapprochement from the US), and not Nassir, who signed the friendship treaty with 
the Soviet Union in 1971, before expelling the Soviet military advisers a year later because of the delay in military shipments, 
which were not resumed until fighting broke out with Israel in 1973 (Calabrese, 1991: 80). 
46 The official restoration of US-Egyptian relations took place in 1974. 
47 It is reported that the military rejected requests for American military bases in Egypt, a position Sadat was not to be able to 
overcome (Stork and Reachard, 1980: 31). 
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noted, which might suggest cooperation between MOBs on both sides during their peak times as 
well. 
 Under Mubarak, it can be said that while Amer managed to provide for the military while 
its political power was on the rise, Abo-ghazala came at a time while the military’s political role 
was increasingly under fire (Springborg, 1987: 8). This may have prompted Abo-ghazala not to 
work through or penetrate civilian bodies, as was Amer’s approach, but rather to compete with 
them (Satloff, 1998: 12). He also preferred to partner with the private sector, being more efficient 
and dynamic as well as capable of returning favors and exchange of expertise, as opposed to the 
increasingly bloated and inefficient state bureaucracy (Springborg, 1987: 14-15). With the policy 
of civil-military separation in effect and the changes in the political-economic atmosphere in the 
early 1990s, the military and its MOBs are no longer highlighted in state media or public 
discourse (Springborg and Stafkinas, 2001: 62). Mubarak repeatedly defended the presence and 
purpose of MOBs as they are used to provide for the military as an institution and to secure it 
against the economic turbulences and inflation the country was experiencing. MOBs also aimed 
at achieving self-sufficiency in strategic commodities and in military supplies (Roy, 1992: 703-
5), especially given the tight economic situation that cannot tolerate a heavy defense burden 
required by the military. He also described them to be small in size48, especially relative to the 
growing size of the national economy (Kandil, 2012: 321). By the end of the Mubarak’s tenure, 
the military has earned a reputation for being a “productive national institution” (Satloff, 1998: 
18). The military also geared some of its production, especially in the food industry, towards 
charity and provision for the needy, which was used during the few incidents of protests in the 
poor neighborhoods in Cairo, as well as during times of economic crises over the course of the 
1990s (Ibid: 14, Barayez, 2015). In addition to their ‘subsidization’ by the government in terms 
                                                 
48 Exact figures were never provided. 
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of inputs and taxation, MOBs were excluded by Mubarak regime from the privatization program 
and the institution was even allowed to run as a contender, especially in the sectors the military 
names strategic (Henry and Springborg, 2010: 198). 
Defense budget is reported as a single overall estimate in state budget and is handled 
through a special office within the ministry of finance that is entitled to managing military 
finances and details of its budget49 (Sayiegh, 2012: 17). The budget, however, largely draws on 
three major sources: state budgetary allocation for military expenditures, the annual military aid 
from the United States, and the extra-budgetary resources of the military, including its MOBs 
proceeds. In fact, military expenditures, according to SIPRI,50 went down from 10% of GDP at 
the end of Sadat’s tenure to less than 2% by the end of Mubarak’s and they remained largely 
constant in terms of their nominal value (and therefore, declining in their real value). In addition, 
the annual US military aid, the second major contributer to military budget worth $1.1 billion 
following the peace treaty with Israel, has been losing value as it comes in terms of equipment 
and training, the costs of which have been rising rapidly over the past three decades (Kandil, 
2012: 322). It can be inferred, therefore, that the contribution of MOBs to the military budget has 
grown over the years and it is what helps keep the military fulfilling its needs. MOBs can be 
grouped into51 52: 
1. Civilian production by the ministry of military production and its 16-affiliated companies, 
listed in presidential decree no. 1167/1975.53 According to law no. 49/1974, the parliament 
                                                 
49 According to the 2014 constitution, the national defense council is the entity where the details of the military budget is 
discussed, http://www.youm7.com/story/2017/6/21/3294131/عافدلا-سلجمب-لايصفت-عافدلا-ةرازو-ةنزاوم-ةشقانم-دكؤي-رماع-لامك  
50 https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex  
51 This listing is based on the analysis of the available issues of the Official Gazette of Egypt between the years 1942 and 2011.  
52 One estimate found “33 military-connected firms” listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange worth around 240 million Egyptian 
pounds, concentrated in the industrial, healthcare and food sectors (Acemoglu et al, 2014: 8-9). 
53 The number of companies grew to 20 as of 2014. 
http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/202270/141/595004/%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B7%D9
%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%89-
%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B9-
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delegates its law-making power in this domain to the president for a 3-year period and since 
then this delegation has been regularly extended.  
2. Specialized organizations within the military, including: 
① National Service Projects Organization: founded according to law no. 32/1979 for the 
purpose of undertaking developmental projects by the military. Its activities, run by 10 
specialized companies, range from food production to light industries and service 
provision.  
② Maritime Industries and Services Organization: founded according to presidential 
decree no. 204/2003, following the takeover of the Alexandria Shipyard, one of the 
oldest in Egypt, in a move to block its privatization, classified as a strategic asset by the 
military;54 
③ Land Projects Organization: founded by presidential decree no. 224/1982 to oversee the 
sale of lands owned by the military (presidential decree no. 531/1981) and to grant 
license for land use (law no. 7/1991, presidential decrees no. 152-153/2001) 
④ General Services Organization55 (laws no. 53/1951 and 281/1953, presidential decrees 
no. 5/1957, 1119/1964, 474/1962 and 195/1981), originally founded in 195156 for the 
purpose of providing discounted commodities and services for military officers and their 
families. It has become increasingly commercialized as the outlets for its own-produced 
commodities are set up as shopping malls, open for civilian customers.  
                                                                                                                                                             
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%80%C2%AB%D8%A7.aspx  
54 Similarly, National Nile company for riparian transport (Presidential decree no. 354/2009; originally a public-sector company, 
was taken over by the military on strategic grounds in 2010 - Minister of Defense decree no. 3/2010) 
55 Its name changed over time and by president. 
56 The economic military establishment was founded after its British counterpart during the re-negotiation of the 1936 treaty as 
part of the efforts on the Egyptian side to build a capable military force (Tignor, 1998: 40). 
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⑤ Medical Services Organization, in charge of running and managing military medical 
facilities while also extending its services to civilian patients. 
⑥ Engineering Authority, increasingly involved in the construction and management of 
highways and other civilian developmental projects. 
⑦ Any corporation57 established by the Minister of Defense or of Military Production 
(presidential decree no. 583/1980) and that targets the civilian market. These may also 
include partnerships with civilian business partners, both national and foreign ventures 
(under law no. 32/1977) (Marshall and Stacher, 2012; Ottaway, 2012: 4). 
⑧ Sports clubs, hotels, and conference and wedding halls that increasingly offer their 
services to civilians. They are organized by military branches and regions (Minister of 
Defense decree no. 68/2015). 
7.4 The 2011 Revolution 
What went above was a sketch of the relationship between the regime and the military as 
well as the financial interests of the military. Factoring in people in the relationship, the military 
was not directly involved in active repression, at least since 1967. Nevertheless, it controlled the 
supply of repression for the regime following the establishment of the republic in 1952. Initially, 
a number of military officers were entrusted with the creation of the security establishment, the 
main repressive tool of the regime, as part of the penetration of the state bureaucracy by the 
military (Kandil, 2012: 138). After 1967 and until the 2011 uprisings, the military also controlled 
the provision of conscripts for the riot control police (CSF), which mushroomed under Sadat 
(grew by 200% from a 100,000 in 1968), a trend that continued under Mubarak (Springborg, 
1987: 7; Springborg and Clement, 2011: 17). Few incidents of direct repression, however, can be 
                                                 
57 As opposed to organizations, which act as holding companies that require a presidential decree for their creation.  
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cited among them the use of military police against a few large landowning families protests in 
the countryside under Amer in his capacity as the head of the feudal liquidation committee 
(Beattie, 1994: 195). One major incident that marked the first clear act of military intervention 
for internal control came during the deployment of the military forces to quell the 1977 protests 
that broke out against Sadat’s economic policies and rising inflation. In fact, the military was too 
reluctant to take such a step because it did not want to tarnish its restored image after the 
crossing and decided to intervene but on the condition that Sadat would reverse his decisions that 
triggered the crisis in the first place, especially as its members have been among those negatively 
affected (Satloff, 1988: 6-7; Karawan, 1996: 115; Hashim, 2011a: 73). Another example was the 
use of the military under Mubarak, being the commander in chief, to refer a number of civilian 
opposition leaders to military courts (Abdalla, 2001: 54). 
But, it remains that the military stayed largely out of the daily processes of internal 
control in the post-1967 period and it did not develop a military “doctrine for internal control” 
either (Hashim, 2015: 10). This disengagement from repression is believed to have allowed the 
military to develop a better focus on its mission, corporate identity and institutionalization 
(Brooks, 2013: 213-4) and eventually made it easier for the military to distance itself from 
Mubarak’s regime as the 2011 revolution unfolded (Kandil, 2012: 4; Springborg and Stafkinas, 
2001: 64-66).  
In fact, January 2011 revolution did not come as a surprise. Preceded by a decade long of 
protests by political activists, labor unions, and other social groups, the protests in January 2011 
came as a culmination for the dissatisfaction with the policies of Mubarak and his ruling party, 
the NDP. The rising inequalities and the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime coupled 
with the manipulation of political life were among the grievances, against which the slogan of 
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the protests was “dignity, freedom, and social justice.” The lengthy tenure of Mubarak in office 
and the circulating news about preparing his younger son and influential leader within the NDP, 
Gamal, to succeed him in office, with the support of the security establishment and some 
influential business groups, added to the public resentment.  
Capitalizing on the success of the Tunisian Spring less than a month earlier, protests 
broke out in the center of the Capital, Cairo, along with some metropolitan regional centers on 
the national police day to protest police brutality and its tight grip over political life. Ending 
peacefully, and probably encouraged by the non-repressive reaction by the police, smaller and 
scattered protests resumed over the following two days but were received with more repression. 
The climax of the protests came on the fourth day, Friday Jan. 28th, which were massive, spread 
over most of the urban centers of the country, and were met with brutal repression. 
Overwhelmed and outpaced by the unexpectedly large number of protesters, police forces were 
ordered to retreat and eventually disappeared from the streets. Protesters decided to go on an 
open sit-in in the square(s) until the demands are considered by the government, reaching the 
point now of Mubarak stepping down, especially after the confirmed deaths of a number of 
protesters. The security vacuum in the streets and the attacks on police stations and prisons by 
some armed groups made no other option but for the military to intervene, on Mubarak’s orders.  
The arrival of the military at the Tahrir Square was cheered by the protesters, for one 
because it did not look like it was coming for repression and for another because of the military’s 
positive image, as opposed to the police, in the minds of average Egyptians. The military became 
in charge of internal security, a mission it has little taste for. Shortly after, on Jan. 31, the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) convened without Mubarak, its supreme leader, 
and issued a statement that it has no intention to stand in the face of people’s legitimate demands, 
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making it clear that the military is distancing itself from Mubarak. The following day, Mubarak 
delivered a televised speech where he promised to step down by the end of his electoral term, in 
six-month time, formed a new government led by the minister of aviation Ahmed Shafiq, a 
former air force commander and a friend of his, and appointed his confident Gen. Omar Soliman, 
head of the general intelligence, as vice president, a position that remained vacant for most of 
Mubarak’s stay in office. The speech, which came in an emotional tone, despite not up to the 
protesters’ expectations of his immediate departure from office, seemed to offer a good way out 
of the crisis. Shortly after, however, groups of thugs flooded the square, which was surrounded 
by the military and that stayed out of what came later to be known as the “Battle of the Camel,” 
signifying the military’s not taking the side of the protesters’ either. The protesters defended 
their control of the square but the incident reversed any achievements made by the speech.  
The standoff continued for another week, by the end of which, on Thursday Feb. 10th, 
Mubarak decided to air another speech that did not bring new to the table. SCAF issued another 
statement58, which communicated the message that Mubarak has to step down. With low spirits, 
protesters were getting increasingly hopeless. But right before the end of the following day, on 
Friday Feb. 11th, the newly-appointed vice president aired a brief and an unexpected speech in 
which he announced Mubarak’s stepping down and his assignment of SCAF to lead the country. 
It remains a mystery to know exactly what went on in the deliberations over these few hours, 
especially given the secretive nature of the Egyptian military (Brooks, 2015: 18). But this 
historic declaration brought an end to the protests, left Mubarak out of the picture, and brought 
the military back to the center stage after more than two decades of political disengagement 
(Hashim, 2011b: 124).  
 
                                                 
58 SCAF’s statements during the 2011 revolution can be retrieved from: http://www.sis.gov.eg/newVR/rev25th4/html/l04.htm  
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7.5 Conclusion 
The decision not to stand by Mubarak can be seen necessitated by the protection of the 
corporate interests and cohesion of the military institution (Brooks, 2013: 217). It was clear 
under Mubarak that the share of the military from the national budget was declining and it had to 
rely more on its own MOBs for the rest of its expenses and investments. This cannot be down 
played in the calculation of the stakes of defending Mubarak, who was gradually shifting the 
center of gravity in the regime away from the military (Springborg and Stafkinas, 2001: 62). The 
presence of such sources of revenue outside of budgetary allocations, outside regime control, 
made Mubarak’s departure from office more conducive to the interests of the military institution. 
Despite the fact that the military had to seek the presidential approval to push forward its agenda, 
i.e. to secure opportunities and to control and own resources, the management of these resources 
remained independent from regime control. This gave the military the chance to decide on where 
to stand and defection came out to be the option that maximized its institutional interests. This 
can also be understood in light of the fact that protecting ‘constitutional legitimacy’ became the 
declared target of the institution’s political intervention (Campbell, 2009: 156). Following the 
transition, realizing the significance of its constitutionally mandated role and prerogatives as well 
as to fortify its autonomy and independence even against the office of the president, it made sure 
to be at the table during the promulgation of the 2012 and 2014 constitutions (Brooks, 2015: 25). 
This was especially true given the fact that the tradition that, “men with military roots always 
inhabit the presidency” in modern Egypt can no longer be guaranteed (Satloff, 1988: 1).  
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8 CONCLUSION: MOBS AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
8.1 Summary 
The argument proposed before is that the chances for military defection from an 
authoritarian regime faced with mass protests are much higher when it controls its own extra-
budgetary resources, i.e. MOBs, independent from the regime. The rationale for this argument is 
that, all else constant, when militaries secure their financial independence from the regime, they 
become less motivated to defend it given that their independent financial resources can seal the 
institution off pressures during the crisis and provide it with resources for action during and 
following the transition. Given that much has been done on the techniques for coup-proofing in 
authoritarian regimes, this argument establishes the case for the need to consider the risk of 
defection from autocratic leaders. As much as dictators need to minimize the risk of a military 
uprising, i.e. coup-proofing, they need also to consider ways to minimize the risk of a military 
defection during a popular uprising, i.e. defection-proofing.  
This survey of the influence of the way in which MOBs of institutionalized militaries 
are owned and run in these five cases has been largely confirming to the hypothesis (see table 2 
below). In the cases where the regime maintained control over the management of its military’s 
MOBs, the military defended the regime’s presence in power and repressed the protests (as in the 
regime-dependent cases of China and Iran). In the cases where the military kept MOBs as part of 
its exclusive domain, even though it occasionally depended on the regime for protecting these 
MOBs against competition and to dominate over some strategic sectors of the economy, it had a 
higher degree of freedom of action and eventually defected from the regime, leading to its 
collapse (as in the regime-independent cases of Indonesia, Thailand59 and Egypt). While in all 
                                                 
59 The Thai military took over the government came in defection from the Prime Minister, but also in defense of the King. 
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these cases the development of MOBs did not come only as a result of patronage by the regime 
but also due to the insufficiency of budgetary allocations (except in the case of Thailand), the 
absence of regime efforts to divest these MOBs or to increase the defense budget can be taken as 
an attempt by the regime to turn these MOBs into tools of patronage over the military institution.  
 
 
Table 2: Summary of MOBs' Politics 
Dimension 
Cases of Regime-Dependent  MOBs Cases of Regime-Independent  MOBs 
Tiananmen Square 
Protests, 1989 
Iran Post-Elections 
Protests, 2009 
Indonesia’s 
Democracy 
Movement, 1998 
Anti-Thaksin Protests, 
2006 
The Arab Spring in 
Egypt, 2011 
Target 
Leader 
Deng Xiaoping (and 
the Chinese 
Communist Party) 
Re-elected President 
Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad 
President Mohamed 
Suharto 
Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra 
President Hosni 
Mubarak 
Leader’s 
Control 
over the 
Military 
Controls senior level 
appointments and the 
budget; and the 
military is penetrated 
through party 
membership. 
Nominates (to the 
supreme Guide) 
senior level 
appointments, 
proposes the budget 
as well as oversees 
the military’s (IRGC) 
social and economic 
roles. 
Controls senior level 
appointments, the 
budget, and   
oversees the political 
and economic roles 
of the military. 
In theory, controls 
senior level 
appointments and the 
budget but in practice, 
these powers are 
challenged by the 
effective power of the 
King and the Privy 
Council. 
Controls senior level 
appointments and the 
budget. 
Developme
nt of 
MOBs 
-Legacy of the 
Revolutionary war of 
the Communist 
Regime through the 
1940s. 
-Continued for self-
sufficiency and to 
supplement the 
budget. 
-Owned by the 
military as an 
institution, at 
different levels and 
service branches. 
-The party leadership 
controls decision-
making in the 
military and therefore 
MOBs were regime-
dependent until 
eventually divested 
in 1998. 
-Developed to absorb 
demobilized guards 
following the gulf 
war and to accelerate 
development. 
-Driven by the 
concept of ‘resistance 
economy’ and is 
taking over some 
privatized state 
corporations. 
-Owned by the IRGC 
as an institution. 
-The inter-mixed 
nature of the elite 
makes MOBs 
regime-dependent.  
-Legacy of the war of 
independence. 
-Continued as a result 
of chronic 
underfunding by the 
state. 
-Owned by the 
military as an 
institution, at 
different levels and 
service branches (in 
addition to active-
duty officers’ 
appointments to 
civilian positions). 
-The military had 
independent control 
from the regime in 
running its MOBs, 
though it depended 
on the president for 
political protection 
and for business 
opportunities. 
-Legacy of the 
military’s takeover the 
government starting the 
1930s. 
-Continued as a political 
and economic resource 
as well as to make up 
for any underfunding by 
the state. 
-Owned by the military 
as an institution. 
-The military had 
independent control 
from the regime in 
running its MOBs and 
was concerned about 
competition, 
privatization, and 
divestment by the Prime 
Minister. 
-Developed on 
grounds of self-
sufficiency and to 
accelerate 
development. 
-Drew on the 
experience of the 
economic 
interventions of the 
military in the 1960s 
-Owned by the 
military as an 
institution. 
-The military had 
independent control 
from the regime in 
running its MOBs, 
though it depended 
on the president for 
access to resources 
and for control of 
strategic industries. 
Military 
Behavior 
Repressed the 
protests. 
Repressed the 
protests. 
Defected but secured 
a safe exit for the 
president. 
Defected from the 
Prime Minister in an 
intervention on behalf 
of the king. 
Defected from the 
president. 
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8.2 Conclusions  
While the challenge was operationalized as mass protests in all five cases, the context 
has varied from one case to the other. While Iran, Thailand, and Egypt shared some similarity in 
terms of the rise of a new class of political actors, i.e. ‘militarized clerics’ in Iran and 
businessmen in both Thailand and Egypt, as one precipitating factor for the protests, the 
challenge in the Chinese case came as one of the outcome of the modernization process in the 
society. Only the Indonesian case is where the challenge was fueled directly by the impact of the 
Asian financial crisis. With regards to the causal pathways for ‘loyalty,’ and with the defection 
of the Egyptian and Indonesian cases in mind, it can be inferred that regime’s control over the 
power of the purse matters much more than maintaining only the power of the appointments, as 
in both cases the leader gave up on the first while maintaining the second. 
It is interesting to see that in the two cases of repression, China and Iran, MOBs took 
divergent paths afterwards. In China, there was an immediate crackdown on the MOBs, followed 
by a short-lived boom but with a stricter party control over them until PLA’s MOBs’ eventual 
divestment in 1998. This is while in Iran, IRGC’s MOBs show no signs of decline. They are 
rather growing at a faster pace, even after Ahmadinejad’s departure from office, adding to the 
corps’ political power and influence with the blessing of the Supreme Leader. Taken as such, the 
IRGC is expected to undertake a role similar to TNI’s ‘middle way’ in Indonesia, rather than 
staying strictly under the command of the civilian leadership in the regime as was seen in the 
Chinese case.  
On the other hand, following defection, the three cases of Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Egypt undertook different routes in the post-authoritarian/democratization phase, yet all were 
marked with, at least initially, with a heavy political role for the military. Thailand witnessed two 
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other military takeovers in 2008 and in 2014 in an attempt to block the political comeback of the 
‘Shinawatras.’ Not only that its MOBs expanded, but also the defense budget grew under the 
military, or military-backed, governments. This is while the military in Egypt, shortly after 
defecting and assuming the role of interim leadership, re-intervened in 2013 against the 
polarizing President Mohamed Morsi and a year after, the former head of the military, FM 
Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, ran for president in 2014, asserting the military’s guardian political role. 
EAF’s MOBs remain largely intact with the increased reliance on the economic resources of the 
institution towards civilian developmental projects. Indonesia, almost twenty years into the 
transition, seems to be the one case where the political role of the military is declining and where 
its MOBs are undergoing a slow, though relatively reluctant, process of divestment. 
It is also worth noting that the development process of both the military and its MOBs 
varied across the different cases. In China, Iran, and Indonesia, the roots of the military can be 
taken back to a war of independence, where in the first two the struggle was for the 
establishment of the regime while in the third the fight was for the declaration of the 
independence of the state/nation. Following the successful end of the struggle, the military 
generally remained subordinate to the civilian government in all three cases with occasional 
interventions in political and economic life. It remains that in the Chinese and Iranian cases, the 
military was also indoctrinated by the regime60. On the other hand, the creation of a 
professionalized military in both the Egyptian and Thai cases was done by the state itself. The 
military took over political power in both cases, a move that provided it with considerable 
economic and administrative experiences. Upon regime civilianization, the military remained 
autonomous against civilian politicians with a strong attachment to the king in the Thai case (the 
                                                 
60 While ideological indoctrination can be taken as an alternative factor in explaining the military’s repression of the protests in 
these two cases, it falls short of explaining the defection of the military from the communist regimes in East Europe for example.  
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Egyptian military abolished the monarchy). While it is true that this evolutionary process of 
civil-military relations, and eventually the decision by the military to repress or to defect, in 
these five cases cannot be accounted for exclusively through analyzing the degree of the financial 
autonomy of the military, this project makes the case for the consideration of the latter as a 
contributing factor in explaining the decision to defect. Several other factors have been heavily 
investigated in the literature, such as: the level of inter-elite connectedness, ethnic or ideological 
engineering of the military, protecting the integrity of the institution, and the cost of the 
application of repression to mass protests, among many others. That is our ability to understand 
the motivations of the military to politically define mass protest either as an opportunity or as a 
threat can be improved by expanding the number of casual factors of relevance.  
8.3 Implications 
Against the earlier survey of cases, it can also be said that MOBs can be categorized by 
nature, i.e. growing out of necessity and as part of the evolutionary development of the military 
institution itself as in the cases of China and Indonesia; or nurture, i.e. the cases where the 
military upon assuming power or being drawn to the orbit of power became involved in business 
activities, as can be seen in the cases of Thailand, Egypt, and Iran. There seems also to be a lot of 
cross-country cooperation and exchange of learning and experiences during the process of MOBs 
development, which took place largely during the Cold War, except for Iran. For example, the 
parallel economic and political re-orientation of both China and Egypt away from the Soviet 
Union and towards improved relations with the US, adoption of market economics, and the 
development of MOBs can be indicative of this cooperation. Iran also seems to have borrowed a 
lot from the Chinese military’s experience in developing civilian technologies and industries. A 
related question in this regard is whether there are militaries that are interventionist by nature 
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while others are not. This may suggest the need to revisit military interventions and to establish a 
distinction between the types of political interventions by the military to overcome the 
dichotomous ‘naming problematique’ in the field, i.e. whether the intervention is a coup or not. 
The fact that military defection, a political decision by the institution, is necessary for the 
disintegration of authoritarian regimes opens the door for the consideration of a pro-democracy 
capacity for the military.  
That said, military defection does not automatically lead to a functioning democracy, 
but rather to the reproduction of autocracy, or some form of a guided democracy. As defection of 
financially autonomous militaries strengthens their political positions, their retreat from political 
life will not be motivated only by the protection and immunity of the institution and its members 
and resources, but also by the stabilization of civilian political life. As can be seen from the 
experiences of Indonesia and Thailand for example, the increased empowerment of civilian 
politicians strengthened their position vis-à-vis the military in the first but not the second. This 
last point can be situated within the wider framework of civil-military relations and which 
dominates the other. In western academic literature and in established democracies as well as in 
some autocracies, the civilian dominates the military. Otherwise, the military takes over. But in 
some cases, including some democracies, the weakness of civilian institutions facilitates military 
interventions (Croissant, 2013: 269), encouraged by a “military mind” different from 
Huntigton’s professional soldier (Heidux, 2011: 252), one that assumes the role of guarding the 
state, sometimes even from its own government (Vatikiotis and Grandjean, 2014: 52). In fact, the 
significance of the presence of effective civilian political organizations can be seen in the 
political behavior of even generals-turned-presidents themselves, such as Suharto and Nasser, 
who, upon assuming power, created their own political organizations and tried to push the 
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military out of the political field. In addition, recalling the experience of both Sadat and Mubarak 
in Egypt, upon rising to power and acting in their ‘civilian’ capacities, they both managed to 
push for their own ‘civilian’ agenda vis-à-vis the military. 
 
8.4 Further Research 
While this study contributes to the move beyond coup-proofing in the study of civil-
military relations in authoritarian regimes towards ‘defection-proofing,’ two further areas can be 
pursued for further research. The first has to do with the reach of the project and it is about 
taking the hypothesis and to try to generalize it on the political behavior of militaries in 
authoritarian regimes in general, not only under the threat of transition through mass protests. 
The second has to do with the scope of the study and is about expanding it to include personalist 
gifts to complement the institutionalized MOBs covered above. This may come as a long-term 
project as it would require a thorough investigation of each of the authoritarian countries. 
The last point is particularly important as the originally proposed MOBs theory applies to 
institutionalized militaries, which may represent the minority among militaries in non-
democracies. This is because many dictators would aim at undermining the institutional 
autonomy of their militaries in their effort to minimize the coup-risk. Therefore, the study of the 
larger issue of financial autonomy of the military may require some further exploration of the 
types of rewards extended by the dictators to their militaries and/or to individual officers so as to 
arrive at comparable patterns across cases. Expanding the scope of the project and with a larger 
set of cases, one can complement the comparative case study analysis with either a comparative 
casual pathway analysis using fuzzy-set logic or a large-N statistical analysis, which would allow 
for better control of the alternative explanations as well as to assess the weight of the proposed 
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casual factor.
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